AdvaitaVedanta Website - Introduction

Shorter works by Nataraja Guru








The need for integrating the vast body of knowledge that men have been able to accumulate into a coherent whole is a subject that has begun to engage the serious attention of educators. Practical aspects of knowledge are now being stressed at the expense of the purer branches. Advanced studies now refer mostly to technological subjects. Universities turn out more and more experts or specialists. As a result, those aspects of higher knowledge which were covered by the term 'humanities' have been by-passed and left behind.

Except in a few places such as the Collège de France, the Institute for Advanced Studies of Princeton, or perhaps also in the recently started Committee on Social Thought under the University of Chicago, attempts at any serious integration of courses seem inadequate and negligible.

There is, however, at the present time a growing feeling for a fresh synthesis of knowledge, so that the sterility of over-departmentalization and the consequent lack of the human touch in education may be effectively stemmed. Specialization at least must not be for its own sake, but must serve some tangible end to produce a better-educated man.


Besides the UNESCO, which may be looked upon as an expression of the desire for a revised impetus to culture and science on a world-wide scale, there are at present many private foundations, both in the East and the West, standing for the same ideal. They adhere to varied programmes, some being overly scientific and others relying more on esoteric cultural values. A particular cosmology or a tacit dogmatic theology can be seen to be implied in many of them. Even the theory of evolution itself is being treated by some of them as an article of faith. They often become thus open to the objection that they tend to be dogmatic, sentimental or religiously pre-disposed. They would fall short of the requirement that any modern attempt at an integration of knowledge should be conceived on more positive or scientific lines.

Although senior professors of universities, who may be in charge of the admission of students for the higher courses, may be heard to refer to what they call 'intellectual formation' as a necessary prerequisite for following a certain specialized course, this expression remains still a very vague one. What precisely the expression is intended to convey may not be clear even as between one professor of a certain department and another who might belong to the same university. The expression as applied to inter-university standards generally becomes still more vague, because cultural backgrounds differ widely, not only between universities of the Old and the New Worlds, but even between universities of the same
continent or even country.

Eastern and Western cultural standards may be said to still lie poles apart. German universities each have an academic reputation and tradition all their own, and certain universities specialize only in select branches. Even in England, an Oxonian is expected to have a formation different from that of a graduate of Cambridge. In France, although the situation has been somewhat mitigated by the existence of the centuries-old foundation of the Collège de France, the 'intellectual


formation' demanded by a certain professor, even in the department of letters, may differ from the one required by another.

In India, which has no university tradition to call its own, but tries to graft Oriental culture on to the stem of Occidental classical tradition, the case for a preliminary intellectual formation for higher studies is in a sad state indeed. The influence, in itself not salubrious, of the non-idealistic and pragmatic tendency of the United States that prevails in the cultural world, as in many other departments of life at the present-day, is tending to further lower standards in cultural education. Measurement is being given primacy, and everything that does not lend itself to brass- or electronic-instrument experimentation or testing is tending to be discredited.

This influence, which is itself enough to dampen intellectual and moral enthusiasm for culture, works hand-in-hand at the present-day with that other tendency to be noticed in India, which gives primacy to localized cultural values. Linguistic preferences in the name of a pseudo-nationalism which encourages parochial loyalties and closed orthodoxies of different shades, are being allowed to compromise more or less completely the cause of the open and universal outlook necessary for any integrated education worth the name. In this connection it has been interesting to note that a group of Indian university vice-chancellors have recently been touring the United States of America seeking a formula for integrated education. From the report of their impressions, it would appear that nothing striking was discovered for adoption in India. In the United States themselves, we find a dissatisfaction which is expressing itself in the form of sporadic revolt by youth.


Whether we are concerned with 'basic' or 'fundamental' education for the emancipation, social or cultural, of the masses of the world; or think in terms of higher cultural


values of an idealistic non-utilitarian programme in education for the select few; it is highly necessary at the present time to visualize the scope and methods of integrated education more clearly than hitherto. We have to be able to think of common human values in the global context of one solid humanity.

There should no longer be cultural preserves or prerogatives which try to divide humanity into sheep or goats. The myth of the primitive or inferior man has to be abandoned. The orthodox and heterodox, the conservative and the liberal, the rightist and the leftist, must be able to meet in the endeavour to preserve the best human heritage that belongs to all. A common cultural language which would enable these precious values to be referred to, irrespective of linguistic or traditional barriers, has to be evolved, Such a mathematically-precise language would pave the way for the formulation of a regular science. Values preserved through humanistic studies could then be effectively cultivated without the arbitrary and sentimental barriers that history or geography might interpose between people. An open, dynamic and positive scientific attitude must invade the closed, static and private preserves in which higher human values have hitherto remained enclosed.

In other words, the challenge involved here is to bring the humanities and the human values involved therein back into line with the other scientific values which, for no just reason,have in recent years tended to be considered as if divorced or disjunct from the former.


In the days of Aristotle all wisdom-disciplines were more unitively understood than at the present-day. The term 'science' covered equally the whole range of subjects, starting from physics and natural history (or rather, natural philosophy), to metaphysics, ethics, economics and politics. The doctrine of the Mean which was Aristotle's contribution to thought, was a subtle underlying unitive principle which strung together branches of knowledge that have now come to be considered as different or disjunct from one another.


From the time when writers like Mill began to arrange cultural or economic notions on a less idealistic and more 'utilitarian' basis, the firm hand of classical unitive thinking based on such bold dicta as "It is in ourselves that we are thus or thus", and the singleness of human end or purpose in life, gave way to the hesitant and wavering attitude implied in such expressions as "not expecting more from life than it is capable of bestowing". Unitive values began to be confused with non-unitive ones. The right regulative or normative principle that related ends with means through deliberation began to be compromised. Horizontal or "here-and-now" values of an ontological nature were stressed at the expense of idealistic, ideological or vertical ones. The intuitive understanding of the doctrine of the Mean was lost for ever, and thus cultural enthusiasm began to flag.

If we could again think of science as including both moral and physical sciences, the task of finding a basis for integrated education could be more easily accomplished. Knowledge can direct its search outward from the seat of the mind or soul within us. The "eye of the soul", to use Aristotle's expression, can look 'positively' and 'objectively' into the world of the 'knowables', or subjectively or introspectively into values or virtues within the personality of man.

The latter has been known as the negative way which, by the eye of the soul directed inwardly, can still conduct 'auto-experimentation' by comparing common human experience of the a priori order. While the positive sciences are and actually objective, this negative science could still be 'objective' in discipline in a virtual or conceptual sense. The strictness of scientific exactitude in thinking need not necessarily suffer in the latter case. When proper terms have been fixed to refer to aspects of knowledge, the whole range of knowledge can be made to come under one science which could be called the Science of sciences. In fact this is what the Science of the Absolute (or brahma-vidya as such is called in India) claims to be. 'Knowledge' (jnanam) and "the knowable" (jneyam) are here to be distinguished, the first as negative and the second as positive. An epistemology and methodology based on a correct contemplative scale of values is here implied.


Some recent attempts at the integration of knowledge have proceeded from the variety of specialized analytic knowledge towards their synthesis. Thus there is the famous instance in which the top-ranking nuclear physicist Schroedinger makes a serious attempt to relate biology with chemistry and physics. In his booklet entitled "What is Life?" an attempt has been made to bridge the gap between inanimate and living matter. Later writers such as Andrew A. Cochran* have availed themselves of the quantum theory to establish a link between life and matter. Such attempts may be said to travel from the positive and overt aspects of reality towards the innate and subtle aspects, or from the positive pole to the negative.


Even while we speak in terms of poles, we have to distinguish two sets of poles as belonging to two distinct aspects of values or interests in life.

Reality, it must be remembered, is to be studied for the human interest in it rather than just for its own sake, without reference to human interests or values. All attempts at integration are for man, and not for knowledge itself. When we visualize the world of values correctly, we will be able to see a vertical series of values in which the positive pole is the world of pure reason or that of the Platonic Intelligibles. The negative pole of vertical values will be the prime means to the supreme end of attaining to the world of the Intelligibles, when understood unitively and synthetically. Thus there is a vertical world of pure values, and a horizontal world of material values.

*Mr. Cochran writes a very interesting and well-documented article on "The Quantum-Physical Basis of Life", postulating a basic hylozoism, with the 'wave' phenomena as the conscious aspect of matter, in the May 1957 issue of "Main Currents in Modern Thought".
(Journal of the Foundation for Integrated Education). Mr. Cochran is attached to the US. Bureau of Mines.


The building up of a cultural life in a person means the recognition of both these sets, while the doctrine of the Mean must constantly convert knowledge in favour of virtues. As we have elsewhere tried to develop, it is possible to bring Gold, Goodness and God to be comprised within the amplitude of a personal scale of values between the poles of which the life of man may be said to oscillate. The science of things taken in themselves, and considered without their fundamental value-import for man, is like a magnetic field, secondary to the main current along which life flows. This latter may be said to be along the vertical axis of pure deliberative values, by means of which man decides to affiliate himself to a good life. Actual physical life is of the nature merely of an epiphenomenon to the real-life interests normal and legitimate to man as Man.


It is a recognized fact, tacitly understood already in the East as well as in the West, that man himself is the proper subject of study. Atmavidya (Self-knowledge) in India has been treated as the same as Brahma-vidya (the wisdom of the Absolute). Ananda (happiness), as a Supreme End or Value in life, has also been treated as in effect the same as the Self or the Absolute. Thus the key for integration of knowledge of wisdom is to be found in the human personality itself, where the subtlest aspects of wisdom find a natural home. The Self is the most precious of values for man, and the "mahavakyas" (Great Dicta) such as "Thou art That" signify this supreme point of culmination of all integrated wisdom.

With such as the target before them, it is encouraging to note that even physicists like Schroedinger have made some first efforts to bring these divergent aspects of human knowledge into integrated relationship. A contemplative Science of the Absolute, conceived in terms of Self-knowledge, could include the Chief End or the Final Good on the one hand, and the negative or prime counterparts of the same in actual life on th eother, within the range of an integrated Science of sciences combining ontological and ideological values. Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean could then be understood in terms of "samya"


(sameness), which is the central doctrine of such Eastern texts as the Bhagavad Gita.When both are properly grasped without prejudice, culture would tend to be integrated and understood in unitive and universal terms.





This study is devoted to exploring the possibility of a scientific language. To think of the whole range of science as one integrated unity is itself a task that has engaged great minds from antiquity to recent times, without much definitive result. The approach so far has been more speculative than scientific in its full sense. A language that would have such a character as to serve effectively as a common basis for the whole range of sciences, experimental or normative, physical or 'metaphysical', as we ought to understand by the term 'Unified Science', is not easy to conceive. Of all the names of thinkers of old who had the ambition of accomplishing this impossible-seeming task, that of Leibniz stands out as one who came nearest to laying the philosophical, logical and mathematical foundations of a "universal language".(1)
This was to counteract the confusion of vernacular tongues.


Even he did not live to see the great ambition of his youthful days accomplished.

In spite of the apparent difficulty and enormity of the task, it is our contention in this study that a simple approach is still possible along the lines that Leibniz indicated. Here we are thinking in terms of normalisation and 're-normalisation' of what constitutes a 'unitive' approach to linguistic activity understood in the context to which it has properly to belong.

A scientific language that is all ready-made for use is not our aim in this study, nor even a scheme that has been worked out in detail to be considered as a blueprint for a universal language that could be adopted without further pains. This study is merely a contribution to a more fruitful discussion of this subject in which there is much interest shown, both by qualified and unqualified persons. Over-speculative, unscientific and pseudo-scientific attitudes in this alluring field have to be discountenanced.

A scientific language, in order to be truly so, must firstly be one that itself can claim scientific validity. It must not disrespect the requirements of a correct epistemology and methodology. Both science and philosophy seek truth behind appearance: both aim at serving humanity by the serious pursuit of worthwhile interests. What gives unity to science in this inclusive sense is the common human purpose that runs through its methodology, epistemology and axiology.

Language lives and moves in that axis which is concerned with reasoning which links visible realities with the rational,intelligible or the calculable, or what lies beyond its scope, understood by such terms as the 'Absolute'. Although the absolutist way of thinking does not at present enjoy much recognition by strict scientific thinkers, an expression that has necessarily to depend on this notion is taking a large place in recent scientific literature, viz. Relativity. Side-by-side with those who denounce 'metaphysics' (whatever they understand by it) as 'non-sense', opposite trends are also becoming more and more evident. (2)

Secondly, a scientific language must be suitable for communicating to others, whether scientists or common men, truthful information about the problems, methods and


results of valid and precise knowledge of the required degree of certitude. It should not itself tend to become a closed and static jargon understood only by specialists of the same group. A certain public character and openness tend to make ordinary language more scientific. Universal communicability across geographic and linguistic frontiers is a necessary condition that should distinguish scientific language.

Thirdly, scientific language cannot afford to be merely a symbolic language of logical or mathematical abstractions. Unilaterally-applied symbolism makes language a puzzle to solve, as in the schoolboy riddle of A being the brother of B but B not being so. The fact that A and B are of two sexes is not revealed by symbolism as directly as in common language.
The 'meta-language' that some propose for a scientific language has innate defects of this kind. We shall examine the case of symbolic logic in this connection. Here we indicate in advance that, as when we name an object and call a spade a 'spade', there must be two sides that must come together and fuse before meaning can emerge. The actual thing, determined by its properties like form - and its name, which is a conceptual factor - come together to result in a meaningful event in consciousness. The elements of a symbolic meta-language have to be put in relationship with what we could with equal justice call a proto-language to result in a naturally meaningful language with validity and legitimacy.
The apodictic or other certitude on which scientific language has to be dependent, could result only when name meets form. The three desiderata of a scientific language are thus that it should be a language of science, for science and through science.


Language tallies with thought, and the requirements of thinking or reasoning in turn determine the nature of any language. Science and philosophy have much common ground between them. Instead of scientists trying in vain to


banish metaphysics as non-sense and philosophers excluding the matter-of-fact and considering science with mistrust, the language of unified science must try and adapt itself to the requirements of science and philosophy. There could be scientific philosophy as well as philosophical science, just as there could be psycho-physics and physiological psychology.
All science, being an experimental discipline, must have much of the matter-of-fact entering into its composition, while its inductive aspects may be said to be more philosophical in character. Thus we could think serially of three kinds of subject matter comprised within what is scientific; viz.: scientific philosophy, the science of science, and philosophical science. Linguistically speaking, the first-mentioned group relies on proto-scientific aspects which call for no proof; the second group hardly depends on inference, except for the mostdirect kind, as when we say the colours of the spectrum are due to the breaking up of white light; and in the third group its apodictic quality is derived from some meta-scientific theory such as that accepted for the purposes of quantum mechanics. We should thus be justified in referring to scientific language in a manner corresponding to its subject-matter, as either proto-linguistic, normal or formal, or meta-linguistic in character. That apodictic certitude with which a man calls a spade a 'spade', and that down-to-earth certitude with which human children take for granted (whether by a priori or reasoning) that 2+2 = 4, come together in a certain manner of independence and interdependence to result in the meaning-certitude of scientific language. This subtle double, or as we shall clarity later, origin of language, forms the theoretical basis of this study it is our task to elaborate and clarify further in the pages that follow.


Why a rose is called a 'rose', or by its corresponding term in any particular language, does not call for any proof. In like manner, the relation that is implied in the linguistic context between what we have tried to distinguish as the proto- and the meta- aspects of any language on which the structure of language itself is based, does not call for any proof in the


usual sense. Validity is not to be sought through inference as is usual in syllogistic reasoning. A certain non-arbitrariness and intrinsic compatibility, when respected, shows itself directly, and conviction is already there immediately before forms of mediate inference could operate. It is to the credit of L.Wittgenstein to have worked out the implications of this statement in recent years. What he states in the context of logic and philosophy becomes all the more true in the context of the structure of linguistic thought:

"4° 121. Propositions cannot represent the logical form: this mirrors itself in the propositions.
That which mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent.
That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language.
The propositions show the logical form of reality.
They exhibit it." (3)

Language must correspond to the form of the thought that is implied in its expression. (4) We suggest here that the validity of the impression-aspect of language, as distinct from its overt expression, lies deep in human consciousness where axiomatic laws of thought, on which all thinking itself has finally to rely without room for contradiction, but, as it were, tautologically and always with sufficient reason, are found.


In the familiar linguistic context of the classroom the school-master might put a dot on the blackboard and represent it, with maximum non-arbitrariness and sense of correctness possible, by the letter "p" (or any other corresponding initial of the language he is employing). A student who would stand up and ask for the proof of it would be making a fool of himself.
Although the selection of the name is arbitrary, a maximum possible attempt has been made, without disrespecting any law of thought hitherto recognized, in the direction of non-arbitrariness. If he had used a letter of the Greek alphabet


instead of a vernacular one, it would perhaps have been more scientific in that there was a greater effort at de-Babelization. Sanskrit letters could have been used for indicating levels of contemplative consciousness with equal justice. Somehow a meta-linguistic aspect and a proto-linguistic aspect have to come together for a precise meaningful situation to emerge. What is important for us to note at this stage of our study is that, in the most primary of linguistic situations in view of a scientific language already in vogue in the scholastic world, we have a visible or perceptual aspect brought into contact with a conceptual aspect of the same reality. In the mathematics class the schoolboy might come to know, in a limited context, the meeting of algebra and geometry in the use of the language of Cartesian co-ordinates. School-room mathematics now comprises such notions as the group, the field, vector space, homomorphism, isomorphism etc.(5)

Starting from naming a point, to communication through vectors, scalars and tensors, the requirements of scientific language range between micro- and macrocosms, analytic and synthetic thought.


Ordinary everyday language has to do mainly with observables. Linguists have used the expression 'thing-language' and the 'language of handling action' in referring to this ordinary workaday world in which linguistic intercourse among humans thrives. Then there is the world of the 'calculables', which has a more theoretical or a non-physical reference or status in reality. In the latest mathematical language these two aspects have been referred to as proper and improper elements. (6) Whatever be the full implications of this kind of mathematical language - which is still in the process of being perfected by those who want to use it for scientific purposes such as that of the relativity theory and of quantum mechanics - all we want to derive for the purposes of our study here is that science is the resultant of the summation or the multiplied product as between proper and improper elements, and that what emerges finally out of science


generally, is something that could be stated, either in correct ordinary language of everyday life or else in terms of a verticalized version of the same which refers to improper elements. Hume, as we shall see presently, would refer to these aspects as quantity and number. (7) Just as the sum and product of mathematical elements could be said to have independence and interdependence at the same time, the two aspects of thought enter into the composition of scientific language. Three kinds of connections between ideas have been recognised by Hume when he says:

"To me there appear to be only three principles of connection among ideas, namely: resemblance, contiguity in time or place and cause or effect" (8)

If we add to this analysis of association of ideas of Hume what is more fundamental, which as he himself said, pertains to either quantity or number, we shall be able, with these factors in mind, to reconstruct for ourselves a schematic and proto-linguistic pattern of the global unit of integrated thought. This we shall attempt to do progressively after other epistemological and methodological aspects have been discussed. Here we have to note in passing that out of the four relational factors above, two could apply to the proper and improper aspects of ideas. There could be innate causes and effects as well as causes and effects that belong to the existent experimental aspect. Scientific language in the meeting place of the experimental and the theoretical, corresponding to quantity and number respectively. Resemblance of past memory with future imagination would belong to contiguity of time rather than of place. The provability of the completeness of this enumeration was doubted by Hume himself, but with the help of a schematic proto-language, the validity of the list of factors becomes at least more certain. (9)


Bertrand Russell, writing on the importance of logical form in "The Encyclopaedia of Unified Science" says: "The old view that measurement is of the essence of science would therefore seem to be erroneous." (10) This revision of an old view he


arrives at because, as he points out:
"It follows that the laws of macroscopic physics are topological laws, and that the introduction of number through co-ordinates is only a practical convenience."

What we should note here is that mathematics has arrived at topology after many vertical stages of abstraction and generalisation and, just as the general theory of Einstein does not contradict but includes the special theory, so the idea of mathematical intrapolation and extrapolation could enable us to see that scientific activity could be understood schematically at different levels of abstraction or generalization, or both, and that the old notion that science is measurement, is fundamentally not true when quantitative as well as qualitative aspects of number are admitted into the scheme.

The primitive pattern of a simple but typical scientific activity could be derived from a simple classroom example. The length, breadth and height of a table, determined with the help of an arbitrarily fixed unit of length, results in ordinary initial knowledge about it for practical purposes of classification or communication. Here the table itself is an 'observable' and the measurement, especially with arbitrary units, in spite of a rod of platinum existing in Paris or London, is a speculative, theoretical and non-empirical operation. Language may be said to participate on one side with brute actualities and on the other with elements opposed to perception diametrically, or at least by a vectorial angle of 90°. Whether with or without measurement or reliance on number quantitatively, the principle of what number represents as an 'improper' element and what in principle again the actual table represents more 'properly', yield that apodictic certitude that belongs intrinsically to scientific language. Between observables and calculables, conceived as pure mathematical elements, all scientific activity is thus comprised.


From the simple instance of measuring a table we could pass on to other examples of a graded order in which the two

elements that we have tried to distinguish enter into combinations of different degrees or proportions with modalities entering in as a distinct factor. If we should take the case of the spectrum, we know that it is, in the first instance, to be understood as equated to white light. It is as good for science to say that white light is formed from spectral colours as conversely to say that spectral colours form white light. As knowledge there is reversibility, but experimental reversal implies different experimental arrangements. Here the white light and the colours belong to the same grade of psycho-physical abstraction; while if we should say that each colour of the spectrum has its wave-length of radiation indicated by different numbers, the relation is between a set of observables and a set of calculables. There was no proof needed in the conviction that white light was the same as spectral colours and vice-versa, when stated in language; but the apodictic nature of this direct conviction becomes overlaid by more complicated experimental and inferential steps in order to be able to equate and understand each colour in relation to its wave-length. The inductive and deductive abstraction as between observables and calculables becomes more complex but retains its structural identity of form. In calculated predictions, later proved experimentally, we have probabilities that sometimes tally with possibilities. Except in axiomatically-valid laws, observables and calculables can enter into the fabric of the language of science, giving threadbare or one-sided theories or hypotheses which later get revised or revalued with more calculable or observable inventions or discoveries. The falling of an apple in the garden was the only observable element on which Newton erected the theory of Universal Gravitation with calculations derived from the writings of Kepler, Copernicus and Galileo. In Darwin's Theory of Evolution we do not know whether it is life or organism that evolves. He never claims to have observed a monkey changing into a man; nor has he been able to show the process experimentally with any direct evidence other than to give instances which resemble natural selection, the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest under artificial conditions - and the rest of the evidence consists of


museum specimens studied in the light of the theory. As there are rival theories by scientific men like Lamarck and Russell, and rival philosophical versions of evolution in the "Creative Evolution" of Bergson, besides the parallel evolution theory - the scientific status of Darwinism is not on very firm ground at all. As it presents a picture of change on quite other lines than that contained in the scriptural version in Genesis, evolutionism has attained in the popular mind the status of an anti-religious doctrine of scientism. There is a just proportion in which observables could be mixed in science with calculables; and when the balance is lost one gets pseudo-scientific literature between whose nonsensical verbalisms and the verbalisms attributed to classical metaphysics there would not be much to choose. Promiscuous mixing of the observable and the calculable elements in scientific language leads to absurdities, of which Eddington gives a striking example:

"I am standing on a threshold about to enter a room.
It is a complicated business. In the first place, I must
shove against an atmosphere pressing with a force of
fourteen pounds on every square inch of my body. I
must make sure of landing on a plank traveling at
twenty miles a second round the sun - a fraction of
a second too early or too late, the plank would be
miles away ... These are some of the minor
difficulties. I ought really to look at the problem four-
dimensionally as concerning the intersection of my
world line with that of the plank. Then again it is
necessary to determine in which direction the entropy
of the world is increasing in order to make sure that
my passage is an entrance, not an exit." (12)

It is easy to see from this extract that between the rival claims of science and common sense, instead of certitude of any kind, puzzlement results, which defeats the purpose of scientific language altogether. We have to beware as much of the false shadows of science, to use the expression of Dr.Holton cited above, as of the false doctrines of metaphysicians.


The Pythagoras theorem could be proved either theoretically or practically. Mixed methods could perhaps be devised by those who know how to play with mathematical axioms and postulates and rules of inference, but the mixing of methods leads to various grades of pseudo- or non-science. In such matters as determining the specific gravity of bodies, it is a relation that is established in the form of an equation based on experimental data which gain primacy; while in formulating the law regulating the increase or decrease of the entropy of the universe, the languages of science and philosophy are indistinguishable. With the canons of Mill being based on agreements and differences; agreement and difference treated together with residual and concomitant variations seem to refer to subtle laws of reasoning which give proportion, balance or harmony as between the two aspects of reality based on the observables and the calculables that we have distinguished. For the purposes of this study we prefer to think in terms of normalisation and re-normalisation (13), instead of thinking in terms of the canons of Mill which might be intended for the same purpose. Normalisation would presuppose the notion of a normative factor which it is the aim of this study to postulate in connection with a scientific language as we understand it here.


Just as in biology plants or animals are classified and named by their characteristics that are primary or secondary with reference to some central representative of a family, genus or phylum; so scientific language would require that a central, neutral and normative principle or notion should be postulated, balancing justly the two factors that, we have seen, enter into the composition of scientific thinking. Language has to concern itself with the mind and matter with which science itself is concerned, and the normative principle has to be neutral as between the mental and the material, the 'psychic' or 'physical'.


We know in recent times of the school of scientific philosophers who called themselves Logical Atomists. Influenced perhaps by the monadology of Leibniz, atomism postulated a unit-entity as a basis for their discussions of questions of a thematical, logical or philosophical import. Precise notions about it have to be derived from the "Principia Mathematica" of Russell and Whitehead, which deals with logic and mathematics as having the same principles. Logical atomism speaks of the distinction between 'atomic sentences' and 'molecular sentences' which result from the union of a unit atomic sentence. Earlier, Wittgenstein, while still under the influence of Russell, put more order into the concept of logical atomism when he said:

"1°13 The facts in logical space are the world.
2 What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
2°01 An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things)" (14)

The unit of logical thought is an atomic sentence round which philosophy and logic was built. James and Russell also agreed in calling themselves 'neutral monists', thus attempting to formulate a normative notion which was neither mental nor material for their philosophy. (15)

The very reference by Wittgenstein above to 'logical space' postulates a psycho-physical entity in which logical activity could have its being. That the concept is not totally without reference to the bodily aspect and the purely metaphysical, is clear from the fact that it belongs to the context of logical empiricism. This double expression is expressly meant to stand for that union of the two aspects which are the same as in the expression 'neutral monism' which we have just examined. The psycho-physical character of this entity is evident from Russell's own words when he writes:

"Thus from both ends physics and psychology have
been approaching each other and making more and
more possible the doctrine of 'neutral monism'
suggested by William James' criticism of consciousness."


He goes on to make the position of this school of thought clearer than ever when he adds in the same paragraph,

"I think that both mind and matter are merely
convenient ways of grouping events. Some single
events, I should admit, belong only to material groups,
but others belong to both kind of groups and are
therefore at once mental and material. This doctrine
effects a great simplification in our picture of the
structure of the world." (16)

Although presented in the usual dogmatic form after the manner of older metaphysicians, without reference to any experimental evidence, it is possible for us to see that logical empiricists generally are already committed to the recognition of a neutral entity which is a kind of absolutist abstraction, neither belonging wholly to any one of the two rival worlds of physics or metaphysics. While this view simplifies matters, it is still open to the charges of a priorism, solipsism and arbitrariness, insofar that it is a doctrine that is asserted. Logical or linguistic structure generally could be examined more scientifically through observational situations of experimental status such as those we are outlining below.


If the indirect evidence of pointer-readings is acceptable in scientific experiments proper (which themselves depend on evidence many degrees removed from the direct observation of events), we may ask legitimately why introspective experimental situations could not be relied on to give us the same degree of scientific certitude that differentiates science from speculation. If a certain botanical specimen is available as a weed it is not necessary to grow it in a special herbarium. In common human life there are common human linguistic situations which have experimental value if the method of experimentation could be applied to them, even introspectively.


Scientific philosophers like Bergson have both relied on schematic proto-language, as understood in this study, and have also made use of the study of experimental situations to give validity to the discussion of factors of psycho-physical import. He puts the question:

"J'écoute deux personnes converser dans une langue inconnue. Cela suffit-il pour que je les entende? Les vibrations qui m'arrivent sont les mêmes qui frappent leurs oreilles. Pourtant je ne perçois qu'un bruit confus ou tous les sons se ressemblent. Je ne distingue rien et ne pourrait rien répèter. Dans cette même masse sonore, au contraire, les deux interlocuteurs démèlent des consonnes, voyelles et syllabes qui ne se ressemblent guère, enfin des mots distincts.
Entre eux et moi, où est la difference?"

(Editor's Note: what follows, is a tentative translation by us, as are similar passages below.)

("I hear two people conversing in an unknown foreign language. Is that enough for me to understand them? The vibrations which come to me are the same as strike their ears. However, I only hear a confused noise which all sounds the same. I can distinguish nothing and could repeat nothing. The two people talking, on the contrary, can hear consonants, vowels and syllables which are not alike and which make up distinct words. What is the difference between them and me?")

After tracing minutely and in detail the insurmountable difficulties that intervene between the physical fact of sound-impressions and their understanding as language Bergson states:

"Ainsi se déroulerait dans notre conscience, sous forme de sensations musculaires naissantes, ce que nous appellerons le schéma moteur de la parole entendue." (17)

("This is how what we could call the "schéma moteur" for understanding words develops within our consciousness in the form of nascent muscular sensations".)

(Note that the term 'schéma moteur', roughly translated as 'motor scheme', which is used innumerable times throughout the Guru's works, was almost always left untranslated by him and so by us, the same applies to the term 'élan vital', more or less translatable as 'vital impulse'.cf. inf. ED)

Thus we see already strict scientific philosophers employing a new kind of introspective experimentation which must be considered at least as valid as the indirect evidence of pointer readings in physical laboratories.


Russell's norm of logical atomism, belonging to the philosophy of neutral monism, as he calls it, and Bergson's effort to establish a 'schéma moteur' in the context of his philosophy of change and becoming of the 'élan vital', are recent attempts on the part of philosophers who are fully scientific in their outlook to arrive at a normative notion that would be free from the one-sided epistemological reference of classical speculations. Why should we not improve on this kind of approach by accentuating the experimental character more consciously and with greater scientific exactitude? By way of showing the possibilities that lie in this direction, and since language itself thrives where mind and matter meet, we shall give here an outline of experimental situations which would


yield us a greater degree of certitude than hitherto possible about the structure of linguistic consciousness. In doing so we shall try to keep as close to that fully scientific but as yet little-favoured branch of knowledge called psycho-physics, into whose domain both the logical atom and the élan vital should belong. We shall divide our experimental situation into two phases for making two sets of observations that properly belong to the observable and calculable worlds which meet in a unitively-conceived psycho-physical event in terms of common human consciousness:


Think of two persons in a dark room. (18). Let us call them A and B. A says to B , 'Who is there?' B retorts with the same question, 'Who are you there?' The possible basic response of either or both of them would be contained in the common personal pronoun 'I', which could apply equally to anyone.

The important condition to note here is that all visual and other impressions are meant to be eliminated except the auditory linguistic link. The observables are eliminated here by the condition of darkness; and the calculables, which have their roots in the sense of hearing which leads to meanings of a conceptual order which refer to central as against peripheral objective realities, are isolated for epistemological analysis so as to arrive at a complete scheme of the structure of the thinking process that is to be understood as implied in language.

It is true that the voice of the two persons who communicate without visual impressions might contain certain physiological elements related to the past habits or tendencies of the person, giving him a certain individuality related to his memory aspect. The memory of the past might be said to determine in some indirect way the future conduct and the imaginative side of that person, giving him imaginative or futuristic orientation of the normative entity, whatever it might be called. This aspect could also give personality or individuality to A as distinct from B. But the intention of the


experiment is to give primacy to the central, invisible, subjective aspect of the personality. Peripheral or marginal factors which belong to the visible are meant to be eliminated in this phase of the experiment. Between the persons A and B, as they carry on a conversation, different grades of pure or practical memory or imaginative factors might enter into the common consciousness of both. The ideas may be said to move in a trans-subjective axis which for taxonomic purposes (which we shall justify more fully later), we shall call the vertical axis.


Now let us change the conditions of the experimental observational situation. A neutral observer or witness, 0, may be thought of as switching on a light in the same dark room. The visible aspect of the reality of the situation now becomes added to the auditory, which had a content belonging to the world of the calculables. The auditory content is not abolished, but a new dimension, depending on the perceptual, peripheral or more 'objective', is imposed on the original stem of the trans-subjective aspect, while the trans-subjective remains intact like stars during daytime. The physical peculiarities of A and B gain primacy and prominence, and sex, complexion, stature and other particularities that are specific and empirical in content emerge into the situation. One could examine the fingerprints of A or B to accentuate their individuality to its limits. Here the specific factors happen to be overt and not innate. They may in a sense be called outer ones as opposed to the innate or subjective ones of the first phase. This we shall refer to as the inter-physical. To put the line of demarcation between the two aspects would take much more discussion than what we might at first think. We could think of different grades of conceptual, perceptual or actual factors claiming primacy in consciousness at a given time. It would be impossible to isolate them and study their characteristics and modes of combination without going still one step further into the implications of this second phase of our experimental situation. Let us suppose now that A or B or both are using telescopes or microscopes to aid their vision


and are interested in the outer limits of space or the microscopic structure of matter as we can know it. They speak about what they are interested in to the neutral observer or witness 0. Now we are ready to extract the linguistic situation implied. In the consciousness of the neutral observer, language makes certain impressions which are events of a psycho-physical order of reality reduced into abstractions of a linguistic order. (19) It is not the actuality that matters any more but the conceptual aspect only. Between the trans-subjective concepts of the first phase and the inter-physical concepts of the second phase there is linguistic parity vertically and a 'strangeness' - if we may use a term borrowed from particle physics to express tentatively what we mean. Both these have the same status linguistically in the consciousness of the neutral observer. The inter-physical aspect thus isolated without full justification, which is to follow, we shall call the horizontal axis.


On the light being switched on, the specifically overt or the objectively perceptual aspects of A and B stand revealed. Their memories and imaginations give them a trans-subjective dimension; and their physical power of seeing objects as such, in true or false light, is an inter-physical or horizontal dimension, measuring along its axis tendencies to day-dreaming or eidetic peculiarities such as exaggerated colour vision, as when under the influence of drugs or colour blindness. The subjective 'I' may be said to converge into the common unity of the vertical self at its negative levels; while the arrow pointing horizontally and perceptively towards the object may be said to diverge into the plurality of conscious units, each with its specific characteristics, as against the generic characteristics of the former.

If we now think that one of the persons A or B suffered from a tooth-ache or a stomach-ache - the facts could have been communicated in words with the lights out, and with facial or other expressions or contortions of the body when the lights are on.


If, as an alternative case, one of them said, "I have a heavy burden on my head which makes me groan under its weight", the linguistic link in a dark room would give less certitude than when the load is seen, and its weight, whether bearable or not, is appraised by the observer-witness. Between suffering from the weight of a load and that of a stomach-ache there is a change in the vertical scale as between the overt and the innate aspects. A sleepwalker or a daydreamer could have his mind at different points in the horizontal scale. When overt and innate factors enter into the situation, both vertically and horizontally, without any regulating principle involved, we have an absurd linguistic situation. All we have to note at this stage is that physical and mental factors could enter positively or negatively into the dimensions that we have distinguished.


If we think of the neutral 'observer-witness' of the above experimental situation that we have examined, and appraise the content of his consciousness with a view to arriving at primitive, atomic or elementary simple happenings therein, we could think of two typical movements which would act as references for all possible events in consciousness. The inter-physical reference may be said to move within the horizontal range of phenomenologically-represented objects or interests, whether subjective or objective in origin. An atomic sentence representing this horizontal movement in consciousness could be the thoughts implied in a sentence of the model, 'this is a pot': where the word 'this' would correspond to the negative horizontal aspect, tending to virtuality and to a general vagueness that is non-specific in character; while the word 'pot' would stand for a more specific actuality. Reversibility and irreversibility could both apply to the process or modality which depends on the degree of attention implied in each mode of thought. Likewise in the sentence, 'this is reason', we have the typical case of a vertical movement in thought: the word 'this' standing for understandable items of thought in general, implicitly understood; and 'reason' representing an element in


thought which is more explicit in its content, though still of the order of pure thoughts. Much concentrated direction of the inner power of attention is needed before one could think of the specific content of reason. It could therefore be called a vertical-positive element in molecular thought consisting of atomic thought-events represented by the first instance.

The verb 'to be' is the link corresponding to the activity in consciousness which relates mental attention or relaxation in one sense or the other.

If we should now remember further that the neutral observer-witness in the imaginary situation does not enter into direct non-linguistic relation with either objects or with specific factors or elements of pure items in consciousness, we have within the schematically-conceived and globally- or unitively-understood personal consciousness, all the possible combinations, characteristics and modalities in which thoughts integrate themselves to form normative linguistic units. Based on such units an over-all norm is also possible to conceive.

In the previous section we have confined our remarks to the study of the linguistic structure of thought from the point of view of what can be described as scientific philosophy. Intrinsic forms of thought, axiomatically given in the laws of thought, were taken to be our point of departure. Science is associated in the popular mind with a laboratory where brass instruments record pointer-readings to reveal verities that are unquestionable. Instead of theological belief we now have truth told to us by apparatus or appliances. These appliances verify equations experimentally. People are convinced more readily when we say that a cardiograph or encephalograph tells us the story directly or indirectly, through automatic recordings of some sort. The chain of inferences and the indirectness of the observations are easily excused. After what we have said in the previous section it is hardly necessary for us to look for further proof. Still, out


of respect for the popular temper of our times in such matters, we are going to examine in this section the merits of a certain number of evidences throwing light on the structure of thought, whether of direct value or only of indirect significance. If the normative notion of integrated thought that we have arrived at in the last part of the previous section is kept in mind; and if the experimental evidence presented in the present section is closely examined - the resulting validity of the structure of thought will surely be enhanced, though certitude may not be totally based on them. As we have to think about thought in this section, we can call this section one belonging to a science of sciences. Observables and calculables come very close together here, one lending certitude to the other. Negative evidence becomes as
significant as positive.


That the activity called thinking has implied within it two different kinds of processes has been made amply evident by investigations conducted with the help of the recently invented Electro-Encephalograph (EEG). There is, in the first place, what is taken to be the normal activity of the brain which produces rhythmic oscillations which have been distinguished and named as alpha rhythms. The strange phenomenon noticed with regard to the activity of the brain is that these electric rhythms tend to disappear, instead of getting augmented, as we should expect, when we know by other evidences that the brain is engaged in thinking or is really active in respect of some problem to be solved. Relaxing and shutting the eyes normally brings alpha rhythms into evidence, but with certain other types of persons they continue when the eyes are open; and some persons are without these rhythms altogether. These paradoxical effects seem to depend on deep-seated factors independent of anything physiological. Changes in the degree of attention or relaxation contribute to the appearance or disappearance of alpha-rhythms, depending on the psycho-physical personality of the individual in question rather than on any physiological factor.


Prof. W. Grey Walter of the Burden Neurological Institute said recently in connection with the findings of the EEG as follows:

"One of the most sobering, even humiliating facts of
the whole of brain physiology is that scarcely a single
phenomenon discovered by the study of electrical
activity of the brain - the EEG - was foreseen or
predicted by physiologists…" (20)

According to the same authority, not only are the evidences of brain activity independent of physiological foundations, as taken for granted hitherto by empirical scientists, but there are deep-seated factors contributing by their elusive paradoxical expression through the language of the EEG which are of such an indeterminate nature as to indicate what may be called personality traits. He continues in the same talk as follows:

"The confusing thing is that even when the eyes are
opened, or the person thinks hard, the (alpha) rhythms
may disappear. Unfortunately for our understanding
of this effect, not everyone shows alpha rhythms,
even with the eyes shut, and in some people the
rhythms persist even with the eyes open, so we are
faced with an objective sign of a mystery that we
accept and delight in in everyday life and find hard to
fit into scientific analysis - that is, human personality."

Thus for the first time the notion of a human personality, independently of physiological factors, enters into the experimental domain of science. This fact suffices to give to the normative notion that we have outlined in the previous section sufficient status as a scientific fact for the purposes of this study.

Prof. Grey Walter has approached the same problem from another end and, when his findings in respect of brain activity are put side-by-side with the story that the EEG has to tell, tends to make clear that there are two distinct kinds of thinking or brain activities going on alternately. Prof. Walter


points out firstly that the brain is essentially 'a problem-solving organ'. In solving problems a mental model that is either pictorial or verbal is involved. Actual seeing and visual imagination are activities that are different and even opposed in their effects. When mentally solving a problem - if the kind of model that the subject uses happens to be one of the usual variety of imagination (not vision) - the alpha rhythms, as seen through the EEG recordings, show a tendency to stop. The brain mechanism has thus two different reactions: the first is the kind that resembles the movement of the eyeballs when looking at an actual sight, and the second is when visual imagination operates at a deeper level of consciousness. The former tends to retain alpha-oscillations while the latter tends to suppress them. Looking at a whole page in reading a book is a visual activity in which "the sweep of electrical activity has implicit in it a sort of scanning process'', as Prof. Walter puts it. Scanning is different from looking at the whole page, in that one sees the words on it one after the other. One changes the steady shape of the printed lines into a series of visual signals spread out in time. In other words scanning means "turning spatial patterns into time ones''. Brain models have also been devised which have helped to reveal that they react as if they had the faculty of memory, where the time-factor rather than the space-factor counts. The relation between the scanning process of the brain and the stoppage of the alpha-rhythms which refer to the deeper or, as we might say, vertical activity of the brain as opposed to its mere spatial (horizontal) functioning, is sufficiently clear from what Prof. Walter has to say on the matter:

"When one reads a page of print one's eyes scan it
systematically line by line. The page is there all the
time, but one sees the words on it one after the other.
This means that one changes the steady shape of the
printed lines into a series of visual signals spread out
in time."

According to Prof. Walter again, scanning comes into evidence when a person looks for a word in the dictionary and finds it interesting. We can see his eyes stop moving. The Professor suggests his theory when he puts the question: "Is this the sort of thing that is going on in the brain when the alpha rhythm stops as a person thinks?" (22)


EEG and brain-model evidences put together thus lend much experimental support to the space-time correlation of mental activities which fall into two interdependent though independent classes.


Various troubles connected with speech with which doctors have had to deal, and which have been the subject of detailed experimental research in clinics and psycho-pathological laboratories in various progressive countries, have already a rich fund of accumulated data which afford us as conclusive evidence as possibly could be expected supporting the reality of a psycho-physical link along whose length various grades of speech-troubles could be located as between the psycho-physical function pertaining to one pole of linguistic habit or the other. The evidence, which is quite striking and conclusive, has been before the scientific world for more than half a century now, but the inferences that could have been made for the service of scientific knowledge about human faculties in general have not, for some reason, received the
attention or been given the importance they deserve. It is to the credit of the intuitive intelligence of Bergson to have tried to enrich metaphysics with the minute details of speech-troubles and to have made valuable inferences based on the evidence they present.

It is not necessary for us to go into all the cases that have been passed in review by Bergson over several pages with full documentation in his fully-scientific study, "Matière et Mémoire: Essai sur la Relation du Corps à l'Esprit", but scientism has, as we have said, its own prejudices - imagining, so to say, that the soul, if real, should be found at the tip of the scalpel. Bergson's fully scientific inferences have been mixed up with other verbose speculations of no value, perhaps because of the lack of a fully-developed epistemology or methodology pertaining to science as such.


We need only two or three typical cases cited by Bergson (23) or the purposes of this study to see that - understood in terms of the schéma moteur (24) that Bergson has developed elsewhere in his studies of the élan vital, and provided that scientific physicalism is not an end in itself - there is sufficient evidence for inferring the reality of a schematically-conceived axis that is mathematically and logically valid and which could help us to get a clear idea of the structure of thought that must be at the basis of linguistic expression. Bergson writes:

"Ainsi, dans un cas observé par Lichtheim lui-même, le
sujet, à la suite d'une chute, avait perdu la mémoire de
l'articulation des mots et par consequent la faculté de
parler spontanément; il répètait pourtant avec la plus
grande correction ce qu'on lui disait. D'autre part, òu
la parole spontanée est intacte, mais òu la surdité verbale
est absolue, le malade ne comprenant plus rien de ce
qu'on lui dit, la faculté de répèter la parole d'autrui peut
encore être entièrement conservée."

("Thus, in a case observed by Lichtheim himself, the subject had, after a fall, lost the memory of articulating words and consequently the ability to speak spontaneously. However, he could repeat what was said to him perfectly correctly. Similarly, in cases of total verbal deafness where the ability to speak spontaneously is intact, the subject can still repeat what other people say to him")

After giving due consideration to all the theories that have been put forward by authorities like Bastian, Romberg, Bateman, Winslow, Kussmaul and Arnaud, besides considering the dozens of varieties of aphasia studied by Lichtheim himself ('Brain', Jan 1885, p. 447) and others, Bergson is able to reduce the phenomena in terms of the schéma moteur, with the help of which he is able to solve the mystery. He concludes by saying:

"La vérité parait être intermédiaire entre ces deux
hypothèses: il y a, dans ces divers phénomènes plus
que des actions absolument mécaniques, mais moins
qu'un appel à la mémoire voluntaire; ils témoignent
d'une tendence des impressions verbales auditives à
se prolonger en mouvements d'articulation, tendence
qui n'échappe surement pas au contrôle habituel de
notre volonté, qui implique même peut-être un
discernement rudimentaire, et qui se traduit, à l'état
normal par une répètition intérieure des traits saillants
de la parole entendue. Or, notre schéma moteur n'est
autre chose." (25)

("The truth appears to lie in an intermediate position between these two hypotheses: these various phenomena are made up of more than purely mechanical actions, but of less than a conscious calling upon memory: they signal tendency of auditory verbal impressions to prolong themselves into articulation; a tendency which surely does not escape from the usual control of our will, and which may even imply a rudimentary discernment. In the normal state it gives rise to an internal rpetition of the main points of speech as it is heard - our schéma moteur is no other than this.")

(EDITORIAL NOTE - we are well aware that these translations are not particularly clear, but Bergson is well-known for the complexity of his thought and style of writing; the original French is difficult even for an educated native speaker, and opaque to most others. We are doing our best.)


Bergson's schematic representation of a psycho-physical unit of consciousness involved in language function is seen to emerge in clear outline in his analysis of verbalistic troubles known to medical science. That he has kept it strictly within the pragmatic frame does not affect the intrinsic and valid character of the scheme, which we can take as applicable to a more general philosophical context by extrapolation. Other cases of a related psycho-pathological order have also been studied and recorded - such as the case of a virtuoso who had lost in some way his material technique of external expression in music while his thoughts and understanding of music remained intact; as opposed to that of an eminent medical man who had retained all his knowledge about anatomy and pathology but had lost his power of fixing his will on one act that was pertinent to a situation, and instead found himself for some days helplessly cutting paper into bits, punching holes or tearing up books. (26) As between neurological and psychiatric troubles there is a psycho-physical polarity which would justify our suggestion just made that the whole series of troubles, whether strictly related to aphasia or apraxia or even dyslexia (27), can be fitted into a common scheme with the help of intrapolation or extrapolation, as known to mathematical thinking.


That a psycho-physical normative unit, whether called by the names of libido, persona, psyche or self, has a distinct and non-metaphysical reality is brought out strikingly by a case that Prof. Pierre Janet of the Collège de France has recorded in his lectures on "La Force et Faiblesse Psychologiques". He refers to a surprising instance of loss of speech. This loss of speech was due to a certain degree of negative withdrawal into oneself rather than the result of anything that had a physical cause in the physico-pathological sense. As one whose authority is high in such matters and one fully appraised of the latest development of this subject, both practical and theoretical, his estimate of the above case would help us to clarify the scientifically valid normative notion for the purposes of our study. We shall quote from


Janet a case in which it is neither a case of aphasia, apraxia nor dyslexia, but one of general mutism and functional hybernation or inactivity:

"Je racontais autrefois l'histoire d'une étrange malade,
soignée dans une maison de santé, qui pendant trois
ans entiers était restée sans consentir à manger un
aliment et sans prononcer un seul mot. . . Après
trois ans, un printemps cette malade se dresse sur
son lit et se met à dire à la garde la phrase suivante:
"Ah ça, on ne déjeune pas ici?" (28)

("I used to describe the strange case of a patient in a nursing home who did not eat or speak a single word for three whole years…After three years, one spring day the patient sat up in bed and said the following to the nurse: 'For goodness sake! Don't we get any breakfast here?'")

One would be fully justified in inferring from such cases that there is at least a real psychophysical entity, understandable as a mathematical unity at least, which is neither body nor mind but something intermediate between the two. When psycho-pathologists say that a certain state is opposed to certain others, as they often do in the case of the troubles connected with the will, as above; or when they oppose or contrast cases of neurasthenia and psychasthesia or reduce both more simply into asthenia, as Pierre Janet prefers to do (29), there is in their minds a vaguely-conceived scheme of interrelation of psycho-pathological conditions.

Pierre Janet further suggests that mental cases which he classifies under 'les délires' (deliria) could all be thought of as pertaining to degrees in a hierarchic scale of over-estimation and under-estimation of the self with reference to speech. He says:

"Examinez les délires et même tous les troubles de la
croyance, quels qu'ils soient, vous pourrez toujours
les résumer par l'une de ces formules: le délirant est
un individu qui place mal sa parole dans la hiérarchie
des degrés de réalité." (30)

("Examine delirium and even all problems of belief, whatever they may be, and you could always sum them up by a formula such as: 'the delirious person is an individual who has problems in placing his discourse correctly in the hierarchy of degrees of reality' ")

Certain other writers on personality problems, like F.Achelle-Delmas and Marcel Boll, go as far as to suggest the methods of interpolation and its inverse procedure of extrapolation, which latter he considers misleading in cases of dementia.
He also says:


"D'une manière générale, nous nous efforcerons
d'appliquer ce qu'on nomme après Stuart Mill, la
méthode des variations concomitantes, qui est le
véritable centre de tout raisonnement inductif." (31)

("Generally speaking, we shall try to apply what Stuart Mill would call the method of concomitant variations, which is the true centre of inductive reasoning")

The systematic classification and nomenclature according to a correct taxonomy becomes full of problems in this domain of psycho-pathology. If a central normative notion is supplied, we could imagine how at present the vast amount of literature of a pseudo-scientific or even non-scientific status could be normalized so as to standardise language generally. What the difference between the libido and the subliminal self amounts to in precise terms, cannot even be discussed at present without taking sides with one school of thought as against another. The classification of mental troubles is at present a fecund field of unscientific statements which, however, pass for science. Normalisation with reference to a norm conceived synthetically, and re-normalisation of terms that have tended to diverge into too many specific analytic sub-divisions of the same fundamental phenomenon, with which they may happen to be basically related, could be accomplished for the language of science only when the neutral norm has been given an integrated status in respect of possible modalities, combinations and characteristics of thought and corresponding language-elements.


Psycho-pedagogy, as it is practised experimentally in modern times, is another department of knowledge from which we could derive some useful directives in regard to the normalisation of scientific language. Teaching and learning involve that bipolar relationship in which a constant interchange of thought is taking place, like a subtle process of osmosis. 'Education' itself is an expression that is full of ambiguity and vagueness. Personal relations between the pupil and teacher are becoming recognized more and more as desirable in the process. The philosophical basis of education could be negatively conceived as with Rousseau; naturalistically conceived as with Spencer; pragmatically


conceived as with Dewey and also idealistically or dialectically conceived as with the Pythagoreans, Platonists, Neo-Platonists or their continuators in modern times like Whitehead or Royce. Whether a stimulus-response psychology, behaviourism or adjustments to the needs of man-making or character-building are to be given primacy as against adjustment to social or citizenship needs, are all questions on which educational literature can differ widely. Normalisation in this domain, so full of possible differences of attitude, can only be expected when the norm of the persons involved in the bi-polar process is postulated scientifically, mathematically, logically, biologically or psycho-physically as the common personal factor at the basis of the process that is to take place. There are at present extant verbose volumes which are a hot-bed of confusion, and this must be reflected in the language used. We cannot do better here than to quote from the writings of one whose scientific training and acquaintance with scientific problems cannot be questioned. Dr. Alexis Carrel writes:

"The tests applied to school-children and students by
inexperienced psychologists have no great
significance. They give an illusive confidence to those
unacquainted with psychology. In fact, they should
be accorded less importance. Psychology is not yet a
science. Today individuality and its potentialities are
not measurable. But a wise observer, trained in the
study of human beings, is sometimes capable of
discovering the future in the present characteristics
of the given individual." (32)

Having in the year 1932 myself submitted a thesis to the University of Paris entitled "Le Facteur Personnel dans le Processus Educatif", and in view of the fact that my work fully answers the question of how normalisation of personal relations takes place, with a central notion of the persons involved in an educational situation as between teacher and pupil, it might be permissible in this section to pass over aspects of educational problems covered in detail and with ample documentation in that study. Since those days, however, some interesting developments have taken place in the


educational world which deserve to be noticed here, especially as they tend to confirm the schematic norm that we have in mind in the present study. On page 25 of that thesis I had given a schematic representation, combining and correlating scientifically certain of the important aspects of educational psychology that have direct bearing on the development of the personality of the child. As most of what is represented there already is still to be considered valid and as by no means outdated; and encouraged by the fact that it has already passed through the scrutiny of an academic body, the schema has been reproduced on page 193 above (fig. 14.3), and when examined and read side-by-side with the concluding findings in the thesis, also given as the footnote below, it would give us here, for the present, a rough idea of what we mean by normalisation in the domain of psycho-pedagogics. (33)


Of the names that have made outstanding contributions of an experimental nature to the most recent developments in pedagogics, that of Prof. Jean Piaget may be mentioned as perhaps the most significant for us in this study. From the year 1921 he has been contributing serious works on such subjects, supported by experiments in every case, beginning with 'Une Forme Verbale de la Comparison chez l'Enfant' (1921) through one concerning 'Le Langage et la Pensée chez l'Enfant' (1928), and leading up to 'La Naissance de l'Intelligence (1932) and 'La Formation du Symbole' (1945). His latest publication, in collaboration with Inhelder, is devoted to the "development of two kinds of operational behaviour, which are classification and seriation, which intervene in the formation of a large number of psychological and pedagogical notions". (34) Running through the whole series of works is his most important contribution of a vertical series of stages which he calls "paliers"*, described by him as a special type of thinking pertaining to child psychology. In the last of his works there is a reference to "the development of classification and that of seriation" which constitute "two unified and synchronous processes". Further there are said to be two factors whose co-ordination assures the reversibility of the

*(A "palier" is literally a "landing", as in a flight of stairs. Perhaps the closest English translation, following Roget and the OED, would be "plateau", but with the implication of being a temporary resting place in the course of an ascent. ED)


operations which are called retroaction and anticipation. The overall explanation is based on the notion of equilibrium. (35) It is not possible nor necessary for us to discuss here the merits of these findings. All we have to note is that they do fit into the scheme that we have so far outlined in which mental activity takes two different directions: one that could be called spatial, and the other connected with the time-axis in which anticipation and retroaction occur - with an overall notion of equilibrium marking the centre of the scheme. Expressions such as 'correspondence topologique bi-univoque et bi-continue' (36) ("bi-univocal and bi-continuous topological correspondance") which Piaget uses, make it unmistakably evident that a mathematical structure is to be understood in the scientific nature of his writings. The new kind of language with the latest terms, with a schematic pattern underlying it, can be discerned from the following summary of the import of Piaget's contributions, from the pen of another contemporary authority in scientific pedagogy. Dr. H. Wallon of the Collège de France:

"Les expériences ingénieuses de Piaget pour connaître
comment l'enfant acquiert les notions de nombre et de
quantité montrent en détail à quelles contradictions il
peut se heurter dans son cheminement pour se débarasser
des apparences purement sensibles, elles-mêmes
contradictoires, et pour les résoudre en invariants auxquels
il faudra que se superpose une vision opératoire . . .
C'est par une suite d'echelons progressifs que le dynamisme
des impressions et des réactions concrètes se fige en
invariants auxquels doit se superposer un acte unificateur
qui lui-même se fige en système stable de symboles. Et
les symboles, prenant graduellement la place des éléments
perceptifs auxquels ils se substituent dans la mesure òu ils
en expriment mieux qu'eux-mêmes les rapports de co-
existence et de devenir, deviennent chacun à son tour les
elements d'une progression nouvelle dans la réduction de
l'être à la connaissance." (37)

("Piaget's ingenious experiments, intended to discover how children acquire notions of number and quantity, show in detail what contradictions the child comes up against in the process of discarding purely sensory appearances - which are themselves contradictory - and resolving them into invariables upon which he has to superpose an operational vision…
It is through a series of progressive stages that the dynamism of impressions and concrete reactions is resolved into invariables that have themselves to be submitted to an act of unification, which in turn resolves itself into a stable system of symbols. These symbols, as they gradually take the place of the perceptual elements which they supplant to the extent that they can express, better than they can themselves, their relations of co-existence and becoming, become in turn elements in a new progression of the reduction of being into knowledge")

Elsewhere in the same work Prof. Wallon speaks of three 'moments' which come into opposition in knowledge. The \first he describes as having


'irreversibilité absolue de l'empiricisme brut' (absolute irreversibility of basic empiricism); the second 'reversibilité totale de l'acte intellectuel (total reversibility of the intellectual act) and thirdly, 'réduction d'un irreversible en reversible.' (reduction of an irreversible into a reversible).

The number of scientific terms that have been used in the above paragraphs to represent something that could be immediately intuitively understood with the help of a schematic representation, and the difficulty for the reader to follow the trend of the transformation that takes place in the child-mind through such words as belong to a sort of meta-language of science, should be sufficient recommendation or us to think of something simpler and of the nature of a proto- rather than a meta-language, which would show these thoughts more directly. Such a language could be no other than the one that can establish a direct link between these two aspects of language. How such a relation could be established in a valid and workable manner is what we have still to make clear in the remainder of this study.


That branch of science known as psycho-physics may be said to take its position between what is called physiological psychology and psycho-physiology. Physiological psychology and psycho-pathology as practised in clinics may be said to be on the side of physiology rather than on that of psychology. As our purpose is to discover the structure of thought just at the point where it gets inserted into matter, psycho-physics and its findings have special interest for us in this study. We shall therefore fix our attention on certain aspects of this branch of science which is based on simple stimuli and responses. Besides the study of relations which might be greater, equal or less than either stimulus or response, we have to have in this branch of knowledge what is called the threshold or "limen". Subliminal responses, both positive and negative, and threshold or liminal ones, are likely to give different laws, such as the different laws of psycho-physics attributed to different experimenters like Weber, Fechner, Delboeuf, Breton and others. Each of them had his own mathematical formula expressing the relation between


stimulus and response, by which the body was to be understood in terms of mind and the mind in terms of the body. Some used logarithmic language while others used the idea of geometric or arithmetic progression to relate the bodily and mental factors. Merkel's law was seen to go against the validity of the Weber formulation of the relation. It states that within the limits of the threshold, there is a simple equality of proportion between stimulus and response. If we should think of the human organism as a whole in the light of these rival and different theories called laws it would not be difficult for us to see that the innate global structure of the psycho-physical entity involved is what is at the origin of the different partial experimental findings. The limen is a notion that touches that zone of the psycho-physical entity which is nearest to the null or zero-point. Stimulus must be said to be quantitative as it is actually physical and measurable as such; and response, which varies geometrically or logarithmically, or according to more complicated mathematical laws, may be more simply looked upon by us as a qualitative factor. It is because even such terms as 'qualitative' are used in different contexts by different philosophers, and thus tend to produce ambiguities, that the need for a schematic language such as we are proposing in this study becomes a necessity. According to what we propose, the outline of which has already emerged from our discussion so far, we could call the response aspects, which are of the order of calculables rather than observables, as pertaining to the qualitative or vertical axis of reference. The stimulus aspects would legitimately belong to the quantitative or horizontal axis of reference. By using these vectorial terms of projective geometry in a certain sense that is to be understood as belonging to the context of analytical geometry and topology at once, as Spearman has already begun to discern, and as known to what is called vectorial psychology, we have the unique advantage of a language for which the languages of the various particular branches of science become merely particular instances. It is in this sense that semiotics could be made a veritable organon for all sciences. (39) Sir Russell Brain, President of the Royal College of Physicians, London, author of "Perception and Science", in a recent pronouncement pertinently puts the question:


"If we become aware of the colour solely as a result of changes occurring in the brain, which is inside the skull, how do we come to locate the red in the book which is lying on the table?" (40)

If this book gets its colour from inside the skull and not from any primary quality in the book itself, we are witnessing in such a question put by a scientific authority a complete change of reference for science as a whole, which, from the days of Heisenberg's Uncertainty and the Relativism of Einstein, has been shifting its accent from the observed to the observer. While we are still on the subject of the light psycho-physics could shed on the schema we are developing, we could also refer to certain findings that have had a well-recognized place in science for many years, such as the phenomenon called 'retinal rivalry', which records the peculiarity of the effect of colour or form on vision by which, if the two eyes are stimulated by different colours or forms at the same time, there is an element of intelligence that enters the situation, by which both eyes together alternately see only one colour after another.

The spatial rivalry is replaced by the mind, or by some inner factor which insists on seeing one colour or form at a time without rivalry.

The very term 'retinal rivalry' retains the old prejudice in favour of physiology as against psychology within psycho-physics, which ought strictly to give equal importance to both aspects. A more correct description of the phenomenon would be to ask how the conceptual factor solves the duality of perceptions.

Sir Russell Brain refers to the phenomenon of 'referred pain', which is not actually in the part of the body to which it is attributed by the sufferer. He explains: 'many people who have had a limb amputated say that for a time it feels as though it were still there'.(41) Examples of this kind could be multiplied to show that even experimentally, mind and matter meet neutrally in psycho-physics.

The sensation of pain depends on its continuity or intensity; while that of a 'just noticeable difference' of colouris more related to space than to duration. The saturation, hues and the brilliance or darkness of colour-shades and their 'just noticeability', resemble modes of intensity characteristic of elements of thought. If we should add to these the notion of the peculiarities of combinations in which


elements of colour integrate themselves, we arrive at the well-known 'colour-solid'. The taxonomy derived from this is now adopted by the American Standards Association and is the accepted language of colour for use by many manufacturers of paints and other products demanding a simple and accurate method of referring to colour and its innumerable shades.(42)

Vectorial space and Cartesian correlation, put together into the idea of the colour-solid, with whose help scientific precision is given to the confusion of the names of colours and their possible varieties, introduces for the first time a public and universally-understandable language - at least with respect to one domain of language where ambiguity is most possible - whether between one vernacular and another or even between those who happen to be using the same language. The vertical axis is here represented by the central achromatic scale ranging from black through grey to white at the top. The spectral colours are related according to hue, light and shade, or degree of saturation, with three distinct integrating, characteristic, combinatorial or modal dimensions or factors which, though understood at present only in the psycho-physical context, could well apply to the integration of thought and language in general, in an extended or extrapolated sense.


If in logical atomism it is permitted for us to think of logical space as a distinct entity, the non-arbitrary status of the colour-solid must be considered to be beyond any question in respect of its validity, even by those who call themselves 'logical empiricists'. Even when a modern physicist refers to space, there are two aspects of the notion of space that meet in it which have to be distinguished. Conceptual and perceptual spaces are put together by him, consciously or unconsciously. It is a sort of neutral space that is involved, as between actual space enclosed in a bell-jar in the laboratory (if a perfect vacuum is possible), and a space conceived by the mind as a metaphysical abstraction that has been defined by Aristotle as: 'That without which bodies could not exist, but itself continuing to exist when bodies cease to exist".


Space possesses magnitude or extension, though it is itself not a body for "in case it were a body then two bodies would exist in the same place" (Aristotle," Physics", Book IV). Colours looked at in the light of Sir Russell Brain's recent words would themselves be within the skull rather than in the object.

Putting this fact together with the structure of the colour-solid - with a vectorial psycho-physics to support it, and understood as having dimensions which schematically represent tendencies in consciousness treated topologically - we have arrived for our purposes at a rough idea of a unit-integrated norm of thought-elements. In order that the full implications of the structure of thought revealed by this analogy may be clear, we are reproducing it below with a full discussion of its possible grades of meaning. By the method of intrapolation and extrapolation we are expected to carry the pure schematic content revealed here to other departments of thought, with the confidence that not only is this method non-arbitrary and justified, but that it could claim to have that degree of apodictic or actual certitude which, as we said, is the criterion of science in general.

In passing it might be permitted to note here the slight difference that exists between this and the idea postulated by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". (43) The following is characteristic of his normative notion of logical space:

"1°13 The facts in logical space are the world.
2°01231 In order to know an object, I must know not its
external but its internal qualities.
2°0232 Roughly speaking, objects are colourless."

The logico-philosophic world of Wittgenstein, like the Monad of Leibniz, suffers from a slight accentuation of the vertical as opposed to horizontal aspect of the global totality of reality with which a scientific language has to cope with. Colour is not to be excluded by us from our world of scientific language - for otherwise it should become suitable merely for equations.


At this stage we are almost in a position to outline some of the more important ideas of this study, ideas which we were unable to clarify at the beginning. We used the expressions 'proto-language' and 'meta-language' and said that these have to come together to result in a 'scientific language' of universal understandability, utility and validity. We have also used the expression 'normalisation' and 're-normalisation', which require to be clarified. These three types of language and the important concept of normalisation have to be conceived in terms of a normative notion which must be sufficiently easy for the human mind to grasp intellectually.

What is more, it must have the advantage of easy communicability, whether through speech or writing. It has to be proof against the gradual encroachment of vernacularisms or patois which may be called broad, low or parochial. It must have an innate stability, depending on its intrinsic character. The very validity of the normative notion must be its recommendation, and the spread and acceptance of this norm must not call for any movement to propagate it, as with closed religious groups. Its open scientific status must be the basis of whatever utility or interest it might have.

As its soundness shows itself, it must get a reputation depending on its own merits, private or public. To have all these conditions fulfilled naturally it is best that it agree with nature, both human and what belongs to the environment.

Physics and psychology, as Bertrand Russell (44) said, have been approaching from both sides to meet in what he called 'neutral monism'. This process of mutual rapprochement of two natural aspects of human thinking, as represented respectively by what we call physics and metaphysics, if it has been taking place, must be intelligently promoted until these aspects of thought fuse into a normative basis, both physical and metaphysical. Mind and matter, spirit and body, physics and psychology, geometry and algebra - and many other pairs of words - refer to the same schematically-understandable aspects of human thinking. In the world of science we have already referred to them tentatively as the observables and the calculables. The distinction itself is a vertical rather than a horizontal one, to use here in advance the terminology we are still in the process of justifying. Language itself can emerge only where it could be meaningful.


If observables refer backwards to an archetypal pattern of language within the mind of man, naturally resembling geometry - as Pascal and Bergson (45), not to speak of Descartes and later Cartesians have intuitively known and have pointed out in their writings - the calculables would also be symbolic in the sense that algebra is. Algebra by its symbolism refers to the Platonic world of the intelligibles, which are like numbers as opposed to quantity. It may be said to be a language that refers forwards and upwards to abstraction of ideas. Symbolic logic, which depends on algebra, has already been named a meta-language. By this very token it is that we have here referred to the other anterior aspect of the structure of linguistic thought as referring to a proto-language. We have to visualize the whole matter schematically in order to follow the stages by which we could pass on from what we have called the normalisation of scientific thought to what we are going to clarify as the re-normalisation of the same.


The blue of the sky, the mirage, the sky-blossom and the gleaming sky-reflection of the mirage surface, have been used by Sanskrit philosophers in speaking of the phenomenal aspect of reality as superimposed as a passing show or appearance hiding the reality which is behind. Without lapsing into oriental contemplative ways of philosophising or promoting wisdom through mere a priori solipsism, pantheism or syncretism, we could in a very matter-of-fact sense still assert with justice here that the colour-solid could be availed of, as a model at least, for representing in tangible form what we have called the proto-linguistic pattern of archetypal thinking.

If the question is put: 'What is colour?', it could be answered in different languages in the same tongue:

We could say, as the dictionary first puts it: "the red of blood, the blue of the sky, the green of grass are colours". Here definition is by mere arbitrary juxtaposition of name and form or colour-aspects and nothing more. The helplessness of the lexicographer is evident. Ordinary expression in any tongue has to have this form for the sake of the apodictic certitude of the resulting knowledge, and no one says 'prove it!'.


2 )
The second definition of the term goes further than just juxtaposing the observable or the nameable, thinkable or calculable, which are, in principle, the same as that number which Pythagoras said was the secret of the universe.
We have distinguished it as the vertical. When the vertical aspect of language is admitted into the meaning, a second degree of certitude results which is not derived from the horizontal axis of reference but from the vertical. 2 + 2 = 4 is an apodictic certitude that the normal human child learns and accepts quickly. As Piaget would say,

"Seriation and classification spatially and in time
are simultaneous operations the child is capable of through
stages of its mental development".(46)

In a higher stage of the education of the child it will be able to grasp the second dictionary meaning of "what is colour?". This time it will be put, as in Webster's New International Dictionary under 'second meaning', as follows:

"A sensation evoked as a specific response to stimulation
of the eye and its attached nervous mechanisms by radiant
energy of certain wavelengths and intensities."

We have already here two grades of language: one of the first-degree common-sense language belonging to what Carnap would call the "protocol language" level, and another which a secondary schoolboy is taught to understand in the classroom. Both of them are scientific.In fact the common-sense language, being the result of the closest union of the observables and the calculables, is valid without the intervention of syllogisms or pointer readings, which only make scientific knowledge less apodictic or certain.

The second meaning in the dictionary under the word 'colour' is less scientific in one sense and more scientific in the other. The common vernacular is easily understood by the closed group which pertains to the vernacular tongue and the certitude has that horizontal quality in which the thought moves between very real or certain factors, whether actual or virtual. In the statement 'the sky is red' the word 'sky' is an observable and 'red' is a name and thus of a conceptual order to be counted as belonging to the calculables. The mental status of the colour-sensation, which is becoming


more confirmed, as we have seen from the findings of Sir Russell Brain above, justifies our assigning a virtual status to it which could be described as eidetic in the terminology of Rorschach's psychology. Colour-vision has its cause within the skull and not in the object outside; but the name by which a certain colour is recognised through ordinary language in any vernacular belongs to the metaphysical context rather than the physical one. A concomitant correlation between two postulated points on the positive and the negative sides of the horizontal axis would thus characterise the nature of the common-sense language. In the terminology developed in the Carnap school (47) this would correspond to the axis in which the pragmatic 'handling action' language (48), the semiotic dimension of 'thing-language', and the 'protocol language' may be said to move. We shall be considering these terms presently in their proper contexts. For the present it would suffice to recognize that within the amplitude of actuality and virtuality which the mind is capable of in its alternating perceptual or conceptual activity there is always a concomitant variation as between points that we could mark in the positive limb of the horizontal and its own negative limb.

The second meaning is removed from the 'protocol language' by its participating in less actual and more calculable aspects of knowledge, which function simultaneously to create the phenomenon of meaning in consciousness. Since the vibrations that correspond to colour and sensations are both physical facts - one treated perceptually and not actually, and the other treated conceptually and not virtually - we have to select the points of concomitant variation involved here very cautiously, without violating methodological, epistemological or axiological factors which enter into the consideration of the particular language that science might employ systematically for some utilitarian or idealistic end - to which the science is said correctly to belong. The person responsible for the discovery of the relation between vibrations and colour may also have to be taken into consideration for determining precisely the points of concomitant variations, agreements, differences or both, that may belong to the four limbs of the vertico-horizontal frame


of reference that we have outlined. Experts of the department of knowledge concerned might have to have their say, to be finalized by an expert committee which understands what normalisation means. One thing can be said at once. While in the first common-sense meaning the two points were located apart in the total range of the amplitude, here they have to be brought together. If the knowledge is for merely serving curiosity about colours, the branch of science is to be placed neutrally, and instinctive dispositions involved in curiosity and its intellectual counterpart have to determine where two other points have to be placed in the vertical axis. Instincts are retrospective in reference and therefore negative; while the interests of scientific progress involved must find a degree marked on the positive side of the vertical axis. The relational picture involved here is quite different from that of the actual and virtual colours that were placed on the horizontal axis to begin with. The mystical joy, if any, involved in the first meaning must also be marked, if necessary on the vertical axis, to the extent that it is considered positive or negative in tone. The second case being relationally of another epistemological context, the curiosity satisfied is a more scientific one. Any number of other fractional or multiplied dimensions, qualitative or quantitative, could be added to analyse the proto-linguistic implications.


Out of the two ways of giving meaning to the question 'What is colour?' we have so far discussed two varieties: one conforming to common-sense requirements, and the other with a more scientific purpose. The vertical component of the psycho-physical entity which gives us the satisfaction of knowing what colour is has been slightly accentuated in the second instance, when vibrations were equated with the name-symbols standing for the different colours of the spectrum. If a colour-manufacturer interested in actual colours and not in science for its own sake was thinking of vibrations with relation to colours, these two factors would have to be put in the horizontal axis. For a scientist in the class-room thinking of the subject for its pure knowledge-content,


a symbolic equation treating colour by letters in the abstract and vibration grades by number would bring them both into the vertical. When the relation is still of a hypothetical status, the vertical and horizontal may be put together tentatively in view of apodictic certitude, when it will be vertical, horizontal or both. What is positive-horizontal might have to be put on the negative side and primacy given to what appears otherwise. Normalisation thus has its rules derived from epistemology and methodology, with an axiological purpose as an over-all consideration. Symbolic logic can deal only with the verticalized aspects and can therefore have no utility except in the steps of mathematical inference involved. We shall be returning to this question later. All that we wish to stress at this stage is that normalisation is not easy and, as we have said already on page 280 above, promiscuous mixing-up of aspects in violation of the innate structure of thought makes the language absurd. If 'metaphysics is non-sense' we could retaliate and say pseudo-science tends to the point of absurdity.


When the vertical and the horizontal aspects of language are juxtaposed, a certain system is put into language, and it gains an apodictic character without further demonstration or syllogistic steps of inference. No better example for this could be found than the case of the colour-solid. The colour-solid is able to circumvent the difficulties of vernacular confusions of tongues, and in one domain at least succeeds in creating the possibility of a standard universal language that is scientifically valid. From it we are able to derive the theoretical basis of a universal language for all sciences, if the integration of all branches of knowledge would be possible. The over-all integration of the whole range of sciences and philosophies could be undertaken with the same model of the structure of thought. In branches of study like sound, heat or the sensation of taste we could adopt the same model so that the monadic units and the monad-of-monads unit, conceived on an absolute basis, could all adhere and organically cling together.


The rough possibility of a language for unified science based on a scheme of integration for each minute branch of science, each having the same proto-linguistic elements as the over-all scheme, thus comes into view.


Again let us put to ourselves the question 'What is colour?' A complete scientific answer is found in the second half of its second meaning as given in Webster's New International Dictionary (49), which fortunately gives us within as short a span as possible the full psycho-physical and categorical implications. We shall take the liberty of extracting from it here while expressing our gratitude to the author of the same:

"Colour may be regarded as a psychological category;
it can be described and specified in terms derivable
from introspective analysis, without any reference
whatever to wavelengths, to energy or to any physical
category; but it is also possible to state the physical
correlates of the psychologically-determined
attributes of colour and to draw up some psycho-
physical relations between them. All colours are
divisible into two classes, the chromatic colours, as
reds, greens, purples, browns and pinks, and the
achromatic or neutral colours, including black, white
and the intermediate series of greys. The latter are
found to differ from each other only in their degree of
resemblance to, or difference from black (or white),
and with each other grey differing from its intermediate
neighbours by an equal sense of differences."

This series can be made into a scale by assigning an ordinal number to each grey, either ascending towards the lighter greys from black as zero; or ascending with positive numbers and descending with negative numbers from median grey as zero. That attribute which thus measures the variation of the greys is called brilliance: dark greys have low; median grey has medium; and light greys have high brilliance.

Chromatic colours differ from each other not only in brilliance, but also in hue and saturation. Hue is that attribute in respect to which colours may be described as red, yellow, green or blue, or as intermediate between two of these. Hues form a natural cyclic series (hue cycle, colour cycle or colour gamut). Colours of the same hue and equal brilliance may differ from each other in saturation, that is, in vividness of hue or in degree of difference from grey.

In terms of these three attributes, colours may be arranged in a symbolic tri-dimensional space (the colour-solid) having the grey series as axis, with median grey at the centre and black and white at the extremities; (fig. 18.1).

Corresponding to each grey is a plane perpendicular to the axis, in which lie the points representing all colours of equal brilliance. In each plane hue is represented cyclically in the order of the hue cycle; and saturation is represented radially with the axial points (greys) as reference points of zero saturation. Thus any colour can be specified by giving three ordinal numbers (colour constants or dimensions) which are coordinates of the corresponding point in the colour-solid.

By establishing arbitrary division points on the scales of brilliance and saturation, any colour can be described as having very low, low, medium high or very high position in these scales.

By establishing arbitrary division points on the hue cycle, hues can be classified as e.g. yellowish-red, reddish-red-yellow, red-yellow, etc.

All principal definitions in this dictionary are in introspective terms like the following: "bay: a colour red-yellow in hue, of low saturation and of low brilliance"; "carmine: a colour red in hue, of high saturation and low brilliance".

We can see here that hue is a factor that could be correlated to the horizontal axis of the scheme we have been developing in this part and that brilliance belongs to the vertical axis.

Saturation is a third radial reference depending on the degree of centralisation. This last could be described as representing the combinatorial mode in terms of thought, while the other two dimensions determine the two main categories into which characteristics of thought could exist negatively or positively in the schematic linguistic space of human consciousness.
A normative proto-linguistic basis for the correlation of thought-characteristics and modes of combination has been outlined on an experimental basis so far, and now we pass on to the re-normalisation of meta-linguistic aspects in the next section of the study.


colour solid fig.18.1

STRUCTURE Fig. 18.1: Figure of colour-solid treated as a non-arbitrary basis for thought integration.(50)




As we are leaving behind with the previous section our discussion of a language for unified science from a strictly experimental point of view; on commencing the present one, which relies on purer linguistics, logic, mathematics and more philosophical or metaphysical aspects of reality - it becomes necessary to preface it with certain preliminary remarks of methodological, epistemological and axiological import. Scientific validity depends on the apodictic certitude resulting from a methodic treatment of items of knowledge which have sufficient significance in human life. Far-off ends and means, dualistically conceived, would be less scientific to the extent that the verity in question is not certain. Too many indirect pointer-readings of observables, and too many steps of inference intervening in calculables, detract to that extent from the degree of certitude of scientific findings.


As we are here concerned not merely with scientific certitude, but also with the language that can express this certitude derived from the various aspects of reality correctly put together to result in conviction; and as language itself is an activity belonging to a neutral trans-subjective and inter-physical order, as we have already explained - that language which is most suitable for the scientific purposes of scientists for their own sake, for the expert outside public and for the common man's edification or education, has to follow the broad lines of the structure of thought as it exists anteriorly, as it were, in the proto-physical as well as the metaphysical aspects of thought. Linguistic consciousness may be said to have a stratum that is anterior and one that is posterior. The latter is more overt than innate. Corresponding to the innate and overt levels there should be an accordance or agreement reflected in the language employed. Mathematical, symbolic or logical language, outside geometrical thinking which, though mathematical, belongs to a proto-linguistic order, leads us upward as it were, into the proper domain of the meta-language relying more on the name-aspect than on the actuality of form.

This study is based on certain fundamental notions out of which we have to keep in mind a few leading ideas, so that details may not confuse the reader. Firstly, there is the notion of the unitive norm as neutral between physics and metaphysics. Proto-language and meta-language must refer to this norm from both sides. The meaning that emerges, like all the varieties of colours in the colour-solid that we have examined in detail at the end of the previous section, could be treated globally or item by item to reveal the combinations, modes and characteristics of language. Normalized meaning would be understandable to experts, the intelligent public or to the common man, just as the definitions of colours (as explained in the last section) in the dictionary are meant to be understood by all who are capable of using a dictionary meant for common use. A standard terminology could be developed, as has been done in respect of various shades and intensities of colour.

Normalisation takes place in two opposing senses; one is when proto-language lends certitude to language, which is from the negative to the positive direction in the vertical axis.


We have called this process 'normalisation' because it should be first understood before the downward or negative normalisation of the over-specific aspects of thought can be clearly visualized. As in psycho-physics and in the colour-solid to which we have referred, psychology and physics meet neutrally with perfect legitimacy and validity without contradicting any epistemological, logical, mathematical or linguistic thoughts. The author of the dictionary article on the colour-solid has stressed the physical side of its reality as against the aspect of science which depends on calculables.

If the measurements of a table could be said to be arbitrary, the geometrical language used in integrating colours schematically would be arbitrary. As we have explained at the beginning, if a schoolmaster puts a dot on the blackboard and called it "p", he is as non-arbitrary as language could ever permit. As the question is of an epistemological order, we are justifying the objection recorded in the footnote there in this general section, where we are considering neutrally and normatively the status of the scheme, even as a psycho-physical scheme which has its reality at the meeting point of introspection and open-eyed observation. Instead of algebra and geometry meeting in analytical geometry, the observables
and the calculables meet on neutral ground in the schema built on the analogy of the colour-solid. We claim for it full scientific status, in the name of the common epistemology which must be implied in any integrated or unified science.


In Eddington's "Space, Time and Gravitation" there is an imaginary conversation between a relativist and a mathematician in which the latter admits that the pure mathematician is not concerned with the truth of his propositions, and the relativist replies:

"Je pense que dans I'Univers réel il doit exister un
groupe d'entités liées les unes aux autres dans un
ordre quadridimensionnel bien défini et qu'elles sont
les bases de l'univers que nous percevons aussi loin
que la physique nous a permis de l'explorer. Les
lignes droites dans l'espace à trois dimensions forment
un groupe quadridimensionnel d'entités, autrement dit
elles ont un ordre quadruple. On ne peut donc pas
prévoir le nombre ultime des dimensions de l'univers,
si toutefois le mot dimensions est applicable."


("I think that in the real universe there must exist a group of entities linked to one another in a well-defined four-dimensional order and that they are the basis of the universe we perceive, as far as physics allows us to explore it. Straight lines in three-dimensional space form a four-dimensional group of entities, in other words, they are of a quaternian order. Therefore one cannot predict the ultimate number of dimensions in the universe, if indeed the word "dimensions" is applicable.")

Earlier in the same conversation the distinction between a variable understood mathematically and a dimension understood relativistically was explained by the relativist as follows:

"Je crois qu'il-y-a une signification réelle attachée au
temps considèré comme quatrième dimension, et non
plus simplement une quatrième variable. Le terme
'dimension' me parait lié a une idée d'ordre. Mon
opinion est que l'ordre des évènements dans la nature
est un ordre quadri-dimensionel indissoluble . . . ". (51)

("I think that there is real meaning attached to Time, considered as a fourth dimension, and not simply as a fourth variable. The term "dimension" seems to me to be linked to an idea of order. My opinion is that the order of events in nature is an indissoluble four-dimensional order…")

Vectorial psychology uses the same scheme. Variables pertain to meta-language and dimensions to the proto-linguistic context. Valid science results by their fusion.


Besides Pascal and Bergson, who have used the schematic proto-language like the Cartesians, we have the case of Kant himself who was able to think of his categories in their primitive schematised form. The summary of his schematism is explained as follows:

"Now all the primary modes of the operations of the
understanding whereby objective unity is imparted
to perceived matter, may be reduced to one of these
four: quantity-quality, relation and modality. These,
with their subordinates, Kant denominates 'categories',
after Aristotle, as determining, in and by themselves,
what in general and antecedentally (a priori) may be
predicted of objects. The three categories of quantity
are unity, multitude and totality; those of quality,
reality, negation and limitation. Those of relation are


double and are paired together, as substance and
accidents, cause and effect, action and reaction.
Lastly, the subordinates of modality are possibly
existence and necessity.
The process by which the categories or pure notions
of the understanding are combined with space and
time, the pure intuitions of sensation, and thereby
presented to knowledge in their possible application
to the objects of sense, Kant calls 'Schematism'
(schematismus). For instance the notion of substance
is said to be schematised when it is not conceived of
absolutely as a self-subsisting thing, but as one that
persists in time and therefore as a constant and
persisting substrate of certain variable qualities or
determinations. Notions thus rendered sensible are
called schematised, in opposition to the pure
categories." (52)

Descartes' great discovery contains the same elements of schematised correlates which belong to a proto-linguistic context. It constitutes a major event in the history of the development of scientific language. Leibniz had a monadology constructed on the same schematic basis in which he tended to verticalize reality by abolishing the value of space. He used the expression "metaphysical points and substantial forms" as applied to the "prime absolute principles of all composite things which he ultimately resolved into them".(53) The principle of occasionalism in Descartes was elaborated by Spinoza into his concept of the "thinking substance", which was to be fitted into his double-aspect theory or scheme which means,

"…that the mind and the body of an individual are
two distinguishable but inseparable aspects of a
single underlying substance or process. Spinoza,
as a consequence of his metaphysical doctrine that
'thinking substance and extended substance are one
and the same thing' ("Ethics" Part I : Prop. 7) was
committed to the two-aspect theory of the body-mind
relation." (54)


Scientific philosophers have always adhered to this proto-linguistic pattern of thinking. We have seen how Hume has no respect for anything but number or quantity (cf. p. 277 above) and even Locke, known for his dictum that mind is a clean slate, we find adhering to the following analysis of the content of consciousness. While his doctrine of signs might refer to the metalinguistic aspects, his analysis of basic aspects of knowledge is contained in his "Essay Concerning Human Understanding". We read:

"Within the four sorts of agreement or disagreement
is, I suppose, contained all the knowledge we have, or
are capable of; for all the inquiries that we can make
concerning any of our ideas, all that we know and can
affirm concerning them is that it is or is not the
same with some other; that it does or does not always
co-exist with some other idea; or that it has a real
existence without the mind." (55)

The categories of thought are here stated in such simplicity that a schematic representation becomes necessary even to say that we follow the classification.

The idea of the quaternion from which vectorial and projective geometrical ideas have developed is a very ancient one. We shall consider the mathematical and logical implications of this ancient idea separately. Before passing from this section we are tempted to quote two lines from Milton to show how the idea has persisted in literature from ancient times:

"Ye elements of the eldest birth
Of Nature's womb that in quaternion run."

Proto-linguistic elements are seen to be present in the structure of complex numbers. The imaginary number 'T'enters into the structure of complex numbers in which real and imaginary numbers enter into relations to be understood in terms of quaternions. Vectors, tensors and scalars are later outgrowths of the concept of quaternions. (56)


When Leibniz wrote, "I hold that the invention of the form of syllogisms is one of the most beautiful that the human mind has made", and asserted that "It is a kind of universal mathematics whose importance is not sufficiently known", he was undoubtedly thinking of the proto-linguistic elements that it represented. Continuing the same line of thought he wrote:

"Algebra itself is not the true characteristic of geometry,
but quite another must be found, which I am certain
will be more useful than algebra for the use of
geometry in the mechanical sciences. And I wonder
that this has hitherto been remarked by no one. For
most of all, men hold Algebra to be the true
mathematical art of discovery, and as long as they
labour under this prejudice, they will never find the
true characteristics of the other sciences." (57)






1, 1= 1 FIGURE

2, 2= 2...........

3, 3= 3...........

4, 4= 4...........

FIG 18.2

When he referred to the alphabet of human thoughts, as also to 'de arte combinatoria' and the 'ars characteristica', and added that by the first he had found the "means of accomplishing in all sciences what Descartes and others


have done in arithmetic and geometry by algebra and analysis" it is not too difficult to guess what was in his mind.He had discovered a proto-linguistic element on which he could build his universal language. The four-fold structure of the form of syllogisms gave him the basis for the superstructure he was planning to erect. Syllogisms represent inferential movements in consciousness represented by the middle term which we might call the zero-point. Instead of subject and predicate we could have the signs (-) and (+). There are thus two sets of reversible movements involving the middle term. Schematically we could represent the syllogistic inferences as shown in fig. 18.2.


The properties of a right-angled triangle as revealed by the Pythagoras Theorem hold good in two ways, referring to the two axes, vertical or horizontal or both treated together. There is the practical verification that is possible, as also the pure one through mathematical logic unaided by experimental aspects. Thought or reasoning may be said to move along the two axes, while the resultant conviction refers to a middle term which corresponds to the norm. Now that Euclidean space and Newtonian motion have been questioned, other considerations have come in to distort the certitude. The three angles of a triangle do not amount to two right-angles any more. Non-Euclidean geometry has displaced the Euclidean. Relativistic epistemology gives primacy to the observer, and there are many correct answers to the same question instead of a single right one. As Wittgenstein would put it:

"2°03 In the atomic fact the objects hang one in another like the members of a chain." (58)

Speaking about Eddington's Principle in the "Philosophy of Science" Sir Edmund Whittaker said:

"Leibniz, however, initiated a new philosophical outlook:
he advocated in his own words (Vol. VI, "Mathesis
Universalis") a subordination of a science of quantity
to the science of quality - of a science that deals with
numerical relations to that which treats of order and
similarity. This is Eddingtonianism pure and simple."


Earlier in the same context he had said:

"Eddington's Principle depends on the distinction
between what we have called quantitative and
qualitative assertions; it may be stated thus: all the
quantitative propositions of physics, that is, the exact
value of the pure numbers that are constants of
science, may be deduced by logical reasoning from
qualitative assertions without making any use of
quantitative data derived from observation."(59)

That geometrical representations were part of the programme that Eddington had in mind when influenced by Leibniz became evident when the work of Eddington was followed up by others like S.R. Milner, F.R.S., after projective geometry was developed and adopted as a language for advanced science. It is interesting to follow Whittaker further to see with what hesitation the claims of a normal proto-language became tacitly adopted. He continues:

"The first progress in carrying out the Leibnizian
programme was achieved in the field of geometry
...The new projective geometry included old metrical
geometry as a particular case; the qualitative concept
of order was shown to lead to a greater degree of
power and generality than the quantitative concept of

"...Eddington based his theory, so far as mathematics
is concerned, on what he called e-numbers. These are
sixteen symbols on the foundations of which it is
possible to construct a non-commutative algebra.
...Milner has now formed from them a class of
expressions which he calls E-tensors which may be
regarded as a new kind of tensors, since they possess
in common with tensors the linearity and the group
property, but they are transformed by the rotations of
the axes of space and time in a different way from


ordinary tensors, and thus he has created a new
branch of tensor analysis, which he has used as the
basis of new developments in theories of gravitation
and electromagnetism." (61)

He concludes strikingly with reference to the structure of the universe, which is to be understood in terms of number:

"...I think we are compelled to believe that there is
a number, at present of the order 10 raised to 78/1
which is fundamental in relation to the structure of
the universe. The question is whether with Eddington
we believe this number to be constant in time or
whether with Dirac and Jordan, we believe it to be
increasing." (62)

He alludes to the reciprocal interdependence between the amount of matter in the universe and the constant of gravitation. With the schema that we have developed in these pages it is not difficult to see, even without entering into the specialized mathematics that is employed by Whittaker, that gravitation, qualitatively understood, would correspond to our vertical axis; and that numbers, when referring to the quantitative aspect of the universe, must be what we call horizontal. There is a slight touch of mysticism and theology when Sir Edmund concludes:

"We stand in awe before the thought that the
intellectual framework of nature is prior to nature
herself - that it existed before the material universe
began its history - that the cosmos revealed to us by
science is only one fragment in the plan of the
eternal." (63)

It is not the mystic touch that we wish to refer to here as un-normalized use of the schematic proto-language. Leibniz minimised the importance of the horizontal aspects of reality; and monads were like the chain links that Wittgenstein speaks about. A tendency to verticalisation at the expense of the ill-understood pre-established harmony factor, as Leibniz would say, is what is not correct according to strict norms of epistemology.


Number and quantity, as representing the vertical and the horizontal aspects of thought, meet in a certain way with Eddington and Leibniz. With both they tend to be verticalized, and the harmony between the two axes of reference is to that extent marred by disproportion. Eddington uses the schematic language to show the difference between the absolutist pattern of thought and the relativistic pattern which, according to him, should be four-dimensional, as we saw above (p. 318). In discrediting the absolutist version he gives a figure which we copy below from his "Nature of the Physical World", which affords an example of the use of a schematic language violating normative rules. The time-element is reduced into a mere point, and the unrealistic pattern of a plane geometrical model is used, while for the relativist pattern he takes care to give duration a line rather than a point as here. The divergent lines are not justified when rational and axiological values are included. A present devoid of significance is what he represents. There are subtle violations of epistemological, methodological and axiological rules. (64)






He explains in the text as follows:

"These hour-glasses (drawn through each point of the
world considered in turn as the Here-Now) embody
what we know of the absolute structure of the world
so far as space and time are concerned. They show
how the grain of the world runs."

The arbitrariness with which he treats this schematic language which should be normalized, is admitted by Eddington when he continues:

"Father Time has been pictured as an old man with a
scythe and an hour-glass. We no longer permit him to
mow instants through the world with his scythe; but
we leave him his hour-glass."


After examining Eddingtonian proto-language, the philosophy of Bergson, which is both scientific and intuitionist at once, offers us a chance for making more explicit the use of the schematic proto-language in integrating different schools of philosophy. There is, as we said, a scientific philosophy, a scientific science and a philosophy of science, based on whichever aspect of reality we consider primary, whetherthe vertical or the horizontal or both.

Locke, Hume and Berkeley take their stand on values belonging to the first-mentioned category.
Eddington is a philosopher of science, which is a recent development.

In between we have philosophers or scientists, or those who are both, and who speak of the subject and the object together. Psycho-physics is at the core of such a compact central group, and language has its life in the vertical aspect of this core, referring to the trans-subjective and inter-physical common ground between the mental and the physical. As an astronomer and a physicist, Eddington thinks in numbers and quantities applicable to the universe of field-physics. Time in its pure aspects does not have such significance for him. For Bergson, change and becoming are all-important, and he takes his position, as it were, within reality rather than as a thinker outside.


He refers to "expérience intégrale" in contradistinction to a mere generalization of experience. (65) Bergson mistrusted 'Le rêve d'une mathématique universelle' ("the dream of a universal mathematics") as a survival of Platonism, and continues:

"Kant a pris pour une réalité ce rève de quelques
philosophes modernes: bien plus, il a cru que toute
connaissance scientifique n'était qu'un fragment
détaché, ou plutôt une pierre d'attente de la
mathématique universelle. Dés lors, la principale
tâche de la critique était de fonder cette mathématique,
c'est-à-dire de determiner ce qui doit être l'intelligence
et ce que doit être l'objet, pour qu'une mathématique
ininterompue puisse les relier l'un à l'autre." (66)

("Kant takes this dream of some modern philosophers for reality: even more, he believes that all scientific knowledge was just a detached fragment, or rather, a stepping-stone to a universal mathematics. Thenceforth, the principal task of critique was to establish such a mathematics, that is, to determine what intelligence should be, and what should be its object, so that an uninterrupted mathematics could link one to the other.")

Bergson's mistrust of an integrated understanding of reality through the symbolism of mathematics - even when symbolism is made more universal - was natural for his time because the latest developments of topology, which belongs to the proto-language aspect with its geometrical schemes, were of a new kind which had not attracted much attention at the time he wrote his best works. When we find that he himself uses such a proto-language in his writings, this proves that the kind of mathematics involved in schematised explanations of reality, synthetically understood, was not repugnant to him. He should himself be classed as a psychologist rather than as a cosmologist. Just as the observer and the field of his observation went together in relativism as opposed to absolutism; so Bergson viewed the evolutionary process of reality as an inner witness rather than as an outer observer.

The proto-language employed by Bergson becomes clear to us from the following example:

"D'òu vient alors qu'une existence en dehors de la
conscience nous parait claire quand il s'agit des
objets, obscure quand nous parlons du sujet? Nos
perceptions, actuelles et virtuelles, s'étendent le
long de deux lignes, l'une horizontale AB, qui
contient tous les objets simultanés dans l'espace,
l'autre verticale CD, sur laquelle se disposent nos
souvenirs successifs échelonnés dans le temps. Le
point I, intersection des deux lignes, est ce qui est
donné actuellement à notre conscience …" (67)


("Whence comes it that an existence outside consciousness seems clear to us when it concerns objects, and obscure when we are talking of the subject? Our actual and virtual perceptions extend along two lines: a horizontal AB, which contains all simultaneous objects in space; and another vertical line CD, along which are disposed our successive memories in time. The point I, at the intersection of the two lines, is what is given to our consciousness at the present moment")

We are not concerned directly in this study with the philosophies of Kant or Bergson. It is not therefore the question here to decide whether Eddington or Bergson are nearer to reality. From the way they give coherence to their views through a proto-linguistic schema, it is possible for us to take a position in the integrated whole which is the field of reasoning. Bergson's philosophy may be said to derive its validity and value from that zone where body and mind meet. What he calls his "schéma moteur" tallies on broad lines with our own except that its coloration with actuality is feeble. Its brilliance as referring to the vertical is high, and realities that are peripheral or actual in an empirical sense do not count for much in his writings, although colourlessly implied in the intensely active 'élan vital'. 'A verticalized type of absolutist and living psychology' could be the characterisation that we could make grosso-modo, in a mixture of the common language with the schematic language developed here. Further precision will be attempted in the pages that remain. If we add here that for Eddington, time was an abstraction and space more real; while for Bergson it was the other way about - a fair comparative appraisal of the two philosophies would be seen as possible in the light of our scheme of integration.


Other experts who have been engaged in linguistic research have at last discovered that it is useless to follow that hackneyed line of investigation which looks for the origin of language in the gestures and laconic grunts of savage people. This kind of theory, which is based on a Darwinian evolutionist bias hitherto affecting the thought of many branches of science, is more and more discredited at present. How far experts are turning their backs on this kind of approach is


marked by the interdiction officially announced by the "Société Linguistique de Paris" which says: "This society does not admit any communication concerning either the origin of language or the creation of a universal language".

In spite of this negative attitude to this aspect of the subject, however, interest in the origin of language - not necessarily evolutionist in the usual sense - has survived and progressed till modern times. Some attempts to reach backwards by extrapolation from the given in language have been undertaken both in the old and new worlds. Two theories stand out, claiming our notice here: one is based on the lyric songs and dances of primitive peoples, and the other is seeking the origin of language in verbal imperatives like 'kill!', 'smash!", 'help!', 'strike!', etc. of people of the area of the African Great Lakes. This last thesis, as with Dr. A.S. Diamond who published his "History and Origin of Language" in 1959, postulates that with imperative utterances like 'help!', 'kill!', etc., other parts of speech developed around the noun-verbs through the accretion of necessary elaboration. John L.M. Trime, who has traced these details in a recent talk on "Who Taught Me Language?" explains:

"In all languages the stock of basic significant sound-
units (phonemes) is small.... Of these, certain types,
plosives (p, t, k, b, d, g, etc.) and nasals (m, n, ng) are
particularly common. Upon this narrow basis are
constructed a large number of morphemes - simple
words, roots and affixes." (68)

After thus probing to the very bottom of the linguistic elements that combine to make language, he refers to what he characteristically calls the ascending hierarchy of units, which expression is of particular relevance in reference to our suggestion in this study that language belongs to the vertical axis. As what Mr. Trim says gives us the position of the latest of scientific linguists, we reproduce here the paragraph that would give this study completeness in respect of linguistics approached from an angle that may be said to be our own.


"When subjected to proper methods of analysis, the
language of every community investigated has proved
to possess a fully developed 'regular structure'. The
types of structure encountered vary widely, but all
share certain fundamental characteristics. All operate
with a small repertory of basic sound units (phonemes)
which are combined together in set ways to form
morphemes, the basic meaningful unit of language,
roots and affixes. These in turn are combined together
in set ways to form an ascending hierarchy of units
(such as 'words', 'clauses', 'sentences'), each having its
own set pattern of subordinate units, each in turn
larger and more complex and with a larger inventory.
Above the word level the inventory is too extensive to
list. Instead, statements of combinability are
generalized in grammar. Above the sentence,
permitted use is so free that no attempt is made
to state the possibilities. Any substantial sequence of
sentences will probably constitute a unique utterance.
All languages are like this; the faculty of language
consists simply in the ability to acquire and operate
such a system, and all human beings possess it." (69)

We have quoted at some length from Mr. Trim and underlined those parts which concern this study closely, to show that the general lines along which modern linguistics for all human beings is being developed have much that is in the spirit of the present study. 'Extension' and 'uniqueness' in the paragraph evidently suggest the two axes; respectively, the horizontal and the vertical; the hierarchy itself being the active, living and changing zone extending horizontally at its middle and re-uniting into uniquely significant speech at the top of the vertical axis. An electro-magnetic field may be said to present this kind of structure. In modern particle physics we have the structure of strangeness and parity with right-handed and left-handed spins, which again suggests the same inner structure of the thought of man reflected in his language; making him Homo Sapiens and Homo Loquens at once.

Our search so far has been into the domain of what we have tried to distinguish as proto-linguistics, polarised as it were negatively at the bottom of the vertical axis of


consciousness. Intellects that conform to what Pascal would call the "esprit géomètrique" are those best suited to an understanding of the structure of this aspect of language. The geometrical structure suggested is necessary to give to language its solid basis, but this does not necessarily mean that a schematised reality is the best version of neutral normative reality understood philosophically, which is quite another matter. The norm itself is something that is neither physical nor metaphysical. Between an epistemology that gives primacy to the physical aspect, and one that gives primacy to the metaphysical aspect, there is a neutral ground in which the absolute unitive norm is to be placed at the very core of our scheme. Language can result only by bringing together the proto- or geometrical aspect in relation with the meta- or algebraic aspect. If we have given importance to the geometrical aspect at this stage of our discussion it is for linguistic reasons and not for philosophical ones. These two aspects have to be kept apart in this study, which is limited to the requirements of a scientific language. We pass on to the search for a meta-language in the next section.

Before we can pass from the discussion of the innate, formal and schematised basis of language, to the more open, nominalistic and symbolically calculable terminal points of linguistic expression, tending to what has been called Babelisation, we have to make this distinction more precise. Instead of entering into the merits of the three levels of semiotics (i.e., the general theory of signs): namely pragmatics, semantics and syntactics, for fear of getting lost in the tangle of theories and counter-theories about the subtler aspects of linguistics*, we are concerned with seeing what kind of link there could be between what we have called proto- and meta-languages.

*e.g. as between leaders such as C.S. Pierce, Ogden and Richards, or by Morris and Carnap himself, who differ slightly or considerably between themselves in the matter of pragmatics; and as between Aristotle's logical form, Euclidean axioms and Leibnizian calculi, not to speak of Boole's logistic, Schroeder's higher functional calculus, together with the contributions made to this body of mathematical, linguistic and logical thought in recent years, touching on the syntactical aspects, and then entering into the various secondary grades of truth-functions that belong to secondary aspects within the semantic level itself, separating L-true or L-implicate or the F-false but L-true possibilities.


The latter term has already received the recognition of Carnap, who defines it as follows:

"Whenever an investigation is made about a language,
we call this language the object-language of the
investigation; and the language in which the results
of the investigation are formulated, the meta-
language." (70)

Even when a meta-language is employed to examine an object-language, the syntactical aspects which lie deep down on the pragmatic level have to be studied by the same aspect in the meta-language, leading to a linguistic indeterminacy, due to the instrument of observation being more delicate or elusive than the object of investigation itself. Bertrand Russell writes about Carnap:

"Carnap advanced the theory that, when errors of
syntax are avoided, a philosophical problem is thereby
either solved or shown to be insoluble. I think, and
Carnap now agrees, that this is an overstatement, but
there can be no doubt that the utility of philosophical
syntax in relation to traditional problems is very
great." (71)

Besides Carnap, Russell himself is the principal spokesman of the group of logical positivists who have behind them names with corresponding theories, as between Morris and Bloomfield. Frege thought of logical rules without designata. Hilbert developed the axiomatic aspects with geometrical and symbolic calculi together.

The three-volume "Principia Mathematica", jointly produced by Whitehead and Russell, is the one work which brings to its culminating point this kind of logico-mathematico-philosophico-linguistic thought.


The whole domain of investigation is capable of being characterised as bristling with hair-splitting 'ifs' and 'buts', and treads certain ground only when dealing with tautologies and contradictions analysed into numbered varieties of paradoxes. After looking at its pages full of symbols, of which many other varieties exist, adding to the confusion of tongues, one asks oneself, "How then - even supposing all this is true - is this meant to serve human progress, and in what respect?"

The great Hume himself, whose scepticism is referred to as the starting point for scientific philosophising, remarked that it is clear definitions that count and not difficulties created by indeterminate meanings of words. 'Propositions are definitions' he states, and continues,

'It is the same case with all those pretended
syllogistical reasonings, which may be found
in every other branch of learning except the
sciences of quantity and number'. (72)

The attitude of Logical Empiricists in general is to give importance to signs and symbols as against schematic models or geometrical patterns. In other words, they have a meta-linguistic prejudice. This is expressed by Carnap when he writes about attempts to make intuitive models by analogy with known macro-processes. Evidently, he is referring to schematic patterns such as what we have tried to present in this study. Carnap says:

"Many attempts have been made in this direction, but
without satisfactory results. It is important to realise
that the discovery of a model has no more than an
aesthetic or didactic, or at best a heuristic value, but
is not at all essential for a successful application of
a physical theory." (73)

Further on, he makes his attitude to proto-linguistic patterns clearer still when he states:

"There the physicist could not tell us what he meant by
the symbol 'E' in Maxwell's equations. Perhaps in
order not to refuse an answer, he would tell us that 'E'
designates the electric field-vector."


Carnap concludes characteristically in a two-faced attitude:

"An 'intuitive understanding' or a direct translation of 'E'
into terms referring to observable properties is neither
necessary nor possible." (74)

The sour-grapism implied here is evident.
The physicist is, generally speaking, not any better here.



This makes the language of symbolic logic, like that of higher mathematics, suitable only in equating subtle epistemological or axiological counterparts, understood, as it were, in a dialectical context. While fighting a priorism and solipsism, the language preferred by empiricists, by a strange irony, fully admits these elements by the back door. The schoolboy riddle about A being the brother of B but B not being the brother of A needs the horizontal observable aspect - the very aspect that symbolism misses totally. Physics, above all other sciences to which the empiricist must give primacy, depends on field-dimensions referring to quantitative, experimental and observable factors which are exactly what is omitted by the meta-language of signs and symbols. Even in the domain of calculables it takes three lines of formulae containing Greek letters, with exponential signs and other special signs between them, before proving, as Wittgenstein points out (75), that 2+2=4. We cannot copy them here nor an ordinary printer print the three lines without having special types of innumerable varieties. This cannot be said to add to the simplicity of a symbolic logical language for science. That it is not tenable for other intrinsic reasons of epistemology has been strikingly pointed out and not answered effectively by Russell himself; for in Russell's own words in the Introduction to Wittgenstein's work:

"The essential business of language is to assert or
deny facts...In order that a certain sentence should
assert a certain fact there must, however the language
may be constructed, be something in common between
the structure of the sentence and structure of the
fact. This is perhaps the most fundamental thesis of
Mr. Wittgenstein's theory. That which has to be in
common between the structure of the sentence and
the fact cannot, so he contends, be itself in turn said
in language. It can, in his phraseology only be shown,
not said, for whatever we may say will still need to
have the same structure." (76)


To the syllogistic forms of Aristotle, logistics have added their propositional calculus which, instead of being based on middle term, subject and predicate, has been further elaborated with the inclusion of words like 'is', 'are', 'not' 'and' 'or' 'if any', 'some'. 'every', 'all', which are said to correspond to signs of logic. The formalism of Aristotle is said to be superseded by the term "syntactical structure". The meta-language must further have its preferred philosophical terms replacing the more commonly understood ones. What contribution these make to an open and universal scientific language to be used by all, or by any at all, is problematic. The airy verbosity in which semiosis has to thrive is evident from one more quotation we shall take, this time from C.W Morris, whose "Foundations of the Theory of Signs" offers as consistent picture of the implications of the relation between signs and language as can be reasonably expected in any possible meta-language.

"Thus in Semiosis something takes account of
something else mediately, i.e., by means of a third
something. Semiosis is accordingly a mediated-
taking-account-of. The mediators are sign vehicles,
the taking-account-of are interpretants, the agents of
the process are interpreters, what is taken-account-
of are designates. There are several comments to be
made of this formulation." (77)

The underlying credo of the school of linguistics is given in the following:

"... it is necessary from the standpoint of behaviouristics
to deny that such (private) experiences are of central
importance, or that the fact of their existence makes the
objective study of semiosis impossible or even incomplete."


Thus, by being affiliated to one particular outlook and by reason of preferring meta-language as against any other possible or legitimate ones, although such may be recognized as necessary; as also by reason of the circumlocutory abstractions of the sign language which shuts out one whole aspect of truth from its purview; and condemned anteriorly by Hume and posteriorly by Wittgenstein - the whole volume of effort in the direction of a language for unified science by logical empiricists seems to us to be heading towards an inevitable impasse. The later Wittgenstein has roughly indicated a way out of the blind alley, which we shall presently examine, linking it with the contributions of Leonard Bloomfield and Braithwaite's contributions to our correct understanding of what a scientific language should be.


At the beginning of this study we clarified the inter-physical and trans-subjective nature of linguistic events in the neutral consciousness of an observer-witness of a typical composite linguistic situation with four dimensions of two axes. Much experimental and theoretical evidence has been adduced to give this scheme its fullest possible status of non-arbitrariness and scientific, logical, mathematical and philosophical validity. More direct or indirect support will be derived in what we still have to say. Although avowedly affiliated to the context of Behaviourism, C.W. Morris, in his efforts to delve into the syntactic structure of logical form, depends, perhaps more than he would admit, on mental dimensions and subtle invisible processes. He uses expressions like "the dual control of linguistic structure" and is obliged to use such self-composed compound expressions as "mediated-taking-account-of", which are not fully made explicit. The later Wittgenstein may be said to step into the context at this point, and his "Philosophical Investigations" contain an analysis of the subtler aspects of linguistic structure which is not given to the tough eye of mere behaviourists. Empiricism is only one degree removed from strict behaviourism, and the pragmatists' approach is perhaps


removed another degree. The behaviouristic aspect of language may be said to be the fraction of the iceberg that is above water. Any linguistic that refuses to take account of the subtler explicit aspects unrecognised by behaviourism may to that extent be characterised as inadequate for arriving at a scientific language which combines observables and calculables together. The limitations under which a pragmatic linguist suffers have been put together by Leonard Bloomfield, whose approach to linguistic problems is diametrically opposed to that of C.W. Morris. His linguistic credo is stated as follows:

"If language is taken into account, then we can
distinguish science from other phases of human
activity by agreeing that science shall deal only with
events that are accessible in their time and place to
any and all observers (strict behaviourism); or only
with events that are placed in co-ordinates of time
and space (mechanism); or that science shall employ
only such initial statements and predictions as lead
to definite handling operations (operationalism); or
only terms such as are derivable by rigid definition
from a set of every-day terms concerning physical
happenings (physicalism)." (79)

Bloomfield takes care to add soon after, "this delimitation does not restrict the subject-matter of science but rather characterises its method".(80) How matter and method could be separated is not easy to understand, and if the limitations were strict, the causes of negative hallucinations or pains or troubles like mutism and its etiology would be taboo to scientists. Such a closing of the frontiers of science is not in the interests of a unified science with a universal language.

Braithwaite of Cambridge has a more open attitude towards scientific language, as explained in his recent work, to which Mr. B.C. Brookes refers in his article on the "Difficulty of Interpreting Science"(81), Braithwaite distinguishes three levels of abstraction in a terminological hierarchy. The terms of the lowest level refer to simple observables. At the second level observables and theoretical terms are related;


and finally in the third level there are formulae (like Maxwell's hypothesis). These are formulae containing theoretical terms only, which he distinguishes by the name "Campbellian hypotheses". These include the highest and the most general laws. Mr. Brookes observes relevantly in this connection,

"Any actual science robbed of its most general hypotheses would, I believe, collapse under its own weight of detail."


This terminological hierarchy, with the first level lying at the meeting-point of the vertical and the horizontal axes but referring only to the horizontal; the second hierarchical level lying in the vertical but referring to the horizontal; and the third lying wholly in the vertical and implying the horizontal, just as a magnetic field is implicit in electricity - could be very well appreciated by us in the light of the remarks and discussions above. Mr. Brookes concludes his article saying:

" .... any language .... in a literal sense is both the
experience and the expression of it .... So those who
ask for more and better interpretations of science can
be wholly satisfied only if they join the scientist in his
laboratory and learn how to share his scientific
experience." (82)

The personality of the scientist, as in the neutral witness observer '0' of our linguistic experimental situation, is where, after all, scientific or any other language must be said to have its being.

The terminological hierarchy of Braithwaite is nothing other than the basis of the 'family resemblance' that Wittgenstein tries to reveal in his "Philosophical Investigations" through what he calls "language-games". Linguistic space, like logical, monadic, atomic or vectorical space, is an abstraction where physics and metaphysics meet and fuse into unity. The unexpected puzzlements that are possible within this meeting-point of the logos and the nous elude strict scientific analysis. It can be looked upon as a mystery or a verbal oddity according to the temperaments ranging between the scepticism of a Hume or the belief of a Kierkegaard.


This contains variables, according to mathematicians, or dimensions, according to relativists; and the principle of the quaternion runs through it. Such are some of the passing remarks we have to make before placing Wittgenstein rightly in the linguistic context of philosophical investigation. He may be said to mark an important stage in the understanding of the nature of language in its full philosophical light, which is neither confined to observables nor calculables.


Ever since the publication of the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" of Wittgenstein, a feeling of discomfort has been produced in the minds of philosophers, who thought that factors like mind and self were to be discovered by scientists at the tip of the scalpel or in the space within a bell-jar. Relativist and quantum-mechanical ideas had opened a new vista for science, and empiricism and logic were put together. Mathematics and logic were married and logic was examined in a larger philosophical context. The ladder of logic itself was to be discarded, and philosophers were asked to observe silence about matters that they did not fully understand, as in the last saying of the earlier Wittgenstein, which read:

"6°54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way:
he who understands me finally recognizes
them as senseless when he has climbed out
through them, on them, over them. (He must
so to speak throw away the ladder after he
has climbed up on it.) He must surmount
these propositions; then he sees the world
7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be
silent." (83)

The content of this silence was meant perhaps to give the same subject a philosophical status. Philosophical puzzlement was such that language alone could finally


penetrate into its secrets. Thus he called what he wrote "language-games" instead of entering into proof, ontological or otherwise, about philosophical verities, whether absolute or relative, pluralistic or monistic. Simple words were to divulge the subtle factors of philosophical puzzlement. The method was so novel and deturgent that intelligent thinkers in the West have not yet fully recovered from the effects of the sheer novelty of the approach to philosophy through language.

The language-games devised by Wittgenstein amply make evident that the philosophical implications of language do not stop within the limits of physicalism, mechanism or operationism. It is not so simple as the handling action - such as when someone says, 'pass me an apple' and if an apple is handy, one passes it - which is what comprises the scope of all language as understood pragmatically by Bloomfield. The lyrical origin of words, as Vico of Italy advocated; and word-origin in verbal-noun imperatives like 'Help!', 'Kill!', as we have examined already - were not sufficient. The interconnections of the structure of language went in different dimensions or as between inner variables. Under item 67 of
Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" we read:

"67 ... And we extend our concept of number as
in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre.
And the strength of the thread does not reside
in the fact that some one fibre runs through
the whole length, but in the overlapping of
many fibres." (84)

Just as the word-games cover many kinds of games, number has kinds that have a family resemblance-factor running through all of them. Here, by the example of the fibres that go to give strength to the thread, he wants to say that individual concepts have a dovetailing series of shades of meaning which make them hang together, with a subtle import running through their whole series, giving them a vertical bond of unity. Again under 284 we read:

"Regardez une pierre et imaginez qu'elle ait des
sensations. On se dit à soi même comment pourrait-
on en venir à cette idée d'attribuer une sensation à
une chose? On pourrait aussi bien l'attribuer à un
nombre! Et maintenant, regardez une mouche se
tortiller; du coup la difficulté a disparue, et il semble
que la douleur puisse s'attaquer là ou il n'y avait, pour
ainsi dire, qu'un terrain trop lisse, trop uni pour elle et
donc défavorable." (85)

("Look at a stone and imagine that it has sensations. One can ask oneself how one could come to the idea of attributing sensation to a thing? One might as well attribute it to a number! Now look at a fly writhing in pain - suddenly the problem disappears, and it seems that pain can attack only where the terrain is not too slippery and homogenous for it, and thus unfavourable")


He then goes on to take the case of a dead body which would appear to be completely inaccessible to pain. The difference in attitude is not to be explained by saying that there is only a difference of behaviour. He would rather say "c'est là un cas de la transition de la quantité à la qualité". ("this is a case of transition from quantity to quality") He goes on to say under item 293 that an object could itself disappear out of account if put in a certain relation:

" ... si l'on construit la grammaire des expressions de
la sensation d'après le modèle 'objet et designation',
l'objet même disparait comme hors de propos." (86)

("If one were to construct a grammar of expressions of sensation, following a model of 'object and designation', then the object itself disappears as irrelevant")

In the example given above of attributing sensation or pain to a stone, the psycho-physical or neutral status of language is brought out. Quality and quantity are treated on a par equitably, as interchangeable trans-physically and inter-subjectively. The neutrality established between object and 'designation' in the last quotation amounts linguistically to the abolition of the objective status of the thing to which the attribute is said to belong. Both the elements have to be on a par to be related at all.

The nature of the vertical relation that Wittgenstein takes all the trouble to explain, is strikingly brought out by another of his items of investigation. Under 77 he writes:

"... the degree to which the sharp picture can
resemble the blurred one depends on the latter's
degree of vagueness ...but if the colours in the
original merge without a hint of any outline, won't
it become a hopeless task to draw a sharp picture
corresponding to a blurred one? Anything and
nothing is right - and this is the position you are in
if you look for definitions corresponding to our
concepts in aesthetics and ethics." (87)


From the standpoint of a neutral observer and witness which we have postulated earlier in this study, for experimental observations we could think of two situations arising as between two persons in the dark room. Supposing that one had a tooth-ache or stomach-ache; to appreciate his pain it would be the same if the lights are on or off. If on the other hand the suffering was due to a heavy load that one carried, it would definitely be better to have the lights on to measure the suffering involved. The age, stature, sex, complexion and other factors have to be appreciated by a rapport that is overt and inter-physical or, to use our terminology, horizontal, while the silent pain suffered without physical change in behaviour, but possibly expressed in words, would be activity that still remained within the limits of the vertical - at least from the linguistic standpoint.

After recommending silence at the end of his earlier work, Wittgenstein introduces us in his later work into the core of the philosophical substratum of all language and thought. In the last of the quotations above, he hints that a vertical psycho-physical relationship between model and imitation is the way to axiology.


Before we can treat of subjects like Aesthetics and Ethics, which imply axiology, we have to explain here a higher kind of reasoning which pure mathematics shares with what is vaguely understood in our times as dialectics. Syllogistic propositions are the rungs of the ladder with which one attains to a-syllogistic reasoning. This ladder was what Wittgenstein asked the person who followed his propositions to discard in the last item of his "Tractatus". When two pictures tallied with each other but differed in the degree of clarity of line, light or colour, there is a maximum limit and a minimal


limit within the amplitude of which such bi-polar relation could be recognized. Beyond these upper and lower limits, as between tautology and contradiction in the prepositional calculus of symbolic logic, 'anything or nothing' is right. Ordinary syllogistic calculi refer more to the horizontal than to the vertical movement of reasoning. The distinction drawn between 'fact-truth' and 'logic-truth', is that one is independent of the other. This verity is brought out strikingly by Wittgenstein when he states "One can draw conclusions from a false proposition" (4°023) (88). Truth-functions and truth-grounds are distinguished under item 5° 101 of the 'Tractatus', and a schematic representation of sixteen truth-possibilities in symbolic and ordinary language, ranging from an upper limit of tautology and a lower limit of contradiction as between 'p' and 'q', which are related elements. The shortcomings of Frege's and Russell's way of looking at logic, giving primacy to the horizontal aspect without recognizing the vertical principle running through the whole series, are effectively pointed out in several places, such as where he says:

"Laws of inference, which - as in Frege and Russell -
are to justify the conclusions, are senseless and would
be superfluous." (5° 132)

In this vertical view of logic taken by Wittgenstein, what is important for us in this study is to note what he says in respect of relations between a theory of knowledge, a branch of natural science, and philosophy conceived as an activity.

"(The word 'philosophy' must mean something which
stands above or below, but not beside the natural
sciences)." (4° 111)

"Philosophy is not a theory but an activity" (4° 112)

"The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of
psychology" (4° 1121)"

Earlier he said:

"All philosophy is critique of language" (4°0031)

Put together in the light of his later writings, which go beyond the zone of propositions into the domain of linguistic


structure in a purer form, irrespective of considerations of duality between 'p' and 'q', which is the subject of all the paradoxes of Russell, we have a modernized version of the age-old dialectical method of reasoning dating from Parmenides and Zeno of pre-Socratic days. It represents, according to the schematic terminology that we have developed in this study, simply a vertical way of higher reasoning. A.C. Bradley in recent years devoted a whole volume to the demolition of conventional textbook-logic and installed instead the time-honoured dialectical way of which Hegel in modern philosophy revived a version, though vitiated by historical perspectives which were extraneous to pure dialectical thinking. A horizontal bias has been given to dialectics in the version known as dialectical materialism that is meant to support politics. What Bradley says in the context of double negation would be sufficient for us to quote here just to show that there are other modern writers who understood fully the implications and the differences as between horizontal and vertical reasoning:

"It is obvious that 'duplex negatio affirmat'. To say
'It is false that A is not B' is equivalent to the positive
assertion 'A is B'. But this is not because the added
negation barely negates the original judgement. For if
that were all, we should be left with nothing. If mere
'not-A' is simply zero, then 'not-not-A' is, if possible,
less. We must not say that negation presupposes a
positive judgement which is left in possession when
the negative is negated. For we saw before (Ch. Ill
Sec. 4) that this positive judgement is not presupposed." (89)

What is important for us to gather here from the above is that logic, like language, is an activity that moves up or down a vertical scale, as implied in the familiar terms still prevailing in academic circles from most ancient times: ascending and descending dialectics. Let us hear the words of Prof. Louis Lavelle of the Collège de France who, in summarising his course said:


".... Enfin, la question se pose de savoir comment
l'unité de l'esprit peut engendrer la multiplicité des
idées. Et si l'on remonte facilement du monde de l'idée
dans une dialectique ascendente, c'est la dialectique
descendante qui est l'objet propre de la metaphysique.
Platon ne l'a qu'esquissé.
.... il s'agit surtout pour Aristote de montrer comment
l'idée s'incarne, alors que pour Platon, il s'agissait au
contraire de montrer comment elle se désincarne".(90)

("Finally, the question arises as to how the unity of spirit can give rise to the multiplicity of ideas. And if it is easy to rise from the world of ideas by ascending dialectics, it is descending dialectics that is the proper object of metaphysics. Plato only touched upon this. … Aristotle is mainly concerned with showing how ideas are incarnated; while Plato is concerned, on the contrary, with how they disincarnate.")

Bergson himself refers to the two functions of the intelligence in terms of what he calls a latent form of geometrical or spatial intuition that is at the basis of deduction and induction in reasoning, which he qualifies as "fonctions essentielles de l'intelligence." (91) Even Charles Sanders Pierce could be quoted to support this vertical and active view that he evidently takes, even when remaining a leader of pragmatic and pluralistic thought.
He says:

"When I just said that thought is an action, and that it
consists of a relation, although a person performs an
action and not a relation, which can only be the result
of an action; yet there is no inconsistency in what I
said, but only grammatical vagueness." (92)

It is not certain if the followers of Pierce would accept that he had consciously or unconsciously something of the old-world way of dialectics in his mode of thinking, but a close scrutiny of the distinction he makes is the same as what we want to make in this study as between the vertical and horizontal aspects of language and grammar respectively.

Pure mathematics, which consists of equations, especially in the statements of the principal findings of science, is a highly-verticalized version of a common language which might be said to spread its ideas horizontally.

The quantum theory tends to abolish the concrete or the horizontal aspect of language in favour of a verticalized one.
Eddington, writing on this subject, shows us how the new


language of physics in the context of quantum mechanics speaks the symbolic and concrete language of co-ordinates.

"... if the quantum theory condemns these images as
too concrete, and leaves us with no coherent images
at all, at least we have symbolic co-ordinates and
momenta and Hamiltonian functions devoting
themselves with single minded purpose to ensuring
that qp-pq shall equal to ih/2 7i." (93)

Every equation may be said to imply dialectical reasoning, because the concrete sensory aspect is absent and reasoning moves up or down inductively or deductively through an axis where all active thinking may be said to reside, to give clear ideas primacy over brute matter. Dialectical reasoning is most concerned with that third level of scientific terminological hierarchy that Braithwaite refers to as consisting of Campbellian hypotheses. Between what we have called the proto-linguistic and the meta-linguistic - the former resembling geometry and the latter algebra - there is a vertical line along which thought moves up and down to produce the language of Campbellian hypotheses. When translated into common language, the same findings of science become expressed in a horizontal version of the same fact, truth or value-content. All scientific language when properly normalized or re-normalized upward to the central norm, or downward from the meta-linguistic side, results in a common language, irrespective of the vernacular tongues. Such is the main line of thought that we have sustained throughout in the present study.That mathematics itself consists of an ascending or a descending hierarchy of linguistic elements is referred to graphically in the following quotation:

"All the lore of mathematics may be considered as
stored in a tall building with many floors, each having
spacious entrance halls, large rooms, closets and
cupboards of every sort. The ground floor is devoted
to arithmetic, the second floor to plane and solid
geometry, the next to algebra, then come trigonometry
and analytic geometry. Above this are successive
floors devoted to calculus, differential equations,
probability, complex function theory, mathematical
logic and so on."

There are many books in the different floors but "Few of these books, however, provide easy transition between floors". (94)


Unified science, conceived in its global totality and unity, cannot afford to leave out any aspect of wisdom, science or knowledge that, when normatively ordered, could belong to it with legitimacy. We have in our days books devoted to what is called the science of emotions. We could have similarly a study of passions such as that of Th. Ribot. Mathematics itself has its emotional repercussions, and Eddington and others have treated of dry physical calculations and mysticism side-by-side as aspects of the totality of the human world of inner or outer values or interests. We can only refer to these aspects of the science of man in order to assign them their positions in the scheme we have so far developed.

Personal taste and aesthetic appreciation go together. The creative artist stands before a painting, and what he is capable of appreciating is just what corresponds to what is in him already. The self at the negative pole of the vertical enters into a bi-polar relation with its own non-self aspect and, projecting a world from within outwards, is capable of seeing itself in terms of the object of art. Except in the appreciation of cheap multicoloured representations which can still remain in the horizontal, real art is where the self enters in relation with the non-self vertically. This applies to all other arts, based on other senses or activities than the visual.

Ethics depends on a sense of goodness or value which one admires in oneself as in others. Aristotle's "Nichomachean Ethics" is based on this principle of being specifically oneself. There are other ethics like the hedonistic where horizontal values enter.


Mystics are those who are said to cultivate the presence of God. There are active and intellectual ones among them, as also quietists who could be classed as belonging to one or other aspect of the normative scheme we have outlined. Any further elaboration of these aspects will take us beyond the limits of our present study. Whatever space remains we shall devote to applied aspects of the theory we have developed so far.


In a speech delivered before the British Academy as recently as the year 1956, the late Prof. J.L. Austin is reported to have had "his eye on the distant - the very distant - prospect" of what he called "a true Science of Language, the joint offspring of philosophy, grammar, linguistics, logic and many other disciplines". He was reputed to be a person who advocated the adoption of the common language because he said, among other reasons for basing a scientific language on it,

"our common stock of words embodies all the
distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the
connections they have found worth marking, in the
life-times of many generations".

Words, moreover, in the ordinary vocabulary of language, were numerous and already available material to work on. Instead of thinking up new expressions, we have to take the given and, if necessary, with ordinary language as a basis, improve on it. He thought it important that the tools that philosophers had to use should be clean ones, and words that were to be the tools of philosophers deserved to be treated not as mere facts or things, but as representing entities of a subtler order. In thinking of a true science of language he thought in terms of a detailed and patient 'anatomisation of attendant vocabularies'. When once asked if this kind of modest ambition would solve all problems, this remarkable philosopher who had devoted his long labours to this subject, terminating in his death only this year (1960), is said to have replied characteristically, "No - or if you prefer it; alas, no". (95)

We are referring here to the above report in order to indicate roughly the prevailing mood at the present moment in respect of a project such as ours in this study, which


follows roughly the same ambitions and lines of thought as that of the professor of Oxford. It came into our hands at the same moment of challenge of this difficult subject, on which many noble minds have in the past exercised their superior intelligence in vain. We have taken care to indicate this at the very beginning, so that anyone whose expectations were raised higher than what was possible would be intimated in advance. A veritable science of language and a veritable language of science are the obverse and the reverse of the same coin. In language we touch that central core of all science or wisdom in which philosophy and science meet differencelessly. The uncertainty principle applies here as between the horizontal and vertical aspects of science. The neutral consciousness is where both the axes meet.

This is the 'age of analysis' for philosophy, as some thinkers declare, and among the analytic philosophers are included all those who do not pin much faith on the notion of the Absolute. Pragmatics and pluralism go together, and all notions that seem to refer to the Absolute are not at all in favour with those philosophers who are classed together for some subtle reason as standing against any absolutism in style as in doctrine. Anti-absolutism and 'de-Hegelisation', as Morton White would call the attitude in general, characterise the philosophy of the analytical philosophers, among whom we have names such as Pierce, Whitehead, James Dewey, Russell, Wittgenstein, Croce, Bergson, Sartre, Santayana and others.


Whether Wittgenstein (especially the later) could be fitted into a common frame of philosophical reference with the others is itself doubtful. This has been expressed by Morton White himself who has grouped them together.(96) The words analytic' and 'synthetic', as applied to philosophies, are perhaps the most misleading. An analytic judgement in Kant is not the same as one used by Bradley, and Bertrand Russell has his own connotation for it in the context of Logical Atomism. The very first chapter of the compilation of analytic philosophies is entitled "The Decline and Fall of the Absolute". This distaste for anything that savours of Absolutism is a wave or vogue that affects the best of modern minds.


Perhaps the distaste for the word, otherwise a respectable and scientifically and epistemologically strict word, has something to do with the last World War and the bitter taste that some political absolutists left behind. Dialectics and absolutism go together in the sober philosophical context, untainted by power politics, and there is no reason why it should not be re-instated after "its decline and fall". The indeterminate neutral world which we have so often indicated in this study, and without which a normative notion would be difficult and incorrect to postulate, is in fact tacitly accepted by the most extreme of pragmatists, as can be proved from the examination of select paragraphs from their writings. In fact the notion of the Absolute is at the basis of philosophising, and in thinking so we have the support of no less a philosopher than Bergson, who is otherwise referred to as the greatest of the philosophers of action or pragmatism. Speaking of the extra-intellectual element that Kant introduced into philosophical thought, Bergson writes:

".... Coincidant avec cette matière (extra-intellectuelle),
adoptant le même rhythme et le même movement, la
conscience ne pourrait-elle pas, par deux efforts de
direction inverse, se haussant et s'abaissant tour à
tour, saisir du dedans et non plus apercevoir du
dehors les deux formes de la réalité, corps et esprit?
Ce double effort ne nous ferait-il pas, dans la mesure
du possible, revivre l'absolu? Comme d'ailleurs, au
cours de cette opération, on verrait l'intelligence surgir
d'elle meme, se découper dans le tout de l'esprit, la
connaissance intellectuelle apparaîtrait alors telle
qu'elle est, limitée, mais non plus relative." (97)

("Coincidentally with this (extra-intellectual) matter, and adopting the same rhythm and motion, could not consciousness then, by two efforts in opposite directions, alternately raising and lowering itself, grasp from within and no longer perceive from without, the two forms of reality, mind and matter? Would this double effort not allow us, insofar as is possible, to re-live the Absolute? Moreover, as in the course of this operation one would see intelligence arise of itself and become distinct from the total mind, intellectual knowledge would appear as it really is, limited but no longer relative.")

This dialectically-revalued and revived notion of the absolute,laced by intrapolation, as it were, into the context of the extra-intelligent factor which is the extrapolated factor of the same principle, with the dichotomy or polarisation as between mind and body, is a complete schematic representation of what we have called the vertical axis of reference in different contexts in the course of this study. A scientific,


normatively-understood notion of the Absolute placed at the core of life is one of the principal contributions we wish to make in the present study, as necessary and inevitable for building round it a veritable science of language and thereby laying the foundations of a veritable language of science. Just as we have seen how elements of dialectical thought are implicit in philosophers who would disavow any such description of their philosophies, the notion of the Absolute is still implicit in their writings.


The personal pronoun 'I' and the relative pronoun 'this': the one referring to the self, and the other referring to the object, give us the two primary directions that radiate outward from the central consciousness represented by the neutral Absolute. The horizontal may be said to refer to what is spatial, and the vertical to time or duration in consciousness. We rely on Bergsonian metaphysics to give the philosophical amplifications in these matters. Intelligence, innate instinctive dispositions and emotions could be referred to the vertical. The line that would demarcate the vertical from the horizontal would depend on the subject in which the norm is postulated. This is because, as Leibniz would put it, "The universe is in a manner multiplied as many times as there are substances". (98) Each monad is a world in itself, and, just as the political personality of a state is complete with its ruler and all other aspects temporal or spiritual; so each branch of the science of philosophy has its central norm and its other secondary aspects of the vertical and the horizontal. The unit of units is the Absolute Unit. Just as one salt-crystal is the same as another in the same matrix; so normalized thought has the same type and form. The microscopic structure in particle physics, with its 'parity' and 'strangeness', refers to the two axes within the branch of science of particle physics. The expanding universe, with its cosmic rays and galaxies influencing across axes, conforms to the same model as in quantum physics. They resemble thoughts which, between them, have the same structure. This is what made Sir Edmund Whittaker say, "the intellectual framework of nature is prior to nature herself."


We can imagine these nuclear patterns of unitive or integrated thought themselves holding together in a pattern that is more general. Small salt crystals adhere to bigger ones with the same crystallographic form.


Whether big or small, unique or aggregate, a single over-all framework connects the core of the psycho-physically conceived human consciousness with which we are concerned when we use language scientifically as of science, science and through science. To bring out the structure of this framework of the universe - whether anteriorly within us or posteriorly in the visible universe of quantities or calculables resembling number - we can think of no better single example than the theorem of Pythagoras. We could think of two right-angled triangles with eyes shut, or draw them on paper: one would refer to the relations between three stars in the sky; and the other would exist as a familiar notion of its schematised properties in the mind, derived from, say, earth measurement in an every-day sense. Divested of colour and form, except in the topological sense, we have a movement of reasoning or thought that could equate, with or without intermediate steps of a mathematico-logical or syllogistic order, the more familiar triangle with the less familiar one. This latter could be the object of investigation. These properties of right-angled triangles could be investigated horizontally in the way known in the classroom, by cutting out and fitting together parts that correspond to the squares of the sides. Even if Euclidean space is not what is to be investigated, some normative over-all notion with two axes of reference could be called the over-all framework.

Common-sense science lives and moves in the horizontal, while the scientist trained to use the concepts and arguments of theoretical mathematics or logic lives and moves in the vertical. Thus we are able in science to distinguish between two languages: one that is now called ordinary and the other which is called logistic. The controversy, now perhaps at its zenith, between the choice of a common language or a symbolic language for science, could be settled by saying that both have their uses. Scientific certitude is the resultant


of the two ways of reasoning taking place simultaneously in the space of linguistic thought, neutrally conceived in the context of the Absolute.


Conviction or certitude that is theoretically apodictic or practically verifiable is both admissible and at the core of the activity called scientific thought. The language of science and the science of language have their common origin in the degree of certitude, which is the essential value that science represents. This certitude can refer to existents like the earth that we measure with geometry, or to topological triangles in the mind, leading reason through higher and higher stages. Just as the turn we have to take at a certain crossing of roads in a big city is certain only when the roads and the map markings agree, so the central certitude that is a neutral value in science has to be translated into verticalized or horizontalized aspects before communicable common knowledge or calculable pure ideas could take place in the consciousness of man, neutrally or normatively understood. Scientific language can result only when the structure and peculiarities of the norm of all thought are fully respected. A common man standing in the laboratory of a specialist might need an ordinary explanation of how pointer readings are related to facts or events; in the same way, an ordinary mechanic can repair a car without being an expert engineer. What they are for, how they came to be there, or how they work, is what matters here. If the common man is interested, he might need explanations about the steps of inference that the scientist might use, sometimes aided by many black-boards on pulleys, by means of which common-sense language becomes more and more verticalized without reference to observables. From there it goes past the point where both calculables and observables are understandable to the common man, and into the region of Campbellian hypotheses that we have referred to earlier.

Thus the same vertico-horizontal structure has to be thought of as applicable at every stage of science. Indirect observables - as with stellar spectra and bands that move, showing a


universe that expands; or galaxies moving out peripherally in space; or complicated calculables with E numbers - thus get into the scope of what is called scientific language. For clarity and the certitude that should result from the use of scientific language, what is horizontal in content should not be mixed up with what is vertical, except for the sake of a particular expert branch where one has to specialize. The dentist should not wait until he attains to the pinnacle of the theoretical secrets of the medical profession before he can ply his trade. That proportion of the calculables and observables that belongs properly to an expert specialist has to be put into an organic or global whole to serve the purposes of that central value that a scientific activity serves. A creative painter could cut himself off from the theory and conventions of painting and the imitation of Rembrandt or Picasso. He would then have his own combination of vertico-horizontal elements to make him valuable, or merely successful as a pavement artist. Language might have as many shades or possibilities as the innumerable colours that are imaginable or possible to make with paints.


When Hume asks us categorically to "commit…then to the flames", a book that "neither contain(s) experimental reasoning concerning fact and existence, nor reasoning concerning quantity or number", he has a certain conviction which is, as it were, at the back of his mind. Hume, as a sceptic and phenomenalist, would perhaps not approve of the a priori as understood by scholastic speculation, which he mistrusts strongly. In spite of this, however, it is certain that he is thinking in terms of certain categories which he wants to make as apodictically certain as possible.

As a philosopher he is able to reach within himself, as it were,to this two-fold conception which would alone give, according to him, any value at all to scientific or scientifically-conceived literature of any kind. He may in short be said to have a proto-linguistic pattern in his mind. We have seen how Locke himself, in spite of his clean-slate doctrine of mind, had his


categories which fitted into the same pattern. Berkeley differed from Locke, and while doing so, independently of accepting Locke's views, he still accepted the same methodological and epistemological frame of reference. His theological affiliation as a dignitary of the church was kept apart, perhaps for non-philosophical or un-philosophical reasons. As empiricists, all three gave primacy to values said to originate outside or inside some sort of mental space which they never clearly explained. Their scepticism did not amount to disbelief in God, but in the tangle of theological disputations about the nature of God. They sought a greater degree of certitude in speculative matters and, mistrusting the meta-language of theology which had gone too far in the direction of over-speculativeness, they turned to other frames of
reference on which they could feel as if standing on firmer ground. They had, in other words, a proper proto-linguistic frame of reference, scientifically conceived, upon which they could erect the superstructure of their philosophies.
The result was that their philosophy had a scientific character.

To visualize the meta-linguistic aspect of scientific language we have to choose another example. The vast body of speculative literature giving primacy to names rather than forms could be included here. A schoolboy describing how a certain salt is to be obtained from an acid and a base might go into details that have nothing to do with the scientific problem, method or value involved. Rules of epistemology might be violated. If a stone hit the head of the boy in the playground, he would have to adopt a common proto-language removed far from the meta-language of science. Weeping would not fit into the context of the science class or the laboratory. Thus within the limits of the proto- and meta-languages there are many vertico-horizontal systems proper for each level of language to adopt. In a psycho-pathological clinic even the emotional language that the boy might use could fit with more correctness or propriety. Language-games refer to the possible levels and dimensions that one has to respect in speaking correctly or scientifically. Now that there is a whole volume of language-games of philosophical, logical or linguistic import it is not necessary for us to multiply instances. We are referring here


to the "Philosophical Investigations" of L. Wittgenstein, posthumously published in translation at Oxford in 1953.(100) The whole of that book may be treated as a meta-linguistic analysis of the science of linguistics. Normalising common language on the basis of the implications understood in its complete setting, from the point of view of every possible branch of scientific literature, is the service that the "Philosophical Investigations" could render to the cause of a common scientific language for unified science. Meta-language itself could be conceived at different levels in the vertical positive series. Thus we have the logistic formulation, in the form of tabulated matrices, to clarify the algebraic content of signs and symbols. The lines of the tabulation really belong to the proto-linguistic pole; while the letters, symbols or signs used really pertain to the opposite pole. In other schematic representations of the sixteen possibilities of propositional calculus, set out with truth- or falsehood- possibilities; with the truth-grounds which give both to truth- and falsehood-possibilities and probabilities a common basis, ranging between the limits of tautology vertically above and contradiction vertically at the zero-point, referring to the contradiction between 'p' and 'q' - we have, strictly speaking, a Platonic world of reasoning through dialectics implicitly contained vertically; and a syllogistic and Aristotelean one horizontally. The dialectics of Aristotle did not concern itself with the meta-language of ideas but was limited to the world where atter and form were the polarities involved. His dialectics was therefore more in the domain of probabilities rather than possibilities. From the zero-point of contradiction between 'p' and 'q', we could extend the reasoning by descending dialectics to another intuitive unity, reaching down to the non-relativist notion of matter itself, through such notions as the "prius nobis" that Aristotle uses, along the lines suggested in the quotation from Bergson given above in this section.

Meta-language is thus what tends to stand apart from scientific language proper in order to examine it from outside - just as proto-language is also meant to function from the negative pole of intelligence. We have, by extrapolation and by intrapolation, to visualize the three levels here involved: the meta-language above, the proto-language below, and scientific


language proper in the central zone of the vertical axis with the 'two efforts in inverse directions' that Bergson refers to above. We come thus to the emergence of a scientific language. When correctly horizontalized at the point of intersection, where contradiction is accepted as against mere sufficient reason, we become able to interpret the purer language of any science into the scientifically-correct ordinary or common language. Common language is thus to be understood as nothing but the horizontalized version of the pure language of science, which tends to become a meta- or proto-languagein inverse senses.

Any number of compromises between the vertical series containing proto- or meta-elements of language would be possible, and experts in each science should decide for themselves where they want to fix the standard language in the scale of possible languages. They have to delimit its range and take account of the overtness or innateness involved in each branch of science. Gestalt psychology may have to be given an inner zone, while stimulus-response or behaviouristic psychology is like a colour that is less saturated. The analogy of the colour-solid with which we terminated the first part of this study should be used here for further guidance.


Before passing on in the next section to the practical steps we have to take in the direction of making a language for unified science, we have to mention where the colour-solid analogy comes in as more useful than the mere vertico-horizontal correlation of plane geometry. The solid gives us a means of integrating all strictly 'objective' sciences, such as those of heat, light, electricity, mechanics, etc., without any vertical depth involved in them. Here, instead of an axis, it would be better to think in terms of radii that diverge from a zero vectorial point through the 360°, and to assign to each branch a well-thought-out number or letter or both, to mark overtness or deflection from negative to positive. Even in this strictly horizontal psycho-physical level


where body and mind meet, it is possible to think of an axis of reference for linguistic purposes which would be as valid as the words we use when we call a rose a 'rose'. Here we have to think of the distinction that Fechner makes between inner and outer psycho-physics, and also of the primary and secondary qualities as known to Locke and from the time of Democritus.

A colour attributed to an object would have a primary status if treated as outside the mind, and colour-vision could be accentuated by the taking of drugs like mescaline and lysergic acid, as Sir Russell Brain has pointed out. To the extent that colour is virtual, one has to take it to belong to the negative pole of the horizontal; but when it is taken to be 'outside the mind' (which possibility is questionable, according to the epistemology at the basis of psycho-physics), we have to place the colour (as if belonging to a paint that we might be using to colour-wash a wall) on the positive pole of the horizontal. The question of the delimitation of dimensions for each branch of science we shall consider in the next section. The Ladd-Franklin theory of colour-vision might also help us to fix further points or degrees in the schematic analogy of the colour-solid that we have adopted for scientifically correlating the structure of thought.


A misplaced enthusiasm for a scientific language is sometimes worse than no enthusiasm at all. We have seen a sample copy of the "International Language Review", from the perusal of whose pages it is amply evident that there is a world-wide interest in this question. Sanskrit and Esperanto have merits which could be compared and pronounced upon by the touchstone of our scheme here, as fitted for vertical and horizontal aspects of language communicability, respectively. One is all roots and the other has no roots yet worth speaking about. Both root and branch aspects of a language have to be considered necessary. There are others who stifle their enthusiasm and fervour in such a way that it hurts them, making for martyrs in the cause of a universal language - the dream of humanity since the days of the Biblical episode of the Tower of Babel. From the start, in writing the foregoing


pages, we have had no illusions about the complexity and enormity of the task. But side-by-side with this sentiment, there has been the opposite feeling that even if the idea of a universal language and its accomplishment are to be separated by time and much effort, there would still be no harm in exploring its avenues and possibilities. After having made as genuine an effort in this direction as perhaps it would be possible to make on the part of one individual, isolated and not in contact with those who can really deliver the goods in such an undertaking, the following suggestions are made in the genuine hope that those who are placed in better positions of advantage may follow up further the lines on which this study has been undertaken, and we have only brought this up to a point on which more fruitful discussions could be based. Sobering though the effect has been of making an effort in this ambitious direction in which many minds have been frustrated, still there is no cause for any discouragement. Given the co-operation of cultural or scientific bodies who have an open and understanding mind in such matters, unlike some who believe in closing rather than broadening their frontiers of enquiry, there is hope that the idea of a language of science could be realized when approached with the proper attitude.


The reader who has taken the trouble and had the patience to go through the foregoing pages, now that we are drawing close to the termination, may be expected to put the question: "What then? Is there anything that could result in tangible form as the upshot of this whole study? What is its practical value? "

We shall begin by summarising what we have tried to establish and then make suggestions.

We have tried to supply a normative notion for a science of language. Such a norm has been approached both experimentally and merely normatively in the two parts of this study.


We have offered some methodological and epistemological clarifications leading up to the normative notion. The experimental discipline of science is based on observations and not primarily on inference. We have tried to show that observations could be made through the indirect evidence of pointer-readings as well as by introspective experimental situations, and we have tried to make clear that one kind of certitude is as good as the other.

We have supported the central notion of this study, which pertains to the reality that we have referred to as the vertical axis of thought, as distinguished from its own horizontal counterpart, with evidence derived as far as could be from the electro-encephalograph. The study of psycho-pathology, psycho-pedagogics and psycho-physics in the light of our revised epistemology and methodology has brought us support of an experimental status to the central notion.

The colour-solid has been given a central position as representing the two kinds of certitudes on which science has to depend, viz., the observables and the calculables. The visible and the thinkable come together, as it were, from both sides of physiology or of psychology so as to yield a model of the integration of thought-characteristics, combinations and modalities after the pattern of the colour-solid. We could think of it with intrapolation or extrapolation in our minds so as to extend its applicability beyond the limits of the colour world to the larger scientific world where elements of thought have to be perceived and conceived as forming a global whole.

The abstract notion of the norm would have a neutral ground, with the help of which, what we have tried to distinguish as the proto- and meta-linguistic aspects could come together from opposite poles, as it were, to coalesce to result in a normalized common language. We then discussed the non-experimental but fully philosophical evidence of the use of a schematic proto-language by many philosophers already, who may be called scientific inasmuch as they adhere to the normative principles implied therein.


We then passed on to examine the claims of the logical-empiricists in the cause of a unified science and a language that would correspond to it. Their failure consisted in that they had a horizontal axis of reference instead of a vertical one, the importance of which was brought out by certain members of the group who had gone beyond their point of view and left the school of thought behind.

The investigations and interest in the dimensions and implications of simple everyday expressions have been examined and fitted into the frame of our scheme. Mathematics and dialectical reasoning, which represent highly verticalized thought have much to do with scientific thought and reach beyond its ordinary limits to the domains of mysticism, aesthetics and ethics.

We have upheld the plea for a common or ordinary language for all science, provided no methodological, epistemological or axiological rules, principles or laws are violated. Normalisation ascends to the neutral, as it were from below; and re-normalisation descends to conform to the requirements of the neutral norm, as it were from above. At each level we have to delimit the vertical or horizontal factors that enter into the composition of a science as having a unitive value or significance. The notion of the modality is to be added to the integration as a dimension to be understood after the analogy of the factor called saturation in the context of the colour-solid. It could be stated meta-linguistically as that modal relation between subject and predicate, referring to the degree of concreteness or apodictic certitude as between those that are hypothetical, theoretical or problematic.(101)


The process of normalisation within the limits of any particular branch of science has to be conceived in the light of concomitant variations on the vertical as well as the horizontal. The canons of Mill, and many other epistemological and methodological requirements, would be respected by this principle of paired limits to be fixed round a central normative


notion of each branch of science. Botany will have an ideal plant or a cell, depending on morphology or histology. Psychology would belong to the proper study of man, both from bodily and mental sides. In mysticism the study of man has to have the vertical aspects pronounced, as against the mechanised man who fits into a robot-world. This work of finding the central normative value; fixing the vertical amplitude and concomitant positive or negative factors, or the horizontal amplitude with its limits of agreement or disagreement with residual factors - is the task experts have to do sitting round a table, collecting, collating and organically ordering data. Such work must proceed from two ends viz.: normalisation and re-normalisation of the simplest elements of thought like words; and the normalisation and re-normalisation of whole branches such as psychology, sociology, economics etc. Then there is the overall normalisation in more comprehensive absolutist terms. This has to be tackled with a plan commonly conceived by a group of persons sufficiently interested in one language for unified science. It is not in terms of an invention by one or two individuals that this aspect of the work is to be conceived. It has to be a combined and co-operative effort, an adventure that would take forward strides by the discovery of new possibilities as the work goes on.


Looking retrospectively for a minute over what we have been able to express with any degree of definiteness, we have to admit that in many parts, especially as we approach the middle of the study as a whole, there is a vagueness that belongs as much at least to the subject-matter as to the lack of power of expression on the part of the present writer. An uncertainty-principle seems involved here, but this is not said as an excuse for the lack of clarity which we are conscious is there.


Just as imaginary numbers could be arranged with reference to lines that resemble latitudes and longitudes (102), it is


suggested here that the first bit of concrete work to be undertaken - even if the above ideas are only tentatively accepted as a basis for discussion and prospective action - would naturally concern the systematic correlation of words into integrated systems conceived round the correlates. As a first step it would suffice to correlate the vertical and the horizontal aspects. The other variations based on the colour-solid analogy would serve for the establishment of a hierarchy of concrete sciences. Heat, light, electricity etc. maybe given radial positions round the base of the double-cones that meet neutrally at the zone where spectral colours of medium brilliance are located. The 360 degrees of variation radially possible will give to librarians and others a way of classifying objective or positive physical sciences. Already there are two kinds of 'objectivity': one speaks of 'real objectivity' and of 'virtual objectivity', often written within quotation marks.


The confusion of tongues in the Bible, and the great dream of Leibniz which seemed to come as an answer to the need that humanity has felt for a universal scientific language, have culminated in our own times in a concerted effort on the part of leading scientists to proclaim their solidarity and singleness of purpose, as evidenced by the publication of an "International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science". It is hard to say, from a perusal of the leading articles in the first volume where the scope of the publication is indicated, whether this age-old ambition that has persisted through the centuries is actually heading to a successful climax or a mere anti-climax. The cover itself, by its blurb design, shows that the integration that is intended in the publications is nothing more than that of a mosaic where black and white are put together according to some distant, general or vaguely-understood over-all design of a common plan. We read in the very first article by Otto Neurath that the ambition of an "all-embracing vision and thought" is an "old desire of humanity"; and that an "empiristic mosaic" was the limit of the ambition of the compilers is stated as follows:

"For, since one cannot compare the historically-given science with 'the real science', the most one can achieve in integration of scientific work seems to be an encyclopaedia, constructed by scientists in co-operation."(103)


In another context we read:

"If one prefers a comprehensive scientific attitude, this encyclopaedia tries to show him the spectrum of scientific thinking". (104)

We already notice a difference between a mere mosaic and a spectrum, the former being a more arbitrary relation between colours than the scientific and neutral relation between spectral colours. Scientism and empiricism, to which the group is committed in advance, cannot evidently permit them to go any further. Bertrand Russell speaks of the principle of a dictionary and remarks:

"Given two sets of propositions such that, by a suitable dictionary, any proposition of either set can be translated into a proposition of the other set, there is no effective difference between the two sets . . . ." (105)

Such dictionaries, which can, as a rule only be constructed by the help of modern logic, suffice to dispose of a large number of metaphysical questions, and thus facilitate concentration upon genuine scientific problems. Niels Bohr takes the view that, "science is, according to its aim of enlarging human understanding, essentially a unity". Extremes of materialism and mysticism are to be avoided, as he says, by a "never-ending endeavour to balance analysis and synthesis".(106)

All the above writers are right to the extent that they think in terms of encyclopaedias and dictionaries and, what is more, there seems to be a strange undercurrent of agreement between the different contributors, though this is not evident at the surface. In the light of what we have said in the present study, Russell's plan of two sets of propositions seems to suggest the same distinction as between the vertical and horizontal aspects of thinking or reasoning. Niels Bohr's vision, like ours, does not exclude mysticism from the scope of science, and even in the very conservative-looking attitude of Otto Neurath we notice that there is more than a mere mosaic to be understood by a non-pretentious encyclopaedia. The principle of unity or integration must be implicit rather than explicit. Thus we see that the dream of Leibniz, who is still the inspirer of the unified science movement, is far from being abandoned by his followers, although the warmth of the first enthusiasm seems to have sobered down a great deal.


Scientism has its own affiliations and loyalties, to the exigencies of which all these writers seem to bow down too respectfully. A true scientist, according to us, should be free from all taint of 'isms', however justifiable on their own merits. Only then could the cause of unified science and of a language that is its corollary be even viewed in its proper proportion and perspective. One has to be able to stand back and look at the whole form to see, not only a mosaic and a spectrum, but a psycho-physical totality which is no other than unified science. The language of unified science has to result from the meeting of two views from opposite sides.


It is not difficult to see from the few quotations that we have taken from the leaders of the logico-empiricist school who plan a unified science and a language to go with it, that the ideas of integration and the possibility of a language do not hold before us anything of the nature of a very encouraging prospect that could rouse our enthusiasm. What we have to suggest, after discussing the same subject from a more comprehensive and global point of view, is that integration in a more cohesive sense and what we have called a unitive attitude of non-duality between body and mind would be possible as soon as the partiality for empiricism is relaxed. One has to begin at the normative core, which is neutral and which is the meeting-point of the tendencies that radiate along the two axes in which scientific thought, reasoning or interest might be said to live and move. We can only hope to elaborate what we mean in the merest of outlines here, because in an undertaking of this kind it is not the philosophy of one person that should count. At every step we take in the direction of the ambitious ideal that we set before ourselves we have to see that there is the greatest of consensus of intelligent opinion behind us.

In this connection the saying that the proper study of mankind is man would at least indicate where we have to begin. Cosmology puts the accent on the visible world, and psychology refers to the world within as given to the shut eyes. We could take to begin with such pairs of names like


Descartes and Newton and think of them with reference to their contributions to cosmology and psychology. Voltaire has compared and contrasted these great personalities of science and philosophy. Before pronouncing any opinion on this, let us pass on to think of a pair of modern thinkers like Bergson and Eddington. How are we to give them their respective places in this psycho-physical or psycho-cosmological scheme? Eddington, as a non-experimental scientist, has to be given a place with thinkers who use the subtle dialectical language of mathematics. What is within himself when his eyes are shut he is able to equate with cosmological realities of the outer universe. Bergson, being against mathematics and still essentially dialectical in his approach, and also because he affiliates himself to a world of living activity, must be located more towards the centre of the vertical axis. The man and the world that goes with him have to be put together before the process of hierarchisation of sciences could be thought of at all.

From the beginning of this study we have broadly referred to three sections, viz. scientific philosophy, the science of science and philosophical science. If we think of the trio of British empiricists, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, as sceptics who gave primacy to the horizontal values in life, we could grade them roughly as follows:

Locke should be placed at the extreme right or plus side of the horizontal, because he went so far as to say that things could exist outside the mind. Concomitantly he made the mind blank like a clean slate. Berkeley would pertain to the negative end of the same axis, and Hume, as a phenomenologist who believed equally in number and quantity, should occupy a central place.
If we take the four rationalist philosophers from Descartes to Kant, through Spinoza and Leibniz, we could at once see that the Cartesian dictum 'cogito ergo sum' gives the key to all of them.

They fall in the vertical axis, and the body-mind duality for which Descartes is often blamed is because his zone pertained to the central core of the psycho-physical norm in a very scientific or real sense. Occasionalism touched the neutral point of the vertical axis. Kant's 'thing-in-itself" and the noumenon were a full recognition of the vertical axis and its philosophical implications. Occasionalism, elaborated a little, gives us


the thinking substance of Spinoza, with its "natura naturans" and "natura naturata", which refer to the vertical and the horizontal respectively. The monad of Leibniz is nothing but a more elaborated version of the thinking substance, with the accent on the vertical aspects, and made into a hierarchical series. We too have put forward the view that there should be as many vertico-horizontal frames applied as there are items of scientific reality to be dealt with by a scientific language.

Now if we pass on to phenomenologists, existentialists, hylozoists of pre-Socratic times, or even to the patristic and scholastic philosophers of various grades, we have to think more in terms of a dialectics that is subtle and tends to be forgotten in modern times of mechanistic progress. Aristotelian dialectics moves only as between matter and form; while Platonic dialectics soars up and down at higher levels of the vertical axis. Existentialists, especially when they discredit essence in favour of existence and shut their eyes to the abstract notion of the Absolute, tend to place their interest at the bottom of the vertical scale of values. Post-Hegelian phenomenologists have a dynamism where thoughts meet from opposite sides to constitute events in consciousness in which the equation of the self with the non-self is implied. This kind of equation is explicit in the philosophy of Fichte. Renouvier translates the same verticalized bi-polar relation into more personalistic terms. He could be placed high up on the vertical positive side of the scale.

We do not wish to tread on these grounds in any greater detail. In order to secure the greatest volume of support for this cause of unified science and its language we cannot do better than to follow the lead given by the scientific empiricists, but on different lines. A vertico-horizontal mapping of word-systems has first to be undertaken. The usual dictionary may be conceived more on the lines of a thesaurus like Roget's, but with synonyms and antonyms of two sets, referring to the vertical and horizontal meanings. Word-system maps could be appended to usual dictionaries inspired by normalisation and re-normalisation.


If what we have very roughly indicated is understood at all, the rest of the work may be left to a committee of experts.


1. "Leibniz thought that a language could be constructed which would be much more efficient for reasoning and for communication than the vague, complicated and more or less parochial languages then available. This language would be completely universal in the sense that all scientific and philosophic concepts could be expressed in it, and also in that it would enable scholars in all countries to communicate over the barriers of their vernacular tongues." P.P. Wiener, "Dictionary of Philosophy", by D. Runes, Jaico Publishing, Bombay.

2. Dr. Holton, Prof. of Physics, Harvard University writes:
".. . Science advances faster and faster every day, widening the rift between science and culture.
To restore them to some kind of reciprocal contact within the concerns of most men - to bring science into an orbit about us instead of letting it escape from the field of our common culture - that is the great challenge before intellectuals to-day. And nothing better illustrates the urgency and difficulty of this task than the false images prevailing about science."
Cf., "The False Images of Science", The Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 9, 1960, p. 72.
Earlier in the same he had pointed out:
"Having destroyed absolute standards, it (science) puts nothing in their place." [Ibid., p. 70)

3. "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", London, 1922, p. 79.

4. Leibniz himself had hinted at the importance of 'form' in logical or other reasoning when he wrote:
"I hold that the invention of the form of syllogisms is one of most beautiful which the human mind has made, and even one of the most considerable. It is a kind of universal mathematics whose importance is not sufficiently known"
Quoted from "New Essays", p. 559 in Russell's "Philosophy of Leibniz" Camb. 1900, p. 282.

5. Cf. "The New Mathematics", Irving Adler, Day and Co. New York,

6. "Pour donner, dans tous les cas possibles, une signification à la somme et au produit de deux éléments, on introduit deux éléments nouveaux: l'élément zero V (ou absence de points, de droites et de plans) et l'élément universel U (ou totalité de ces éléments, c'est-à-dire l'espace). Par définition l'élément zero V est contenu dans tout élément et l'on convient qu'il a un nombre negatif -1 de dimensions; par définition également, l'élément universel U contient tout et à trois dimensions. Ces deux éléments nouveaux sont appelés les éléments impropres, les autres sont les éléments propres. Supposons, maintenant, que A et B representent, par example, deux droites qui ne se rencontrent pas dans l'espace; on aura A + B = U et A.B. = V, et on voit que la somme et le produit de deux éléments quelconques representent toujours un élément soit propre, soit impropre."

("To give, in all possible cases, a significance to the sum and product of two elements, one introduces two new elements: the zero element V (or the absence of points, straight lines and planes), and the element U (or the totality of these elements - that is, space). By definition the zero element V, is contained in all elements and one accepts that there is a negative number, -1, of dimensions. Equally by definition, the universal element U contains everything, and that in three dimensions. These two new elements are called improper elements, the others are proper elements. Let us suppose, then, that A and B represent for example, two straight lines that do not meet in space; then we shall have A+B=U and A.B=V, and we can see that the sum and the product of any two elements will always be a proper or an improper element.")

Col. Ar. Colin, "Les Nombres et Les Espaces", Gustave Verriest; Paris 1956, pp. 180-81.

7. "When we run over libraries .... what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume, of divinity or school metaphysics for instance, let us ask, 'Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?' No. 'Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?' No. Commit it then to the flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." "Essays", Routledge, Lond. , pp. 384-85.

Cf. Also Ibid., p. "It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract science or of demonstration are quantity and number…"

8. Ibid., p. 321.

7. He adds :
"But that this enumeration is complete, and that there are no other principles of association except these, may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader, or even to a man's own satisfaction." Ibid., p. 321.

10. p. 41, Vol. I, Chicago University, 1955.

11. Ibid.

12. "The Nature of the Physical World", Dent. Lond. 1947, p. 328.

13. Speaking of Eddington's "Principle on the Philosophy of Science", Sir Edmund Whittaker, F.R.S., said:
"The development of quantum electro-dynamics has, in fact shown the necessity for what is called re-normalisation, which is precisely a recognition of the difference between observed and theoretical values . . . etc."
Camb. Univ. Press 1951, p. 25.

14. "History of Western Philosophy", London, 1946, p. 861.

15. "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", London 1922, p. 31.

16. "History of Western Philosophy", London, 1946, p. 861.

17. Bergson, "Oeuvres"; Centenary Edition, Paris 1959, pp. 254-55.

18. The initial idea of the scope of such 'experiments' in philosophy is found in the Verses 10 and 11 of the "Atmopadesa Satakam" of Guru Narayana translated by me and commented, cf. "Life and Teachings of Narayana Guru", East-West University, Fernhill, S. India, 1990, pp. 488-99.

19. "If S 1 and S2 are different people, 'S 1' s protocol language refers to the content of S 1's experience. S 2's... to the content of S 2 ... 'Whatcan the inter-subjective physical language refer to?' The answer isit refers to the experiences of anyone you please." A.J. Ayer, "The Problem of Knowledge", London 1957, p. 211.

20. "The Listener", London, Oct. 1, 1959, p. 521.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 522.

23. "Matière et Mémoire", ed. by Skira; Geneva 1946, pp. 117, 13 ff.

23. Bergson, "Oeuvres"; Centenary edn. Paris 1959. pp. 254 -55.

25. "Matière et Mémoire", ed. by Skira; Geneva, 1946, p. 118.

26. "Psychoses et Neuroses" by Henri Baruk, Paris 1946, pp. 5-6.

27. Bergson alludes to "Dyslexie" in connection with the two forms of memory that he distinguished, to which he alludes as follows:

"Ce souvenir spontané, qui se cache sans doute derrière le souvenir acquis, peut se révèler par des éclairs brusques: mais il se dérobe au moindre mouvement de la mémoire. Si le sujet voit disparaître la série de lettres dont il croyait avoir retenu l'image, c'est surtout pendant qu'il commence à les répèter que cet effort semble pousser le reste de l'image hors de la conscience."

("This spontaneous memory, which is doubtless hidden behind acquired memory, can reveal itself in sudden flashes, but it disappears at the slightest movement of memory. If the subject sees the series of letters which he thought he had memorised disappear, it is particularly when he tries to repeat them that this effort seems to push the rest of the image out of consciousness")

He adds in a footnote on the same page;

"Ne serait-ce pas quelque chose du même genre qui se passe dans cette affection que les auteurs allemends ont appelée dyslexie?"

("Would it not be something like this that occurs in the affliction that German authors call dyslexia?")
"Matière et Mémoire", Geneva 1946 pp. 89-90 and ff.

28. "La Force et la Faiblesse Psychologiques": Malone edn. Paris, 1932, p. 11.

29. Henri Baruk "Psychoses et Neuroses", Paris 1946.

30. Ibid., p. 25.

31. "La Personalité Humaine; son Analyse", Delmas et Boll, Flammarion Paris,1930,p.25.

32. "Man the Unknown". Lond. 1956, p. 231.

33. Extract from the Conclusion of "Le Facteur Personnel dans le Processus Educatif" by the present author of this study (Thesis for Univ. of Paris later published by Librarie Philosophique, Vrin Paris 1932, out of print at present. See Contents page of this website. ED.) page 171.

"Notre point de départ principal a été de considérer l'individu comme un tout, c'est-a-dire ayant une vie corporelle, avec ses comportements et ses emotions; doué d'une intelligence et d'un pouvoir de pensée reflechie. Cet examen de l' inventaire de tout ce qui appartient à l'individu nous a permis de parler de deux aspects de la personnalité: l'un qui envisage l'activité receptive, representative, symbolique et strictement individuelle; l'autre, l'activité expressive, réelle, sociale, se conformant au monde objectif qui nous entoure. Ce qui ressort tout d'abord de cette distinction, c'est le fait que nous ne pouvons pas nous baser uniquement sur l'expression des capacités mentales de l'enfant, mais qu'en le jugeant nous devons tenir compte de l'arrière-plan de la personnalité de l'enfant. Cette distinction nous a amené aussi à considérer les types d'élèves comme les expressions asymetriques de ces deuxaspects fondamentaux de la personnalité. En examinant ce processus d'éducation, nous avons constaté que les étapes de croissance de l'enfance à l'age adulte présentaient des caractères qui correspondent en même temps aux types que nous avons distingués: l'enfance, jusqu'à 8 ans environ, se présente sous ce que nous avons appelé le type négatif-subjectif, l'adulte, qui a passé la vingtaine, le type positif-subjectif; le type négatif-objectif et le type positif-objectif s'intercalant entre les deux ages mentionnés ci-dessus. Nous avons essayé de voir comment, en rapport avec chaque étape et chaque type d'élève, le maître doit se représenter le type de son influence éducative: retrospective, prospective, négative ou positive, suivant les cas.

Cette dernière nécessité implique une relation entre le maître et l'élève, qui doit avoir un caractère bipolaire, remplissant les conditions exposées plus haut. Ainsi l'éducation doit être connue comme un contact entre le maître et l'élève, dans un sens intime et personnel, ne pouvant en aucun cas etre remplacé par un système, par des règles, des programmes ou des méthodes élaborées.

Nous avons flnalement examiné les théories existentes sur l'éducation et essayé d'en voir la relation avec les différentes étapes de l'adaptatlon personnelle. Dans l'étape négative, le maître a une influence de contrôle et de sélection sur l'ambiance de l'enfant. Il n'est pas question de guider intellectuellement, mais d'établir des relations intimes entre le maître et l'élève. Dans l'étape moyenne de l'adaptation (c'est-à-dire entre 15 et 20 ans), l'enfant a besoin d'une activité sociale. La relation intime et personnelle n'est pas aussi nécessaire que dans la première et la dernière étape, comme nous l'avons dit. Dans la dernière etape, le maître devient à proprement parler un guide: il représente l'idéal subjectif qui est caché dans l'avenir. Ceci constitute l'étape idéaliste dernière dans le processus. L'idéal de vie, des attitudes mentales, les intérêts dirigeants d'une personnalité plus évoluée sont, par une méditation constante de la part de l'élève, transférès ou greffés sur lui-meme, lui donnant une vision plus profonde de la vie. Nous avons examiné d'autre part quelques concepts de la pensée hindoue qui donne depuis des temps anciens une importance particulière aux relations personnelles entre le Gourou et l'élève. Nous avons pu d'ailleurs utiliser dans notre discussion quelques-uns des concepts spéciaux appartenant à la pédagogie hindoue, à propos surtout des étapes négatives et idéalistes de l'adaptation personnelle. Ils ont suffit à démontrer amplement que cette pedagogie, dans ce qu'elle a d'essentiel, est conforme au schéma du développement personnel et des relations éducatives que nousavons presenté dans cette étude."

("Our main point of departure has been to consider the individual as a whole; that is, as having a bodily life, with its behaviour and its emotions, endowed with intelligence and reflective thought. This examination of the inventory of all that belongs to the individual allows us to speak of two aspects of the personality: one which deals with receptive, representational, symbolic and strictly indvidual activity; the other with expressive, real and social activity, according to the objective world around us. What first arises from this distinction is the fact that we cannot base ourselves only on the expression of the child's mental functions, but when we judge him we must take into account the background of the child's personality. This distinction has also led us to consider the different types of pupil as asymetric expressions of these two fundamental aspects of the personality. When we examined this educational process, we discovered that the stages of growth from child to adult reveal characteristics which also correspond to the types that we have described: childhood, up to the age of around eight, shows the characteristics that we have described as negative-subjective; the adult after twenty, the positive-subjective type; the negative-objective and positive-objective types can be inserted between the two above-mentioned types. We have tried to discover how the teacher should determine the type of educational influence corresponding to each stage and to each type of pupil; be it retrospective, prospective, negative or positive, as the case requires.
This last necessity implies a teacher-pupil relationship which must have a bi-polar character, fulfilling the above conditions. Thus, education must be conceived as an intimate and personal contact between teacher and pupil, which can in no case be be replaced by a system, by rules, programs or elaborated methods. Finally, we have examined extant theories of education and tried to distinguish their relation to the different stages of personal adaptation.

In the negative stage, the teacher has an influence of control and selection on the child's environment. There is no question of guiding him intellectually, but of establishing an intimate relation between teacher and pupil. In the middle stage of adaptation (that is between the ages of 15 and 20), the child needs social activity. An intimate and personal relation is not as necessary as in the first and last stages, as we have said. In the last stage, the teacher becomes, properly speaking, more of a guide: he represents the subjective ideal that is hidden in the future. This is the last, idealistic, phase of the process. Ideals of life, mental attitudes, the guiding interests of a more evolved personality, are by a constant mediation on the pupil's part, transferred or grafted on himself, giving him a deeper vision of life.

We have also taken into consideration some concepts from Indian thought which have, since ancient times, given particular importance to the relationship between Guru and student. We have used in our discussion some of the special concepts of Indian pedagogy, particularly as concerns the negative and idealistic stages of personal adaptation. They have served to amply demonstrate that pedagogy, in its essentials, conforms to the scheme of personal development and educational relationships that we have presented in this study.")

34. "Child Psychology": Neuchâtel and Paris, 1959.

35. We are indebted to the review of Piaget's latest work appearing in the "Bulletin of the International Bureau of Education" 4th Quarter, 1959 for the resumé and quotations of the work. cf. p. 241.

36. "Les Notions de Mouvement et de Vitesse chez l'Enfant": Paris, p. 273 ff.

37. "Les Origines de la Pensée chez l'Enfant", Paris, 1947. p. 209.

38. Ibid., p. 437.

39. C.W. Morris' "International Cyclopedia of Unified Science", Vol. I, Part I. Chicago, 1955, p. 134.

40. "The Listener", London, March 10, 1960, p. 443.

41. Ibid.

42. The classification of colours on the basis of the colour-solid as the introspective psycho-physical entity is now well-known as attributed to Albert H. Munsell (1858-1919) who, it is stated:
"Borrowing from Helmholtz … classified colours according to hue, lightness and saturation. The horizontal axis proceeds from the vertical black-grey-white".
cf. "Colliers Encyclopaedia", p. 485, Vol. 5, (More details below).

43. Kegan Paul London, 1922, pp. 31-35.

44. See pp. 280-81 above.

45. "Notre intelligence triomphe dans la géometrie, ou se révèle la parenté de la pensée logique avec la matière inerte etc . ."
("Our intelligence has triumphed in geometry, where is revealed the apparentation of logical thought with inert matter etc.")
Bergson; Ev. Cr. Cf. Pascal, "Pensées et Opuscules": Lib. Hatier Paris, p. 13; "De l'Esprit Géometrique"; "Oeuvres", Paris, 1959, p. 489.

46. See pp. 298-300 above.

47. Carnap's article, "International Cyclopedia of Unified Science", Vol. I, Part II, pp. 143 ff.

48. Bloomfield's article Ibid., p. 219 ff and p. 88, Morris,
Sec. 4 Language.

49. Unabridged Second Edition.

50. The characterisation of this scheme being introspective and arbitrary.

51. Quoted from "Panorama", Galimard Paris, 1957 extracted from trad. Rossignol Hermann, p. 575.

52. "The English Cyclopaedia", Vol. 3, London, 1856, p. 697.

53. Cf. Under Leibniz, Ibid.

54. "Dictionary of Philosophy", Runes, Jaico Bombay, 1956.

55. Quoted from p. 132, "Philosophy Made Simple", New York, 1958.

56. Cf. "Columbia Cyclopaedia" under "Quaternions". (See also Note 7, above)

57. "A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz". B. Russell, Camb. Univ. Press, 1900, p. 252 and 283-84 respectively.

58. "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus",

59. pp. 2 to 25 ff. Lecture Delivered 9th Aug. 1951, Camb. Univ. Press.

60. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

61. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

62. Ibid., p. 29.

63. Ibid., p. 31.

64. Copied from p. 57 "The Nature of the Physical World", Everyman, Lond. 1947.

65. "Oeuvres", Centenary edn. Paris, 1959, p. 1432.

66. "La Pensée et le Mouvement", Genève, 1946, pp. 211-16.

67. "Oeuvres": Centenary edn. Paris, 1959, pp. 284-85.

68. "The Listener", Lond. Feb. 25, 1960.

69. Ibid.

70. "International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science", Chicago, Vol. I Part I, p.147.

71. "The History of Western Philosophy", Lond. 1946, p. 859.

72. Hume's "Essays", Routledge, London, p. 383.

73. "International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science": Vol. I, Part I, Chicago, 1955,p.210.

74. Ibid.

75. p. 173, item 6°241 : "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", Kegan Paul, Lond. 1922.

76. Ibid., p. 8.

77. "International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science", Chicago, 1955, p. 82, Part I Vol. I.

78. Ibid., p. 84.

79. "International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science", Vol.I, Part I, p.231.

80. Ibid.

81. The Listener, Lond. Oct. 1, 1959, p. 519.

82. Ibid.

83. "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", Kegan Paul, Lond. 1922, p. 189.

84. "The Age of Analysis", Mentor, New York, 1956 as quoted from Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, 1953, p. 231,

85. "Les Lettres Nouvelles": Nov. 25, 1959, p. 37, Julliard Paris, Tr. from the German by Pierre Klossowskl.

86. Ibid., p. 39.

87. p. 235-6, "The Age of Analysis", Mentor New York, 1956 as quoted from item 77 of "Philosophical Investigations" by Wittgenstein, Oxford, 1953.

88. The numbers in brackets in this chapter and previous chapters refer to items of Wittgenstein's "Tractatus".

89. "Principles of Logic": A.C. Bradley: Kegan Paul, London, 1883, p. 149.

90. "Annuaire du Collège de France", 1948, p. 121.

91. "Oeuvres", Centenary edn. Paris, 1959, p. 674.

92. "The Age of Analysis", New York 1955, p. 144 quoting "Popular Science Monthly", Jan 1878.

93. "The Nature of the Physical World", Lond. 1947, p. 306.

94. "Mathematics for Science and Engineering", Philip L. Alger, New York, 1957, p. vii.

95. The report above is from "The Listener", London of April 7, 1960.

96. The passage below gives a glimpse of the contrast between the later Wittgenstein and all the three of the other 'analytic' philosophers represented in this volume : Carnap, Moore and Russell. In fact the contrast is great enough to warrant our not calling the later Wittgenstein an analytic philosopher at all. "The Age of Analysis", New York 1956, p. 229.

97. Bergson, "Oeuvres", Paris, 1959, p. 797.

98. Cf. "Encyclopaedia Britannica", under "Theory of Knowledge".

99. Hume's "Essays", Routledge, London, pp. 384-85.

100. Blackwell, Oxford. Tr. G.E.M. Anscombe.

101. "We may take for instance a content S-P, not yet asserted, and may claim for modality the power of affirming this content S-P unaltered and unqualified in several ways. S-P, it is supposed, may be asserted, for instance, either simply or problematically or apodictically and yet remain throughout S-P; and thus, though the content is unmodified, the assertion is modal." - A.C. Bradley. "Principles of Logic", p. 181 (London, 1883).

102. Explaining this method of longitude and latitude we read:
"Imaginary numbers are a particular case of what are called complex numbers, which consist of a real and an imaginary part ... a so-called complex number is actually a pair of numbers, and if one thinks of it in that way the mystery vanishes."
M.G. Kendall, Prof. Lond. Univ., cf. The Listener, Nov. 19, 1959.

103. "International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science", Vol. I, Part I, pp. 12 and 20, Chicago, 1955.

104. Ibid. p. 23.

105. Ibid., p. 41.

106. Ibid., p. 28.


Absolute, the
dialectically revalued, 350
fall of-, 123, 158, 349
science of the, 269
surplus-value, 121
Hegelian, 122
levels of-, 337
Abundance, 91
the world of-, 95 f, 129
worth of-, 138
five factors of-, 244
mutual, 24
Advaita Vedanta
and human welfare, 3 f
and rival aspects, 4
economic, 83, 98
Ambivalence, 238
Anti-Absolutism, 349
principle of-, 173
contribution of-, 266
essence of-, 347
Association of ideas
Hume on, 277
Atman, 189
analysis of-, 222
and the Absolute, 269
Atma-Vidya, 269
way to, 342

origin of-, 56
favouring features of-, 56
modern, 10
Henri, 169, 187 f, 190, 284, 293
and Eddington, 328
relied on, 351
Bhagavad Gita, 179, 182, 187, 195, 201, 207, 220, 231, 241, 243 f, 259,
credo of-, 337
Brahmacarin, 181, 183
the science of sciences, 267, 269

Candide, 50, 114
climate and economics, 138
defined, 134
Dr. Alexis, 213
co-ordinates, 126
tradition, 124
Categorical imperative, 180
vertical, and horizontal, 312, 360
Characterology, 236
as a human, 184
and psycho-physics, 304f
as a proto-linguistic model, 308, 313, 357, 360
Common language
normalized, 360
Common-sense language, 309
and science, 352
characteristic of-, 310
Communism as a religion, 252
Compte, 49, 79
failure of-, 120
Consciousness, 187
analysis by Narayana Guru, 196 ff., 222
component elements of-, 196, 218
dichotomy at the core of-, 218
directions of radiation, 351
four zones of-, 22 ff.
Kant on, 320
neutral, 348
resolving of-, 16
Contemplative life in East and West, 182
Creative evolution, 188
abstract, 113
and gold, 76
and God, 76
and trust, 139
money, 56
moral aspects of-, 100 f
mysteries of-, 98
two aspects of-, 97
flagging of-, 267
influence of pragmatism, 265

Das Kapital, 76, 89, 122
Definition, 308
Dewey, John, 156, 159, 179, 195 f, 221, 228 f
Dialectical approach
and sex variation, 233
and pure mathematics, 342 ff.
Bergson's, 189
in education, 184, 209
mechanism of-, 122 f, 228
personal, 20 ff., 208
superior to the rational, 219
the correct, 187
the essence of-, 4 f, 60, 220
to economics, 65, 142
to politics, 4
to values, 5, 220
Dialectical materialism, 37
Dialectical reasoning, 62
Dialectical revaluation of values, 7
Dialectical Wisdom, 23, 60, 220
in the Bible, 60
and Absolutism, 349
and human values, 7
and wisdom, 7
ascending and descending, 268
concern of-, 346
Hegel's, 343
in Economics, 134, 143
in World literature, 176
of Ethics, 259
of one and the many, 143
resolves disasters, 209
science of-, 7
the crowning attainment of-, 231
the greatest textbook of-, 187
a just ruler, 49
abolition of-, 219

East and West meet, 223
Economic activity,
four-concerned, 149
Economic crisis
sign of-, 140
Economic man at cross roads, 91 f
Economic measurement,
yardstick of-, 83, 88, 116
Economic progress
reversal of-, 102
Economic situation,
four limbs of-, 120, 126
simplified, 65
a religion, 79, 81, 131
aim of-, 73, 87, 118, 130, 132
an Absolutist approach, 48, 102 f
and ethics, 87 f, 92
and human touch, 76
and liberty, 44
and political conservatism, 75
and religion, 71, 84, 110, 112, 121 f
and statistics, 46
an enemy, 81
as a dismal science, 46, 142
as a game, 94
as a normative science, 65
as a science, 79, 109, 144
as Value-wisdom, 77, 115, 118, 125
axiologically based, 49, 131
basis of-, 43
burial of-, 82
complete theory of-, 47 f, 102, 111
comprehensive definition of-, 115
conflict in, 43, 109
dangers in, 43f
death of-, 80
double gain in, 60, 93, 134, 143
drawbacks of-, 73
dualistic, 133
ethical, 98, 101
factors in, 47 f, 11 ff.
frame of reference revised, 76
good, 130, 132
is for man, 65, 78, 87, 111, 116, 138
in Sanskrit literature, 51
Jevons on, 69, 73
Kalidasa on, 49 f
Keynes on, 73
lament for, 79
man at the core of-, 116
Mill on, 73
nature of-, 72
normal, 74, 77, 121, 130
normative approach to, 103
not a normative science, 84
present-day, 102
restated, 143
questionable practices, 44 ff.
scientific, 75, 92, 117 f
scope and limits of-, 73, 115
series of value worlds in, 75
single defect of-, 84
two poles of-, 92, 95, 127, 129
two worlds of-, 61, 75, 113, 115, 127,131
uncertainty in, 95
value and, 84f
Economic theory,
three schools of-, 64
Economic Value,
evolution of-, 112
as charlatans, 79
good, 118
interest in, 73
Eddingtonianism, 317, 322 f, 366
Educability, 208
Educated man, 200
a bipolar process, 160, 163, 221
Absolute necessity in. 201
a dialectical situation, 165, 208
alpha and omega of-, 202
and higher values, 165
and social values, 229 f
and sex variation, 233
and values, 157
a pleasure, 210
background aspect in, 209
bipolar relation in, 164, 180 f, 207
central notion in, 199
content of-, 202 ff., 205, 207
contradiction in, 168 f
defined, 155, 200, 205
dialectical counterparts in, 163 f
dialectical way in, 220
effective, 221
ends and means, 200
for man and citizen, 158, 168 f
four stages of-, 159 f, 224 f, 298
fresh start of-, 176f
fundamental, 171
future of-, 220, 223
hesitancy today, 216
idealistic, 230
inhibitory crises in, 211
integration of-, 265
interest as basis, 173
law of equilibrium in, 205
lifetime, 159
Main plank in, 223
mind-matter duality in, 213
modern endeavour in, 170
mutual adoption in, 221
naturalistic, 227'
new orientation in, 174
normalisation of-, 298
one-sided approach in, 156
personal adjustment in, 214
personal factor in, 164f, 180
philosophical bases of-, 225, 298
positive process of-, 206 f
practical guidelines, 209 ff.
private and public, 173
public standard in, 173 f
specialisation in, 263 f
three kinds of-, 173
three laws of-, 204 f
to save humanity, 163
tragic paradoxes in, 157
well-founded, 220
Educational institutions,
four patterns of-, 235 f
the task of-, 206
the best, 206
a gardener, 208
a midwife, 208
Elan vital, 180, 284 f, 294
Emile, 155, 158, 160, 168, 172, 175, 179, 181f, 184, 226, 242
place of-, 366
Engels' law, 81
Entelechies, 204
revised, 359
Absolutist, 259
cause of violation, 256
correct, 257
dialectical basis of-, 255, 257
dialectical counterparts of-, 256
first desideratum of-, 255
normalized, 255 ff.
normative notion in, 257
Evolution theory,
scientific status of-, 279 f
place of-, 367
introspective, 284 f
on personality, 291
Exploiters as advisers, 58, 74, 76

a dragon, 54
theories of-, 62
horizontal and vertical, 135 f
Four-fold scheme,
justification of-, 225
Free enterprise,
limits of-, 39 ff.
Fundamental education, 166

Geneva declaration, 175
Geo-dialectical approach, 5
advantage of-, 24
basis of-, 17
defined, 7 f
and dialectics, 8
and world Govt., 12
Geo-politics, 4f, 23
Gestalt psychology, 237
scientifically conceived, 244
and capital, 76
and God, 53, 112
and goodness, 6
and paper money, 54
and spirituality, 57
as an economic value, 77
a source of wickedness, 77
the best use of-, 62
the two poles of value, 59
value of-, 53 ff., 63
virtual and actual, 63, 77
Golden mean, 63
Good and bad
cancelling of-, 7
conflict between, 6
Good economic living, 91
internal and external, 78, 87
kingdom of economical, 142
Goodwill, 138
mandate for, 17
Gresham's law, 60
Gurukula education, 181, 183 f
Guru-sisya relationship, 223, 226

Handling action language, 310
actualisation, 8, 117, 132
dialectical counterparts of-, 8, 129
of all and the general, 96
public and private, 92f
sharable and not, 96

Happy man, 39
the most desirable for, 126
as yardstick of economics, 116, 135
Heuristic method, 173
Horizontal values, 115, 127
lovers of-, 49
Human life,
and unitive thinking, 7
basis of-, 6 f
good and evil in, 6
Human values
and dialectics, 7
and perfect man, 200 f
necessary and contingent, 8
network of, 109 ff.
vertical scale of, 7, 269

diagnostics of-, 231
Hegelian, 126
highest limits of-, 231
in education, 230 f
Idealistic Education, 159
Incertitude in Economics, 113
Inflation, 54, 139
Integration of sciences,
clear pattern of-, 350
key to, 269
Intellectual formation, 264
negativism in, 15, 21
relativism in, 16
the present, 9, 15
Introversion and extroversion, 238
Intuitive approach, 186

on Economics, 50
on stages of education, 159, 161
schematism of-, 318
Positive and negative, 148
respect for, 226
vertical and horizontal, 139
and thought, 273 ff.
archetypal patterns of-, 307 f
as a vertical process, 329
basis of-, 350
basis of structure, 274, 336
business of-, 334
domain of-, 272, 284, 338
hierarchies in, 337
norm of ordinary, 347
scientific, 272 f, 307
the doorway to philosophy, 339
true science of-, 347 f
two grades of-, 309
two worlds of-, 276
link between, 302
participation with the, 276
validity of-, 274
League of Nations, 16
Leibniz, 217, 282
on universal language, 271
three kinds of-, 61
Life tendencies, 189
problems of-, 216
Limited liability,
honesty of-, 140
Linguistic space, 338
Linguistic Structure,
archetypal model of-, 275
axes of-, 286 f
normative appraisal of-, 288
observations, 283, 285
two dimensions of-, 287 f
Logical Empiricists,
attitudes of-, 33 f
failure of-, 360
Logical tradition,
gap in, 123
movement of-, 344
role of-, 334 f

a just ruler, 49
Malthusian theory, 46, 62, 80, 86, 141
and Economics, 85, 88
as measuring rod, 87, 129
economic, double reference to, 91
economic value of-, 85 ff., 118, 129, 137
study of-, 215
Man as a whole, 220
Marshall, 64, 75 ff., 115
Marx, 64, 76, 89, 111, 118, 121, 125, 127 f
Mass re-education, 232
doctrine of the, 266 ff.
two ways of giving, 311
Mechanistic approach
dangers of-, 8
to vital problems, 80
Meta-language, 118
defined, 331 f
innate defects of-, 273
nature of-, 308
revised, 359
Mill, J.S., 76. 98, 267
cannons of-, 281
on political economy, 73
utilitarianism of-, 156
Mind and matter, 187, 219
common ground of-, 326
Monad in Economics, 130, 134
and enjoyment, 114
and wealth, 114
as wealth, 78
as measure, 78
Montessori method, 156, 173
popularity of-, 174
Myth language, 59

Narayana Guru, 58, 197, 218
analysis of consciousness by, 196 ff.
on Ethics, 257 f
of Rousseau and Spencer, 227
Naturalistic education, 159, 227 f
Natural religion, 179
Natural resources,
economic value of-, 74
an Absolute Value, 227
contact with-, 228
Rousseau's concept of-, 178, 180, 227
Negative education, 158 f, 173
a regulating principle, 225 f
implications of-, 179 ff., 206
meaning of-, 226
Neutral epistemology, 330 f
Neutral monism, 186, 213, 283 f, 307
New Education Movement, 171
Nivritti marga, 179
Normal economics, 74
Normalisation, 281, 297, 307, 311, 361
to accomplish, 361
two senses of-, 316
in Economics, 135
of language, 311 ff.
Normative frame of reference, 50
Normative notion,
for a science of language, 359
how to build up, 112, 119, 124, 287f
in Economics, 105
in Education, 232, 235
in Science and language, 316
in scientific language, 281, 307
need of-, 110, 121
of Russell, 282
outline features of-, 129, 134, 136, 287
proto-linguistic, 315
relation-relata complex of-, 117
scientifically valid, 296
the principal contribution, 350
Normative rules,
violation of-, 324 f

real and virtual, 363
Observables and calculables,
balance of-, 280 f, 307, 309, 360
One-World Economics,
scope of-, 117, 143
Opportunities available, 239 ff.
Opulence and abundance
a middle of-, 63, 91
and scientific economics, 77
ascending pyramid of-, 97
as counterparts, 69, 77
distinguished, 46, 61, 69, 77, 81, 95, 129
new problems of-, 102
Original-sin economics, 120

Parkinsonianism, 48
Passion and person, 231
Person in education, 212
Personal factor,
a central concept, 185, 213
analytical perspective of-, 212 ff.
an organism, 188
approach to, 187
a reality, 186
a unit, 190 f
explicit traits of-, 200
functional zones of-, 191 f
grades of-. 187
important aspect of-, 221
most elementary aspect, 189 f
psycho-dynamical aspects of-, 212
reconstructed, 193
schematic representation of-, 188
synthetic perspective of-, 185 ff.
two sides of-, 185
unitively treated, 213
Personal rhythm, 210
experiment on, 290 f, 298
in teaching, 210 f
place of-, 367
Phenomenology, 124
Physiocrats, 82, 87 f, 113
fundamentals of-, 103, 125
watered down, 82
role of-, 131
a meeting point, 189
Political economics,
Keynes on, 79 f
Mill on, 73
scope of-, 43
and geo-politics, 4
and spiritual life, 4 f
dialectical approach to, 4
emergence of-, 5
Johnson on, 3
Population control, 76, 87, 140
a suicidal madness, 141
maximum, minimum and optimum, 81
and 'poverty', 99
hidden, 136
unhappiness and, 98
Pragmatic education, 159, 228 f
failure of-, 230
Pragmatism, revolt from, 215 f
Probability and possibility, 279
cancelling out of-, 38
two kinds of-, 148
Project-method, 156, 228
Protocol language, 310
and meta-language, 273, 331
and scientific philosophers, 379
basis of-, 318
Bergson uses, 326
Carnap suggests, 333
Empiricists and, 354 f
in complex numbers, 32 f
in Leibniz, 320 f, 322 f
model of-, 308
of Eddington, 325
reconstructed, 277, 308
un-normalized, 322
Whittaker on, 322 f
in Economics, 111, 118, 123, 126, 128 f, 147 ff.
Psycho-analysis, 237
Psychology meets physics, 316
Psycho-physical axis, 293

Quesnay, 49, 87, 107, 111 f, 118, 121, 125, 127, 135, 147 f
economic theory of-, 103, 105f, 125

places of-, 366
personal, 209
complete, 210
hypostatic status of-, 218
horizontal and vertical, 344
theory of-, 123
natural, 179
one goal of-, 252
saving factor in, 253
two paths of-, 253
Religious groups,
classification of-, 250 f
Renormalisation, 281, 307, 361
of language, 308
Republic, The, 75, 77
Restated economics, 143
Revaluation of values, 114
of methodology, 124
Richest country, 78, 116
Rousseau, J.J., 5, 35 f, 49 f, 50, 69, 113 f
a contemplative, 175
a jagad-guru, 183
and Dewey, 229 f
and social education, 179
and Spencer, 227
an enigma, 172 f
as citizen of Geneva, 243
a yogi, 182
champion of human values, 182
developments after, 172 f
dialectical idiom of-, 176
faces paradoxes, 157 f
father of education, 155, 168, 171
laughed at, 168
mistrust in, 172
mystical note in, 182
on politics, 5, 35 f
on types of states, 63 f
secret of-, 228
Ruskin, 43, 46, 49, 54, 75, 78, 87 ff., 115, 147
protests, 88
Russell, Bertrand, 186, 213, 283, 307
on logical form, 277

Scarcity economics,
counterparts of-, 75
impasse created by, 45, 74 f
Scepticism and belief, 252
a religion, 253
and aesthetics, 347
and ethics, 347
and mysticism, 347
of Bergson, 326 ff.
of Hume, 320
of Kant, 318
of Milton, 320
Scheme of correlation, 238
criterion of-, 306
distinguished, 337
falls apart, 109
results as, 276 f
vertico-horizontal structure of-, 353
Science of Sciences, 119, 257, 266 f
certitude in, 278, 352
integration of-, 263
positive and negative, 267
Scientific activity,
different levels of-, 278
domain of-, 278
linguistic scheme of-, 277
typical pattern of-, 278
Scientific language,
absurdities in, 280, 312
and common language, 356
and structure of thought, 315 f
calculables in, 279 f
certitude of-, 274, 278
desiderata of-, 272 f
elements in, 276 f
horizontal inclinations of-, 13, 357 f
horizontalization of-, 311 ff.
meta-linguistic levels of-, 355 f
misplaced enthusiasm for, 358
name and form in, 376
normalisation of-, 311
normative factor in, 281
observables in, 279 f
origin of-, 352
proto-linguistic levels of-, 354, 356
range of-, 276
suggestions on, 359 ff.
three levels of-, 356
thrives in, 277
Scientific thinking, 274, 352
Scientific validity, 315
Scientism, 293
two worlds of-, 365
as seat of bliss and suffering, 4
Semiosis, 335
Sensation and reaction, 191
ideological, 83
Sex variation,
laws of-, 233 f
Sin in economics, 116, 137
of the present age, 87
Slavery persists, 142
Smith, Adam, 58, 64, 76, 125, 135, 147
concern of-, 73
Social Contract, 5, 203
logical, 305 f
two aspect of-, 305
Spiritualism and materialism,
reconciliation of-, 37
Standard of life,
meaning of-, 132
a lie, 46, 61
Surplus-value. 107, 127
absolute and relative, 122, 124, 126
emergence of-, 121, 128, 133
Theory, 45
Svadharma, 207

Tableau Economique, 104, 112, 127, 135, 148
scrutinized, 105
Tao Teh Khing, 205
Thing-language, 310
two kinds of-, 292
and colour-solid, 313 f
as a global whole, 360
divisions of-, 366
horizontal axis of-, 359
integrated norm of-, 306
outline of-, 309 f
pairs in, 307
process, 195, 290
structure of-, 290, 294, 302, 306
unit of-, 306
vertical axis of-, 359
Tariff, 140
Trust, 134, 138
Turiya, 194
Type-psychology, 239
in education, 236
unitive, 238
psychological, 237

empty content of-, 170
failure of-, 166 f
Unemployment and leisure, 140
Unified language,
and languages, 357
derived, 312, 346, 365
efforts by logical empiricists, 335
elements unified, in, 276
goal of-, 272, 274, 281
main findings on, 359
Unified science
and sciences, 357
defined, 271
United Nations, 16
negativism in, 15
relativism in, 16
Unitive approach
to language, 272
Unitive vision
in economics, 65, 121, 130
suspected, 215
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 29 f
defeat of-, 171
Upanishads, 147, 205
Utility, 73
Utopia, 75

the Absolute, 109
and Economics, 84 f, 108 f, 112, 118
and price, 112
labour theory of-, 85
economics as, 115, 121, 131
problems of-, 110
Absolute, 132f
and personal tendencies, 204
basic conflict in, 204
circulation, 125, 130
exchangeable and not, 73 f
four aspects of-, 125, 128, 130
horizontal and vertical, 115, 127, 129, 132 f, 203 f, 218, 268
contrasted, 218
negative and positive, 118, 125,127 f
possible worlds of-, 75 f, 115
pure, 133
real and false, 58
vertical, 115, 127
Vasana, 194
Vedanta, 108, 113, 179, 189, 214
the, defined, 309
Virtue and Wisdom, 117
Voltaire on Economics, 50, 113 f,
172, 175,208

War crimes and justice, 10
Watson, J.B.,
on child, 214
best, 133
capital and, 74. 76
common value reference, 105
four limbs of-, 133
healthy circulation of-, 133
horizontal circulation of-, 106, 134
is not money, 114
non-mercantilist notion of-, 77
positive and negative, 110,121
the only, 78
the real, 116, 126 f
three strata of circulation, 106
vertical and horizontal, 97
Wealth of Nations. 73, 82, 125, 135
measure for, 135
Wells, H.G., 155. 157, 169, 172
Whittaker, 322 ff.
a weight of poverty, 138
Absolute, 163
a foster mother, 243
and dialectics, 7, 176
and good and evil, 7
and world problems, 24, 163
a perennial way, 7
components of-, 217
lack of-,
in economics, 61
method of-, 6
enigma of-, 339
on atomic facts, 322
on logical atomism, 282
on structure of language, 274
thesis of-, 334
Word system,
mapping of-, 362 f, 367
Work and joy, 139
World Government,
active programme of-, 23 ff.
an accomplished fact, 11
and danger of exclusiveness, 24
approach to, 7
a priori basis of-, 5, 14, 20
dialectical contract in, 13
functions of-, 7, 10, 12, 20 f, 29
its power, 12
its presence, 13
jurisdiction of-, 31
justification of-, 11
revenue of-, 31 f
success of-, 24 f
the asset of-, 25, 32
to make it effective, 25 f
validity of-, 12
what it is not, 19
zero hour for, 9
World law,
and the good of all. 34
dialectical formula for, 34
dialectical Interaction in, 36
general good in, 34
guidelines for, 35
structural perspective of, 34f
World passport, 29
World politics
practising it, 26
World problems,
spiritual solutions to, 37
Wrong economics, 69

Yoga, 159,184
defined, 176
and economist, 130, 220
perfect, 195























1. Preamble 3
2. Genesis 11
3. Other Partial Approaches 15
4. Unique and Positive Qualities 19
5. Active Programme 23
6. Jurisdiction, Revenue, Resources, etc. 31
7. World Law 33
8. Conclusion 37


9. Introduction 43
10. Gold in Wisdom's Language 53
11. Towards a One-World Economic 71
12. Proto-Linguistics Applied to Economics 147


13. Introduction 155
14. World Education Manifesto 163


15. One Religion 249
16. Ethics Normalized 255





The subject which concerns us here is that of World Government. In the light of Samuel Johnson's statement that "politics is the last refuge of scoundrels"; and in view of the more than evident nuisance-value created by the din of rival politicians at the time of political elections, contemplatives are naturally expected to steer clear of all politics. The question arises then as to why spiritual and contemplative persons like ourselves, speaking of Unitive Understanding (advaita), and taking our position on the long spiritual tradition of India, should dabble in such subjects as government and politics at all; and the general reader would be justified in wanting to know the place of Advaita Vedanta in such a context.

Vedanta comes into contact with the problem of human welfare only indirectly, and sometimes after prayers there is a sort of ending benediction of "shanti", which consists of saying, "let all people in the world be happy". The welfare of humanity is thus not altogether outside the scope of the Vedantic tradition of India. Suffering anywhere in the world must be considered as belonging to the subject. Every such situation has the subjective side or the self-aspect which


might be outside the context of actual suffering, and the objective side or the non-self aspect, which is the actual seat or scene of such sufferings.

Advaita Philosophy, which is no other than the way of Unitive Understanding in its essence, must be capable of equating the self and the non-self as interchangeable terms. The suffering of fellow man thus equates itself naturally with the suffering of every true Vedantin. Bliss (ananda) and suffering (dukha) both take place within the self, which has the absolute status of cancelling its own subjective and objective prejudices. Advaita is a supposition taken between two rival aspects of the same problem. Thus the welfare of humanity and the suffering of even the smallest animal, such as an ant going to be lightly trampled upon by a vedantin, become subjects of equal concern to him by the two sides of the situation in which he is to be correctly situated.

It is not the suffering as we see it in the headlines of a morning newspaper, glanced at before breakfast in a light-hearted way, that is to be kept in mind here. Headlines big and small reflect major or minor disasters which take place in this world; and what is read in one daily newspaper is forgotten by the next morning's breakfast. This is the common way of taking a casual interest in politics. The difference between this way and the contemplative way that belongs to the Gurukula is that our interest does not fluctuate between morning and evening, or even between weekdays and Sundays.
Newspaper politics has to be reduced to a common numerator or denominator. We get thus a dialectical approach to politics which is, in our case, to be distinguished by two other terms besides Unitive Understanding. Firstly, we are interested in geo-politics, and not just politics. This implies that we treat of the planet Earth as a unit called "geos", in which politics is to be discussed in terms of Ius Solis, the Justice of the Earth. We are thus interested in world politics, and not just local or even national party politics. Secondly, our politics is based on a dialectical approach, the essence of which can be stated by the formula inscribed on the shields of the two female figures in the


monument of the Swiss Confederation in Geneva, Switzerland. One tall female figure holds a shield bearing the inscription, "One for All"; the other corresponding counterpart of the same tall woman holds another shield, though placed on the ground, with the reciprocal part of the formula, "All for One". Thus between the General Good and the Good of All there is a dialectical interplay of values. Politics emerges into view, as amply proved in the "Social Contract" of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, when two factors, one standing for the General Good and the other for the Good of All, come into interplay.

These subtleties require much more elaboration than we can make in these short preliminary remarks. Geo-politics, thus understood geo-dialectically, is a special branch or discipline. We cannot go into all the detailed aspects here, but we can refer to some of the salient features of the geo-dialectical approach to World Government by way of indicating some of the highlights and by way of underlining some of the characteristics of this kind of politics, to show that such a subject is not outside the scope of a contemplative or spiritual way of life, especially at the present time, when mass communication portends a time when humanity will receive messages which cannot be distinguished from the medium, nor the medium from the message.


This is the a priori given basis of the World Government outlined in this memorandum. The recognition of the unity and solidarity of mankind follows from the correct application of the scientific or unitive approach to the problems of humanity. Just as belief in many gods is incorrect, so when humanity is considered relativistically as consisting of closed groups - however big or justified in the name of power or practicability - such a view violates this first and fundamental principle of the indivisible unity of Man. Humanity is one by its common origin, one in its common interests and motives of happiness here on earth in everyday living, and one in its relation to the aspirations and ideals which bind human beings together by bonds of sympathy for each other.


A unitive and absolute value is at the basis of human life. This high human value knows no frontier, either actual or ideological. It makes no discrimination between rich and poor, high and low, civilised and backward. Sympathy for suffering and indignation against injustice to fellow men transcends time and clime, and reaches out evenly or pointedly, as the case may deserve, to the uttermost recesses of the one world which man inhabits.


To say that evil does not exist and that God created all men of good will sounds unrealistic to modern ears after all the experience of humanity which historians have recorded. To state, on the contrary, that evil is the basis of human life, leaves us equally unconvinced. The wary man would back out of the paradox involved by saying that the verdict would depend on the particular case, and refuse to generalise. He might even go further and say sophistically that the possibility of error or evil in human nature is what makes man human at all; and by the same token it could be argued that even evil must have a basis of goodness. Such arguments have brought human affairs up against impasses again and again. We are no nearer to the right answers to such questions than we were thousands of years ago. General scepticism drives people to sit on the fence.

Irrespective of time or clime, wise men have repeatedly tried to teach us a way out of these dilemmas. There is a method and a theory of knowledge proper to wisdom, which is not the same as that of logic, ratiocination or even 'objective' or mechanistic intelligence.


Such an approach should be scientifically formulated. It will then resolve conflicting counterparts of a given situation or problem unitively, without conflict. Just as one humanity is true; so one absolute justice for all mankind, one goodness applicable to all mankind, and one God or ideal of human happiness could be stated to be at the basis of common human existence. The ordering of human life on unitive lines is the function of the World Government envisaged in the present memorandum.


Whether human life is fundamentally good or bad does not concern us here as directly as whether it is possible to cancel out evil by the good residing in human nature itself: i.e. whether there is still hope for humanity to overcome ignorance by wisdom. The static verity of human goodness or badness should be viewed dynamically as belonging to the flow of human life shaping itself in time. Living unitive thinking is concerned with the progressive shaping of human life based on values which fuse into an ever newly-integrated flux which is subject to a constant process of becoming. The old order changes, giving place to the new. It is in this sense that wisdom is a perennial way of contemplation. This wisdom forms part of a science which could be called dialectics. The truth that makes men free and the knowledge that gives power are open and dynamic human values to be understood in the light of dialectics. The 'evil' that is necessarily present in human nature, when viewed unitively according to dialectics, is as true as the 'goodness' inherent in human nature, when viewed in a similar way. All values, positive or negative, when unitively understood, belong to a vertical scale of values which man must recognize, and at every moment he has to choose between opposite alternatives. At each step here a constant process of dialectical revaluation is involved, whether in the life of each man, each unit group, or of humanity as a whole. Such an approach to world affairs is what this memorandum recommends, and it is this which makes it so unique as legitimately to claim the attention of all lovers of humanity who are interested in a World Government, which for the first time is scientifically conceived. This newly formulated science, wherein pure dialectical reasoning is applied to problems of the world, may be called the 'Science of Geo-Dialectics'.


The geo-dialectical method consists of clearly recognizing the two counterparts which belong together in any given situation or problem to be eased or resolved in human affairs. Man is caught in necessity or bondage on the one hand; and on the other reaches out towards the contingent factor of freedom. If we could say that his necessity is symbolized either by the need for bread or by common hunger; contingency is symbolized by the need to live and breathe freely, and in fulfilling one's life according to the inner urges within each man. Man has to fulfil life according to his own nature without being stifled or suffocated. Bread and freedom, resolved into unitive terms of a central value, spell happiness. When each man is happy, all mankind is happy. When there is a general happiness of mankind as a whole, each man has his happiness most secure. No mother is happy unless her child is also happy; and no ruler is happy unless the subjects too are happy. To recognize and deal with the dialectical counterparts - while respecting fully the nature of the individual or the integrated personality of normal units called nations in such a manner as to cancel out counterparts in unitive terms of positive human values conducive to human happiness - is the basis of the geo-dialectical method. Being an applied part of pure dialectics, the full implications of this statement can be clarified only after studying dialectics. (1)


The non-dialectical, non-unitive, mechanistic or unilateral approach which does not respect the integrated personality of nations or individual citizens gives rise to many anomalies, absurdities and disasters. If the case of a mother is taken up without including with it the case of the child; if the case of a ruler is taken without considering the ruled; or the master's case without the servant's - and even if we should forget to take into account that the one and the many are interdependent or reciprocally interrelated in a subtle dialectical manner - we invoke disasters large or small and sow the seeds of injustice and consequent suffering.


Each man consists of what he is subjectively and what he holds as dear as life itself, such as his money, his family, or even his faith. These adhere closely to each person and result in the happiness that he craves for. National and cultural groups also have integrated personalities of their own which cannot be subjected without injury to a mechanistic treatment which is merely based on quantitative statistics or facts. Such roots of integration lie deeply buried in history. The partitioning of nations has resulted in genocidal tragedies.

Operating through decades or centuries, historical necessity gives the raison d'être to the jigsaw-puzzle-patterns of the differently-coloured patches on the mapped surface of the globe which school children are taught to distinguish as self-contained or autonomous political units, entities, states, countries or nations. Sometimes such patches tend merely to mark an area where lives an amorphous mass of people who are dictated to by external forces. Even while the child is being taught political geography, the patches change their outline or encroach on each other with a strange irrationality. These patches are not the result of any scientific ordering of the world, but are arbitrary and haphazard in their origin and growth.

They have been traced by wars old or recent, whether just or unjust, and the de facto status of certain units does not correspond to their de jure status in the present set-up of nations. The status of member-nations in present-day international bodies such as the United Nations depends on the veto or whim of the powers that be. No public or objective norms prevail here. Neither the natural law of the jungle, nor any law consciously formulated in any manner in keeping with the much-vaunted dignity of man, regulates internationalism at present.


In the days of chivalry, willing combatants fought duels in strict accordance with certain codes of honour consistent with human dignity as understood in those olden days. But the day has now come when a brave general is reported to be proudly contemplating the extermination of whole sections


of people by the latest weapons which human intelligence itself has placed at the service of irresponsible adventurers. Instead of the knight-errant helping women and children in distress, humanity today hears of threats against the innocent and the unarmed. We hear of war criminals punished after wars have ceased, when we are not sure whether the punishment or the crime violates human codes of honour or justice. While their children wait for the horrible news outside the prison, parents get the electric chair for not keeping their own intelligence from helping those whom one nation or other suspects for the time being. Politics too keeps strangely changing its own complexion from day to day. Concentration camps and the lot of millions of displaced families who are denied papers year after year, making illegal even their right to work and earn a living - thus in effect taking away their de facto status as fellow human beings - prove that the days of barbarity and slavery are not over. Exposed to fear and insecurity, humanity knows not which way to turn for consolation. Helplessly, it looks on with impotence when the dignity of humanity itself is at stake. The zero hour for the declaration of a World Government, at least in principle, is long past. Such a Government must voice human honour and self-respect. It must preserve the wisdom-heritage of humanity and hand it down to coming generations. Those who love humanity and absolute human values at every level and in every department of life must be protected. Those who hate their fellow men for reasons that are not universally valid are as good as not existing. Those who adhere to rival relativist values are bound, in any case, to cancel one another out. There is no real need to name the enemies of humanity, because their days are numbered if humanity has any hope of survival at all. That humanity will survive, the supporters of World Government do firmly and solemnly believe.

Therefore the time has come for all lovers of humanity to take a definite stand, avoiding double-talk, duplicity, compromise and doubt.


1. See "Dialectical Methodology", "An Integrated Science of the Absolute", and other allied works by the present author.



The World Government came into being (in principle at least) at Long. 63° 25' West, Lat. 44° 32' North on Sept. 4, 1953. Utter necessity was its justification. Very special states of stress, both personal and global, ushered it into being when a stateless person was forced into a closed territory against his own will or consent. Even a de facto citizen of the world already, with a fine record of service to the same closed territory or 'nation', was denied the right to make a living or pursue his own happiness. There was no government to represent him or stand by him. The World Government had therefore to be conceived, as though immaculately - though neither illegitimately, disloyally, nor dishonourably - born. "Time waits for no man"; "Better now than never"; "Necessity knows no law"; "All is fair in love and war" - these are some of the sayings that hold good here. It takes only two to start a quarrel or sign a pact, and only one to tell the truth. It is not numbers that can justify a government, but its intrinsic quality based on Absolute Truth or Justice. It takes but one to steer the ship to safety, though hundreds may weep and wail in vain.


If even today the simple accident of being born in a so-called royal family can justify the formation of an absolute monarchy. It can be seen that no principle of geo-dialectics is violated by the formation of a World Government. The World Government has no territory other than the surface of the globe. It is not conceived as a rival to any existing government, it does not intend to duplicate any of their functions, nor does it wish to be a parallel government, nor has it ambitions to be a super-state. On the other hand, it has no wish to occupy a second place among nation states. It has an absolute status of its own as understood in the light of the science of geo-dialectics already referred to in the usually- understood sense. The World Government has no programme of action or territorial ambition. It does not rule by force or by the power of magistrates or the police. Knowledge is its power and, instead of threats or punishments, it relies on the dictum that a word to the wise will suffice. Just as a ball of iron can be made white-hot without the ball itself suffering division, change, or control from outside, so the World Government proposes to influence humanity in and through humanity, and for humanity. Nothing is to be disrupted in the process. A certain type of truth which has been called the 'pearl of great price', the 'little leaven that leaveneth the whole lump' or that 'dharma' (right way of life), 'even a little of which will save from great fear' is the pinch of absolutist wisdom which is to be added to the chaotic world-situation so as help us to reorientate, reintegrate and regulate human affairs. In other words, the World Government applies a subtle form of vertical pressure corresponding to spiritual heat or electricity. Order then emerges, as with magnetised iron filings from non-magnetised chaos.


A second step forward in the formation of the World Government was taken at Long. 77° 38' East, Lat. 12° 58' North, on May 15, 1956. A recessive part of the world, never even to be suspected of any intention to dominate the world through its power, has been chosen this time as the location from which to confirm and sanction the first formation of the World Government in a dominant part of the world. To rise above suspicion, World Government has to be established neutrally between the dominant and the recessive aspects of world political life. No one carrying the threat of the atom bomb in one hand and a message of peace in the other can be trusted by others who sail in the same boat. Relativism breeds rivals while the correctly dialectical or absolutist approach unites and frees men in the name of a humanity which is understood unitively.

Between the initial formation of the World Government and its later more precise formulation and confirmation, nearly three years of experimentation, meditation and study have been undertaken. This second time, as stricter geo-dialectics would require, there were two sides, represented by two men, in the solemn pact before the declaration of the World Government. One of these contracting parties represented the good of all and the other represented the general good. This subtle dialectical contract sets the pattern for the growth of the World Government. Such a formation of an actual government, at least in a nuclear form, has been duly announced. More conferences could be contemplated in the near future in different parts of the world, involving those who represent the general good or the good of all, or both. The nuclear yet actual government will gather momentum by the good will of the people of the world from day to day, so as to become an efficient and effective instrument for the reorientation and regulation of human affairs under the aegis of the most high principle of Goodness, or the most supreme value of happiness that humanity can accept to regulate its life.

This memorandum hereby greets all lovers of humanity with the happy news of the birth of the World Government. Its presence is to be felt, not especially in any fixed locality or centre, but in every part of the world, wherever it can best serve its supreme purpose which is the political happiness of humanity


It is however the global, unitive one-world politics of all mankind with which we are concerned here. Because of its absolutist character, this can be called both politics and no-politics at once, or a politics that gets rid of politics. In other words, the World Government is based on the pure politics to be known as geo-politics.



To the natural question why we should not join hands with other organisations working already in the field of internationalism, we have to answer that there is the fundamental drawback that all of them are vitiated by either a negative or a relativistic approach. What we mean by these two expressions must be somewhat clear from what we have already said.

By negativism we mean that proposals for peace or disarmament have been based on a regret or a fear connected with wars just fought or wars expected. At such moments there is great volume of collective emotion available and those who offer quick results get nations to pay large sums for preserving peace, or in the name of security. The regret, however, passes, as also the fear. Positive attitudes take their place, and one organization which failed to fulfil its contract is succeeded by another in a modified form. This is how the League of Nations was displaced by the United Nations.


The latter may be expected to go the way of its predecessor as soon as its impotence in the matter of securing peace becomes evident to all. It is patent that, in spite of its declared intentions, the UN has not been able to make its member-nations reduce their armaments, nor has it been able to mitigate the national excesses of its member nations. Of course in some matters it is better than nothing, but in other matters it is worse than nothing. Representatives of major nations get the chance to call each other names at the glorified debates held under the auspices of these bodies. With points of order, explanations of votes, amendments, counter-amendments and arbitrary powers of veto or methods of filibustering or blocking through satellite members, the UN has no power to implement even the smallest item in its own Declaration of Human Rights, not to speak of objecting to the dangers of atomic tests. Actually, it is used by power-groupings to sling mud at each other. At best it is a glorified debating society employing thousands of interpreters, stenographers and clerks who live and move in a beehive of modern buildings. They are obliged to keep the powers that be in good humour.

Every effort has already been made by the sponsors of the present World Government to try and work through the UN. The story is too long to relate here. Suffice it to say that it has been a signal failure.

By relativism we mean that some sort of duality, as between free nations and others who are not so, is still retained in the structure of the organization. The organization is not unitively conceived according to any science of absolutism. Representation, admission, or expulsion are based on no uniform norms of any science universally or publicly formulated.


There are various religious, political or even commercial bodies which influence world affairs. There is the Communist Party, which shapes the trend of world politics. Then there is the Catholic Church and various other bodies which have world programmes.


Commercial combines and banking agencies fulfil, openly or secretly, many functions which properly should belong to a World Government. These serve humanity in good, bad or indifferent ways; but as long as a correctly-formulated World Government is not there, no one has any right to find fault with whatever service they render or even with whatever exploitation they consciously or unconsciously exercise in world affairs.
International organisations exist in many departments, such as the Universal Postal Union, etc. Member nations may or may not ratify their resolutions, and even when they do so, the limitations of their own arbitrary sovereignty or nationalism are not wholly discarded. The approach to such problems is not based at present on any exact science such as we claim to be at the basis of the World Government envisaged in this memorandum. This class of organisation can be almost good or the next best - but just as one cannot jump a chasm in two leaps or expect a prize for the number nearest to the one that wins the prize, so the wholesale scientific basis of the World Government is all-important. The science of geo-dialectics is based on a rare and precious way of higher reasoning without which no World Government can be expected to succeed. Such undertakings would not be justified even if they should obtain a large measure of success. Here almost true is not good enough. This same verity is couched in the old saying that 'good government is no substitute for self-government'. The mandate for any government has to be derived from the people who are to be governed on the one pole; and from another pole, derived from the absolute justice implicit in any such government. Like religion or morality, there are two different sources to World Government. It has to be the resultant of ascending and descending dialectical counterparts. Such principles, however, can be made clear only in the light of general dialectics, which has still to be formulated and taught in the proposed Institute of Dialectics. Meanwhile we are here obliged to state with seeming dogmatism that partial and unscientific approaches to the problem of World Government are not valid.


We have already stated in passing that the World Government is not based on power with weapons or threats of punishment. Its authority is derived from humanity's need for it and from its rightness and justice. It has been mentioned also that it has no territorial ambitions or designs. It does not propose to arrogate to itself any functions that are already being fulfilled correctly by existing governments. No overlapping or duplication of functions is in the scheme presented here. Neither is diarchy or a parallel form of government contemplated. However, in spite of this position, the World Government will not be second to any other government. It will consciously avoid functioning even as a supra-state in the usual sense. If we should want to think of the political theory on which it is to be based, it can be said here in advance that it does not subscribe to the laissez-faire doctrine. Much less does it adhere to the doctrine of 'might is right', which, though more positive, is still outmoded. The Benthamian doctrine of 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' is also not in keeping with the principles of the present Government.


It does not think quantitatively at all. That would make it fall into the capital error of being mechanistic or relativistic in its approach - which we have stated to be the very drawback we wish to avoid. It is based on a dialectical approach to world problems. What this implies we shall clarify as much as possible below.


The World Government is based on a solemn pact between the people of the world and their own dialectical counterpart in the form of a wise lover of humanity representing the general good of humanity as a whole. Although stated in the form of two aspects, these counterparts form the obverse and reverse of the same coin called Absolute Happiness, Goodness, or Justice of Humanity. This is a unitive central value, whatever the word-stimulus employed may be. Moreover, it is essentially a human value in keeping with the dignity of the human species. Bread and freedom will be provided for all when such a government comes into its full swing of effective and efficient working, by the conscious co-operation and understanding of the people of the world. Stated in the most general terms, the task of the World Government will be the intelligent ordering of human life-activities in a manner normal and natural to man, without violating his own innate dispositions, legitimate interests, or aspirations.


It must be practical and effective in its functioning. Mere pious hopes like that of wanting to establish the kingdom of heaven on earth will not improve matters. A government worth the name must deliver the goods or benefits belonging to the domain of politics. It must make human life on earth less full of humiliation, helplessness or suffering. While this is right, the World Government must guard itself from falling into the opposite error of getting involved in a maze of overt actions which will fan feelings of rivalry and create more warring camps than ever.


To avoid war, to guarantee collective security, to make co-existence possible or to practise the virtues of the "panca-sila" (the 'five principles' of the Bandung Conference, ED) of non-interference, or to cultivate an attitude of positive neutrality, have been the recommendations of some of the world's politicians for improving human affairs. These recommendations, though good as far as they go, embody the negative side of the virtue of international life. To leave matters well alone and not to make more rules than are necessary, are cardinal virtues for the World Government to cultivate. Stopping at harmless virtues which are still relative will not make a World Government function normally. The positive programme of the World Government has at every stage to balance or cancel out the negative, so as to strike the just mean between war and peace, activity and passivity, hot and cold attitudes, co-operation and competition. A constant pressure has to be maintained between these opposing tendencies so as to throw up constantly a higher value as an ideal for humanity.


A man becomes a better man by intensely and consciously wanting to be good. When he is good he should mind his own business and not interfere with others. His own inner urges as a man, insofar as they are in keeping with human nature as understood scientifically in all its bearings, have normally to get the full play of expansion and expression, without clashing with others who want to have the same chances. Those deep-seated specific qualities which distinguish man and make him unique and unrivalled, must be brought out into creative expression instead of lying dormant or unfulfilled. If virtues such as these apply to the individual, they could apply equally to families as normal units of human life. Rural or urban units could have personalities cultivating the same virtues or moral principles in keeping with a science or philosophy of human life. Bloated amorphous political units must also attempt to conform to the requirements of this geo-dialectical absolutist morality. When all formations follow the same laws, the order which constitutes World Government can be expected. No feverish horizontal activity is here involved.


A certain positive pressure resulting in a vertical ascent is what needs to be constantly maintained in human life. This pressure can also be compared to a moral or spiritual heat or to the magnetising influence of a current of electricity. The principle of double negation and double assertion as known to scholastic philosophy in Europe should be understood as implicit here. Only a fuller treatise on geo-dialectics itself can clarify such matters more completely or elaborately.


What the World Government actually proposes to do is first and foremost to bring to bear a new and total world-outlook upon world problems. It will help to turn out more and more world citizens. They will be human beings who have attained the full status of persons who represent the general good and the good of all. While making themselves happy according to the light of dialectical wisdom, they will constantly strive for the happiness of their fellow men in a manner consistent with the same wisdom. Such a balanced life between two interests, unitively treated, will enhance the value of the individual in society. He will carry with him a subtle influence or presence. Such a person would be a modern version of a knight-errant seeking the right kind of adventure to face in the name of his love of humanity. He would soon be appraised of innumerable opportunities presenting themselves to him where he can render signal service to his fellow men without going at all out of his way. Many such functions might lie outside the scope of geo-politics proper, with which alone we are primarily concerned in this memorandum.


However, this should not deter such a man or woman from placing his or her high personal credit at the service of the cause of world citizenship and World Government. To call oneself a sovereign citizen of the world and consciously to affiliate oneself wholeheartedly to the noble ideal, reveals in one who does so the true human value which a lover of humanity must carry within him, thus enhancing his value at once with reference to himself and to all others with whom his lot is to live on earth. These are the rights and duties that such an affiliation at once confers.

As such a status comes from an understanding of the science involved, there is no danger of groups of such people considering themselves as belonging to any superior caste or group. The danger of such a contingency need not, however, be ruled out. On the contrary, all such world citizens should be taught to keep this danger constantly in their minds, to correct themselves consciously, and to help fellow world citizens to do the same. The danger, however, should not deter humanity from launching the undertaking; just in the same way that burst boilers or air crashes do not deter people from navigation or flying. Moreover, by the overall unitive approach which is the basis of the whole new outlook involved in the World Citizenship Movement, the danger of clannishness or caste-mindedness can always be counteracted consciously, even when the tendency is there. This unitive outlook is more deeply rooted than at that level of life where World Citizenship has to express itself, which at most is the waking world of the conscious ego. The unitive approach to reality will permeate the subconscious, the infra conscious, and the fourth stratum of transparent or direct awareness in the individual, so that the danger of exclusiveness as an individual will be countered very effectively. This is the definite advantage of this approach to world problems, being actually a particular branch of the general science of wisdom-dialectics. This will further guarantee proportion, balance, normality, wholesomeness, harmony, and humane grace or correctness to World citizenship.


The success of the World Government depends on its ability to produce the right kind of world citizens as its champions in different parts of the world. They could be described as the most important single asset on the side of the undertaking.


Once the reorientation of the spirit or the change of heart in regard to world problems has taken place in a given individual, and he feels keenly that he has to do something for the furtherance of his ideal, it is possible for him to do it from where he naturally happens to be. If he is a legislator he can stand for election on a World Government ticket. The immense popularity of the One World idea will only enhance his chances of success. According to qualitative geo-dialectical principles it would not be wrong for him to enter any given council, big or small, national or local, urban or rural, swearing allegiance to the head of that group or the head of several groups for the time being; for in doing so he would be recognizing only the symbolic absolutism implicit or inherent in the person (president or monarch) who happens to be at the head. Moreover, in terms of the universal human values for which he is a politician, there is no contradiction or conflict between the interests of that particular political unit and the human interests of the world itself taken as a unit. There is a geo-dialectical secret involved here which could be brought out by a homely example. If an old well should be hidden by a flood which covered it later, the water that quenches the thirst is the same water, whether it comes from the hidden well or from the lake overcovering it. There is no conflict possible between two concentric circles. This is the ancient wisdom found in the Bhagavad Gita, which comes to the rescue of world politics and by which the walls of all the Jerichos in the world must fall. The blast of absolutism from inside or outside the walls, or both together; by those placed superiorly above or in, as it were, helpless positions below - dominant or recessive men or women the world over have only to want with real solemn earnestness to make the World Government effective. Thus will the work of World Government become most practicable, positive, and irresistible.


When once elected to a local or national body on a World Government ticket, the man or woman concerned takes a course of action in keeping with the principles of humanity and world morality or value comprised between the two poles of bread and freedom. Taking his stand on the norms and standards of geo-dialectics, the world citizen generally takes a middle-of-the-road position in respect of leftist or rightist parties, and generally supports the president when absolute justice, morality or the ideal are not violated by his position. When resolutions are moved or voting is explained he gets a chance of placing before those who are politically-minded a new approach based on global human interests. He can bring token motions to cut armament budgets when disproportionate, and the people's sense of justice can be appealed to. If he should be ousted from the Council the people will follow him into the street if his cause is just and in the name of the interests of the common man and humanity at once.

Here, for the present, the possibilities of such action from inside must be left to the imagination. When permanent support for the world approach is certain, 'mondialisation' within such units is not impossible. Symbolic acts in keeping with the code of honour or morals proper to the world citizen could be resorted to, resembling Tolstoyan or Gandhian methods, as revised in the light of a stricter geo-dialectical science.


Men, and more especially women, who occupy positions of influence or who have resources at their command, can study the plans of World Government and bring their weight to bear on the side of supporting human rights and preserving the best in the heritage of mankind, whether in art, culture, or wisdom. Dante, Shakespeare, and Kalidasa belong to humanity first, and the claims of particular nations are for them only incidental.


There is also the one perennial contemplative tradition based on a science of the Absolute, which is the common property of humanity. In preserving these and in protecting the common wisdom-heritage of mankind the best interests of the common man will be secured also.

Poor men, who have to make a living wherever it is at present available to them, are kept from freely reaching out to their God-given opportunities by artificial man-made rules. These rules must be broken down. Travel becomes more and more difficult and rules are piled upon rules by nations big and small, for no valid or justifiable reason except to retaliate in the name of national pride or exclusiveness. Parochialism, tribalism, casteism, and nationalism have much in common with fanaticism or blind orthodoxy. A world-philosophy and religion, critically and scientifically ordered, will help to relieve the existing asphyxiating conditions wherein miserable men and women have to live in the prison of criss-cross rules which is the present world. All modern people are keenly aware of this stifling atmosphere. The well to do, the influential, or at least their wives, must take interest in the poor, not to disrupt anything or anybody, but to bring just that kind of legitimate pressure which will ease the trouble of the common man. There can be a World Order of Ladies or Knights who could function as supervisors, permission authorities, world guards or witnesses of natural integrity, peacemakers or arbitrating advisers in the numerous walks of life in all matters ranging between the gaining of bread and the gaining of personal or spiritual freedom.

Premarital, post-marital and familial arbitration or advice, helping juveniles and children with possible maladjustments, the re-education of delinquents, psychological guidance, a pedagogy which respects the personality of the child, co-operative centres for the reclamation and relaxation of persons caught in the stress of life or in conditions of tension, and occupational guidance or treatment - these are only a few of the fields in which the world citizen could help the lot of humanity from wherever he or she might be living. A complete philosophy and a way of life shaped on unitive and absolutist lines are of course presupposed here. It will be the task of the World Institute of Human Affairs to elaborate, formulate, and make this available in the different languages of the world.


Individual men and women are caught in the barbed-wire frontiers, both ideological and actual, of rules and interdictions against freedom to pursue happiness freely and peacefully on the surface of the God-or-Nature-given earth. There has been no way hitherto for the articulation of their grievances. Not content with enforcing the rules of their own country, police belonging to one country have begun to help other countries in enforcing wrong rules in the name of internationalism. There is thus a double barrage of many absurd rules which themselves are multiplied beyond reason or necessity. The clever ones somehow get around every restriction, but the lot of the ordinary man becomes difficult. One only has to linger for a few minutes at passport or permit offices to be convinced of the large volume of suffering to which men and women are subjected. To refer even to a few typical cases would be outside the scope of this memorandum and would mar the sobriety of style which we wish to preserve here as far as possible. In one of his works, Ruskin had a paragraph from a daily newspaper printed in red ink because the subject was shocking to all decent human sentiments. The untold sufferings of the common man because of red tape and regulations would have to be printed in some other ink if they are to find a place in a memorandum such as this is intended to be.

What the common man could do is to register with the World Government as a world citizen and try to bring a vertically- conceived pressure to bear on the situation. He has to rely on numbers here to cope with the machinery of governments, which have a great deal of inertia in them. All shoulders have to be applied to the wheel to set affairs going normally. The trumpet blasts for absolute fairness from outside the walls of Jericho have to resound in consonance with the trumpet blasts from above or inside.


The inarticulate feelings of the soul of humanity or the emergent personality of the people of the world, have to find a voice in the World Government. The point of view of the World Government has to be broadcast unhesitatingly, in no uncertain terms and even with authority. Truth must be given a chance to prevail. Relativistic compromise is what makes humanity weak at present. These are facts which need no repetition here. As the World Government emerges more and more into public view, it will represent the conscience of humanity and will spotlight from day to day the errors detrimental to humanity's interests. In such a task it must keep clear from tacitly or openly becoming a tool in the hands of any existing power-block. Even if help should be obtained from one quarter more than another, the World Government must be above suspicion in pointing out mistakes. The cheap headline-world of propaganda must be avoided. A Voice of Humanity and a World News Agency may be started to serve the cause of the World Government.


The issuance of World Passports has already commenced. This would ease the situation arising in the cases of millions of persons who have no national status within nations. The response of nations is already there. Such persons will henceforth belong to the World Government. Their combined voice will and must be heard through the instrumentality of the World Government.


The proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights made by the United Nations in Paris in 1948 gives a legitimate overall function covering many points so far remaining unimplemented. Many major and minor nations are already committed to the thirty articles in this declaration. In bringing vertical pressure to bear on this matter of implementation of that declaration, the World Government would be in fact only helping the great number of nations to be true to their avowed undertakings.


To have a World Committee to give assent to the World Government and its functions from time to time, to hold World Conferences to compare notes, and do all that is incidental to the formation and correct functioning of the Government, are also matters which are naturally to be provided for as normal to the programme of the Government as it is expected to unfold and expand quickly or gradually, as outside conditions and innate forces warrant. Powers of supervision and assent may be vested in a representative Select Committee of those who are wise normally or who have received proper training in the Institute of Dialectics connected with the World Government.


The territorial jurisdiction of the World Government is the surface of the Earth. It does not think about owning any limited area to run its own primary government with land taxes, frontiers to protect, and defence arrangements. Overweighed with these items, present governments are in many ways outmoded remnants of the past which must all be subjected to drastic revision. These revisions will take place automatically when the World Government as envisaged here begins to be more and more effective. Globalisation of select units of administration is not to be ruled out.

Revenue is to be derived from the principle of indirect taxation as it prevails even now. Though indirect, the revenue will be by mutual consent. Services rendered by the Government could be charged for and, while prime necessities will be exempt even from such taxation as far as possible, items of luxury could be freely taxed.


Such matters will be attended to by the World Service Authority under the World Government. Indirect taxation is a form of profit which it is open for the World Government to make against services rendered. In fact, there exist even now trade combines and banking corporations - not to speak of religious bodies - which have enormous assets, sometimes as large and general as those of many existing governments. Economic and financial experts can see through the irregularities of some of the present monetary and other arrangements in which, by words such as 'going off the gold standard', or in dividing the world into 'hard' and 'soft' currency areas, wealth is conserved in pockets which, when examined by standards of absolute justice, do not belong to them. Gold is stored in vaults without use, for the artificially inflated credit of power blocks, and various book-adjustments are made behind the back of the common man to whom the money really belongs.

World banks and world currencies exist already without the regular consent of the people of the world, and what is called a loan to one country from another is not really a loan, but a long-term commercial deal. It would not be impossible for the World Government to have its own credit and currency, valid the world over, and planned on some rational human basis, such as having one day's labour equal one day's food and shelter, with a working week of 30 or 40 hours or even less, in a world where competition has been counteracted by co-operation, and where labour-saving devices are employed for more humane conditions.

As we have already said, the most valuable single asset of the World Government is the world citizen. Since world citizens can be found by virtue of the rightness of the cause in any part of the world in unlimited numbers, the assets of all well-intending people anywhere in the world are already in effect those of the World Government. A revised, living and organic system of accounting and budgeting has to be devised. There being no duality of ends and means in this work, receipts and disbursements need not necessarily show large figures. After all, on final analysis, large-scale banking is nothing but book-keeping.



When we think of World Law, and of somebody who is able to conceive it on concrete lines, we are at once confronted with two rival aspects of the same question. A law is made to benefit a group of people; such a group of people, whether in a particular state or country or political unit, geographically understood or merely ideological in status, must consist of individuals. Each individual is likely to differ from other individuals in some detail or other at least. Temperaments and tastes have to tally with what each person receives or deserves to receive. One man's meat could be another man's poison. What a man needs may not be the same as what a woman needs, nor what a child might need. Thus, what is called the general good can never be the same as what is conceived as the good of each individual, or the good of all. One has necessarily to bring in the mathematical notion of the greatest common multiple or the least common measure when thinking of any one item that caters to the needs of a group treated as comprising individuals, or else as a general totality treated as one unit. To give a concrete example, a municipality might have 10,000 Rupees to be distributed generously. This amount might be spent in two ways: it could be used for giving a prize or


scholarship to the best student at school; or else it could be evenly distributed to buy books or slates for every student in the municipality. In the latter case, it is the good of all that is behind the motive for the benefit conferred. On the other hand, in the first case of helping the best student, it is through the satisfaction of the individual that the benefit is supposed to be conferred on all the students. Thus in formulating beneficial laws for any group, one could think in only one of these two alternative ways. But law has to be conceived primarily for the benefit of the general good, and it should harmonise within its scope the good of all secondarily.

Between these rival claims of the general and the individual there is a subtle dialectical formula which has always to be respected. This formula could be stated in the words, "One for All and All for One". We thus arrive at the famous formula on which Rousseau's Contrat Social is based, and on which the Swiss Confederation has been conceived. A socialistically- conceived law respects the same dialectical formula when it lays down the maxim, "From each according to his ability and to each according to his need."

Thus, the lawmaker can take his stand on the general good or on the good of all when he formulates his laws. Just as an umpire cannot be a player in the game, it is not possible for one and the same person to fulfil these two roles, which are necessarily dialectical counterparts. It is therefore that Rousseau says that the man who lays down the law should be "oceans removed" from the problems of the group itself, so that the general good and good of all might have a healthy interaction. What could be good for a small group might not be good for a big country, although the overall structure of both might conform to the same pattern. Good government or law is the resultant of an equilibrium established between what represents the good of all individuals in it, and what is conducive to the general good of the group taken as a whole.


Keeping this dialectical secret in one's mind, World Law must conform to an abstract structural pattern within which these two rival considerations can have a full and free scope for attaining a harmonious equilibrium, where individual interests cancel out against collective interests in every walk of life coming within the scope of government. Thus, World Government and World Law need not necessarily be thought of in terms of a world that is only geographically true. Whatever the extent of the population or government, the same structural pattern and the same dialectical counterparts are found to prevail within its total frame of reference. A World State has therefore to be conceived of first as a structural abstraction, while the functions of the state and its head - who is always a singular person - with all the other ramifications constituting the functions of a government, whether de jure or de facto, have to be thought of, as Rousseau has been able to do masterfully in his "Contrat Social". But Rousseau remains even to this day a much-misunderstood man. Let us therefore briefly turn our eyes elsewhere to see if this same dialectical approach is found acceptable to any other tradition or civilization. Here we are confronted with a surprising coincidence. In ancient Sanskrit literature, there are revealed norms and patterns of behaviour attributed to celebrated kings such as those of the Solar Dynasty descended from Manu, the first lawgiver. Kalidasa's "Raghuvamsa" is an epic of nineteen cantos, each of which depicts a king who conforms to this same dialectically-conceived and structurally balanced pattern of behaviour. Economics, ethics, aesthetics and education are all woven inextricably into this general political fabric in the works of Kalidasa. The King, who is a ruler of earth, is treated as a replica of Indra, the ruler of heaven and its denizens, the only difference being that of levels of value-systems, each having its centre in a scale of a vertical series of points. Politics and law are thus conceived of under the aegis of what is called an absolute pattern of principles as well as of behaviour. Any World Law has thus to be formulated with due respect for these relational aspects.

Besides the masterpiece on such a subject by Rousseau, it would be profitable for the modern student of World Law to


scrutinize in great detail the implications of a unified World Government as revealed in the writings of such great poets as Kalidasa, more especially as such matters are brought into relief successively with reference to the long line of model monarchs in whose praise the immortal epic "Raghuvamsa" itself been conceived. World Law is likely to receive a valuable original impetus when studied on the broad basis of a two-sided or dialectical interaction between the general good and the good of all, especially in India where holy tradition seems already to be in favour of such an approach. Rousseau's name, supplementing such a view from the Western World, would be sure to give it additional confirmation and support, even in the light of the most modern political theories. World Law thus becomes one that is unwritten, as well as being easily given to a common sense of justice in human relations. It is thus in this double perspective that we invite the attention of students to this all-important subject.



When it is said that wars begin in the minds of men, conversely it is already admitted by even full-fledged politicians that the solution to world problems is of a spiritual order. The doctrine of Dialectical Materialism, which puts necessity and hunger first, follows another line of approach. Both these approaches can be reconciled in a unitive approach to world problems as implied in the present memorandum.

Let us consider the armaments race, which is due to mistrust and fear of other nations. A serious proposal from the World Government is sure to have an almost magical effect in easing the tension of mistrust between nations.

The de-hypnotization of the mentality of mutual suspicion will save every nation, large or small, from the lop-sided provisions at present made in their budgets. Let world opinion merely support the idea of the World Government and a tangible relaxation will be felt at the poles in the personality of nations which breed mistrust; and even a theoretically respected authority can avoid the waste of billions of dollars for the world as a whole.


Let the World Government honour the farmer instead of vexing him with ever more items of taxation; let it start co-operative colonies to ease the tension of competitive life, such as those now working successfully in Israel, known as Kibbutzim, where there is no money exchanged at all; let it start fair-price shops, taking a percentage in the place of a tax, and so effectively eliminating the middleman, the black-marketeer and those who corner the necessities of life and make great and disproportionate profits at the expense of the common man; let it create clubs or pensions for persons obliged to pass their lives in eternal boredom, by means of colonies for the young, the old and the weak, which will give them natural outlets for expression and opportunities for light occupation without competition; let it confer titles or honours on people who render signal service to the needy and thus give them a legitimately-deserved chance to shine in the eyes of their fellow men. Such are some of the miscellaneous ways - too numerous to list completely - by which the World Government can justify its existence while it gathers momentum to be finally effective.


Another method full of possibilities for the World Government is decentralisation, and the method of cancellation of the plus and minus of a given situation. For instance: capital is the cause of the sufferings of labour; large factories are responsible for slums; promiscuous religious charity is responsible for begging - these pairs that are interdependent could be cancelled out one against the other without punishment or reform coming from the centre. The head and the tail aspects can be cancelled-out dialectically without central interference. The World
Government can help in the ordering of such matters, taking into consideration the counterparts involved in each problem.


There are many new states which require a new and fresh constitution. They could be guided by the World Government so that their new constitution would be framed in the spirit of World Government itself. This would prevent their disruption when world-mindedness in politics becomes a fully- accomplished fact.


The sponsors of World Government have ever to keep before their minds that only through sacrifice and renunciation can such a noble idea be ushered into being. Human unity is an idea which is valid in theory at present. For people to adhere to the idea earnestly, they have to be sure that those who stand for it are not themselves lovers of power or grabbers of goods with unholy greed. Such a detachment should not be merely superficial, taking only the outward form of abstinence or even austerity.

Happiness in the contemplation of the self in its absolute sense, alone brings that blissful self-sufficiency which belongs to one who is able to be an exemplar of wisdom. This contented state of happiness is induced by knowledge of the science of the Absolute. A human being attains to his full stature as man when he is happy with himself, and thus in himself represents this high human value. Such an ideal is within the reach of every human being, without distinction of race, religion, nationality, sex, or even station in life. Even the humblest can walk in the way of the Absolute. A bad man who has taken the decision to regulate his life with reference to this final absolute norm of human life becomes by that mere decision equal in spiritual status to the greatest of wise men.

Thus, having referred finally to the fountain-source of wisdom from which one has to drink if one is to become a world citizen in the fullest sense of the term, we hereby commend this memorandum with all its imperfections to the attention of those generous spirits who are favourably disposed to examine it with sympathy and earnest understanding. Let those who are not of this category at least spare the sponsors of the memorandum their disadoption of it and consequent disparagement of its contents. Such is the prayer with which this document goes out to lovers of Wisdom and of Humanity.




Economics deals with wealth as a value in life. Political economics as talked about in our times, whatever it might really be in itself, is confined to such subjects as would tend to make a chancellor of the exchequer act more intelligently than he might have done had he not studied them. The subject of economics has been laughed at by most serious thinkers, and been dubbed a 'dismal science'. It is based on a chronic desire in man to become richer and richer. In this sense economics is not a science at all, but reflects the diseased condition of an individual who thinks of the wealth of nations, or of one nation, from the egocentric standpoint of self-aggrandisement.
The conflict involved in economics is paradoxical: one is to love one's neighbour as oneself, but at the same time Britannia must rule the waves.

Between such rival positions, economics textbooks range in endless variety, wherein so-called wise people indulge themselves in notions such as those of supply and demand, production and distribution, or communication, transport and exchange. The token-value of a coin should not be mixed up with its precious metallic content, and an unintelligent change in the proportion of silver added to minted coins in a state can make all the coins


disappear from the country in the twinkling of an eye. Such are some of the dangers that economics textbooks warn the Chancellor of the Exchequer about.

The spiralling of prices, increases of rent-value, pressures of population, the efficacy of tariff walls - unjust and immoral in themselves, in which crag-barons rob bag-barons, as Ruskin would put it - give us an endless variety of textbook subjects as taught in colleges and universities of the present-day all over the world. One hears of a possible explosion of population, and the control of displaced persons to keep them from seeking livelihoods beyond national frontiers. Liberty is flaunted at every step of what passes for good economics.

Subjects like inflation are as vague in the minds of economists as in the most ancient days, when economics was not taught in schools as a science, as it is at present. We are told that it is good to have a high standard of life in a country, while at the same time there are economic experts who ascribe the spiralling of prices to too much planning. Quantities of edible products are known to be buried, burned or thrown into the sea so that the height of prices could be maintained, without respect for the hunger of people who might be starving.

Every market-woman knows that supply and demand have to balance each other, but the relation between production and exchange is still a mysterious factor. One hears of countries like England going off the gold standard at a given moment - when it is their turn to pay their debts - while they themselves respected it at the time that the standard was favourable to them. Whether this is honest dealing has been questioned by eminent authorities, irrespective of the side they took in economics.

There is recognition of such factors as sterile and fecund wealth; as also of the possibility of 'creating credit' to help nations in special kinds of economic distress, who could be allowed time to recover by long-term credit adjustments arranged by financial magnates who meet in secret to have questionable dealings.


A bank can function with only one-tenth of its capital inside its coffers and carry on ten times the volume of business without anyone knowing whether the assets are really in the vault or not. It is the "Big Ten" - whether in Wall Street, Lombard Street, La Bourse, or in Bonn or Tokyo - who decide the fate of other people's money without their consent, and without telling them what they are doing in their names.

Insurance companies gain enormous profit by maintaining account-books in big buildings like the Empire State Building. Their article of trade is the natural fear or anxiety among the generality of their clients whom they exploit on the basis of their gullibility, promising security from fire or fear, etc. 'World Banks' seem to lend money to help borrowers, while actually being primarily interested in promoting their own exports. The dumping of condemned goods from 'advanced' to 'backward' countries contains a snag to which only now are people like Chavan (the then Finance Minister of India, ED) opening their eyes. 'Hard' and 'soft' currencies are differentiated without justice in respect of the membership fees of so-called World Banks. Scarcity economics has created an impasse which has climaxed into what is now understood as a joke under the name of Parkinsonianism. "Maintain the price line"; "don't let the dollar wobble"; "keep the pound steady" - these are slogans referring to economic malaises which come to evidence in various countries, the remedies for which are equally vague and have to be guessed at from the graphs of such bodies as the Chase Manhattan Bank, whose experts know everything.

The 'iron law of necessity' regulates the relationship between labour and capital, but there is a more complicated surplus-value theory which has come into the picture of economics and for the clarification of which one has to read Engels' "Anti-Dühring", where he discovers the subtle relationship between production and exchange - more difficult to understand than the graphs of infinitesimal calculus - where parameters cut curves marking ups and downs in the economic progress or regression of a given country.


Lastly, nobody speaks of a World Economics at all. There is no textbook of World Economics, though economics as a science - if it really is a science - should necessarily be most directly concerned with the happiness of humanity as a whole. Instead, economists visualize a world consisting of differently-coloured Hitlerish patches of territory, from within which each man is thinking hard economically so as to defeat his neighbour. Such is this dismal or sombre science, which is not a science at all.


The greatest prop of this science is statistics, about which Mark Twain said that there are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics. Statistics can prove anything, and one can easily rob a neighbouring country by using high finance based on false statistics. Statistics about population are the worst of all. They say that God protects his creation, but there are at present international agencies which kill human progeny before they are even born. All textbooks declare that the Malthusian theory of population is an exploded one, but castration of men and women based on the most garish of inducements rudely violates and circumvents the law of the individual, in a manner that could only be described in mild terms as questionable.

Opulence and abundance are not distinguished sufficiently clearly. Creating scarcity can raise the standard of life; but living in plenty is said to be a backward condition, only because such backward countries do not buy transistor radios or refrigerators, and because the women take care of their wealth by keeping some gold ornaments in their boxes. Why they are wrong is not clear to any intelligent man.

Combines and monopolies are a menace to those who have no shares in such concerns, and at whose expense they become rich. A 'limited liability company', which is respected in the eyes of the law, amounts to pooling the funds of several capitalists so that the power of the bag could weigh more heavily on the poor people who are not able to pool their resources in the same way. Ruskin stated this truth most pithily in his "Crown of Wild Olives", when he said, "bags and crags have the same effect on rags."


The same applies to politics when economic blocs are formed between countries, and 'common markets' instituted so that their bargaining power against others could be strengthened. Paper money is not always supported by tangible wealth within the vaults of big banks. Even world currencies are being floated by big companies, cutting across the currencies of nations in circulation - the moral justification of which is still to be clarified. Indefinite credit can be created by financial experts meeting together now and then, giving them enormous power over the inarticulate masses who are always the sufferers at the hands of the more clever ones in the world. Paper currency cannot be eaten instead of rice or wheat, and its value has to reflect those aspects of wealth which are not just paper but which touch human well-being more directly and actually. The great discrepancy between the two spells grave disasters underneath the visible level - no power is trying to balance them, and no textbook tells us how to make the correspondence between them more compatible, just, or even barely honest.

All economists cry themselves hoarse against unemployment. The present writer is unemployed, but has never been sorry for it all his life. Economists sometimes create problems which really do not exist, or at best exist only in their imagination, propped up by that master lie called statistics.


In short, what we wish to point out is that whatever measure an economic authority might consider applying to a situation in a country, whether advanced or backward, mercantilist or agriculturalist, in an opulencist or abundancist context; whether standards there are high or low; where demand and supply are not balanced, and where inequality is the prevailing given datum in whatever branch of economics - it would be better to leave affairs well alone to let them find a natural balance between the rival prevailing forces. 'Do not control population, lest the balance of nature should be disturbed'. This is a dictum which has been proved with rabbits in Australia.


The lopping of a tree makes that part of the tree proliferate all the more. Shaving too often only increases the growth of beard. Such subtle factors have all to be taken into consideration before a complete theory of economics could be developed, more especially, as we have said, in respect of the one world of tomorrow.

The laissez-faire policy of Bentham must have been suggested by such a line of thought; but who takes it seriously? Planning, on the other hand, and even over-planning, is the order of the day, in spite of such ideas as Parkinsonianism becoming equally credible side by side with it. One might ask, what is the remedy? The answer is simple, but will surely not receive the approbation of professional economists, because it would imply indirectly that they should put themselves out of commission.


Relativistic theories of economic happiness must give place to an economics based on norms and constants derived from an absolutist standpoint. Slogans like "Liberty, Equality Fraternity", "The greatest good of the greatest number", "laissez-faire", "equality of opportunity for all" and all the varieties of socialistic dicta such as "dictatorship of the proletariat", "classless society", etc., have all of them the needle pointing in the same direction - towards the need for a normalized form of economic theory based on first principles, rather than one which serves as a basis for further fanning into flames rivalries that lurk within the relativistic set-up, however good they might be by utilitarian standards. Lukewarm economics favours the fecund proliferation of injustices which keep creeping up from its hotbed. Such an economics can create more problems than it can solve.


We have to turn away from formulating further economic theories in which relativism is allowed to vitiate our approach, even at its very inception. There are no textbooks at present which seem to fulfil this requirement, except in the voices of


protest against modern economics raised by such lovers of humanity as Plato, Rousseau, Tolstoy, Ruskin, Carlyle, Quesnay, Compte, St. Simon, Gandhi, Thoreau, Emerson and others. These voices are hardly audible above the clamour contained in other literature, and they are put into the shade by not being taken sufficiently seriously. We have, therefore, to turn our eyes elsewhere for any consolation in such an important question which intimately touches the happiness of humanity.

If we look over the utopian pictures that have been painted in various books describing a perfect state of economy prevailing in any country - which stand self-condemned by the very meaning of the term 'Utopia' as applied to them - we have only a very thin and negligible quantity of literature left which could be said to describe a normal viewpoint. It is that part of economic theory which stems out of the totality of values in the world that can relate the subject correctly to that very zone of general happiness from which alone an axiologically-based subject could derive its origin.There are starting postulates and premises for every precise science.

Literature often tries to portray perfect conditions to serve as a model or basis for further discussions on the subject. It was because such a model was needed that Gandhi often alluded to "Ramarajya" (the rule of Rama, or God) for expressing his own special ideas. One could substitute this term with another equally good, which we could call "Dharmarajya" (the rule of Dharma), which would however have a Buddhistic flavour of Asoka's time. Constantine's empire and the days of Akbar and of Asoka have left impressions recorded in literature, with economic theories directly or indirectly stated in them. Mahabali and Dilipa were also just rulers in whom absolutist standards of ethics, economics and aesthetics were supposed to have prevailed. Their stories continue to inspire generations of humanity, even to the present day. Although in their approach to value-judgements, economics is treated together with other subjects as being only one among many of them, it is not impossible to derive the purest of guiding principles from such writings. There is the whole of Kalidasa's "Raghuvamsa", which affords us ample ground for searching for normative


guidelines in formulating a new theory of economics in the absence of any at present, as we have said, which could be called normalized at all.


Before recommending that we should turn our eyes to the wisdom of the 'Golden Period' of Indian history for gleaning guidelines on this subject, which might itself be said to be a product of Western civilization, we have to establish sufficiently clearly that economics in the West has proved itself to be a complete failure so far. It might be suspected that such a sweeping statement could be due to some old-fashioned mode of thinking not at all acceptable to the ways of the Age of Enlightenment, of which men of the twentieth century are unquestionably proud. How could backward countries even think of criticising advanced countries to say that they are wrong?

In such a predicament, one has the unstinting support of a writer and thinker of unquestionable status, who could himself be said to be one of the representatives and forerunners of what we call the Age of Enlightenment. Between him and Rousseau, we have two great names in the history of modern thought who could be said to be the harbingers of modernism itself, leaving behind the mentality belonging to the so-called Middle Ages. One has only to mention "Candide" to modern enthusiasts of Western economy with their contempt for anything old or oriental to see how the very name itself succeeds in turning the tables against their stand. "Have you read 'Candide'?" is all that needs to be said to see the retroactive effect on the face of an enthusiast of the economics of the West. Opulencist economics, mercantilism, the 'Gold Rush', the South Sea bubble that burst, and the adventurous search for Eldorado or the Golden Fleece are all satirised in this classic by Voltaire.


Indian scholars did not compartmentalize disciplines unnecessarily. Thus, valuable theories of ethics, aesthetics and economics find unitive treatment in the vast body of classical Sanskrit literature - particularly in the works of Kalidasa, the uncrowned king among poets of the Indian soil. Vikramaditya's empire must, as scholars think, have been a model of economic success. The theories which contributed to such a success must have influenced Kalidasa's own theories. There are many precious passages from which the groundwork of economic theorisation itself could be collected. Even the verses of the "Kumarasambhava", when carefully examined, reveal their own economic theory, studied at a point where all human values stem out of the context of the atman or self. Man is the measure of all things, and the proper study of mankind is man. One must first know oneself, and be true to oneself, and one cannot then be wrong. The normative reference for wisdom was seen to be located and rooted in self-knowledge, and was fully, schematically and structurally analyzed by the Upanishadic seers, conforming to a fully scientific and sound methodology, epistemology and axiology. It is true that Sanskrit literature is clothed in the cryptic ideograms and favourite clichés of its own peculiar "lingua mystica". This does not detract, however, from the fundamental postulates and sound starting premises of the economics envisaged therein. It has to be treated as a study in itself, before its contributions could be analyzed and enumerated so as to reveal their great value in acting as a corrective to modern economic theorisation.


Gold is the God of the world of finance. It occupies a central position among things that men, and women more especially, wish to possess and keep. The value of all other things is determined mostly with gold as the norm or standard. Although it is a thing, when related to man it has more of a perceptual status than that of a mere outside object. Its utility is often a theoretical and negligible factor. It is by the intimacy that gold is able to establish with human beings in a personal sense that it gets its value. It thus reflects a state of mind of which the businessman knows how to take advantage. If we should toss a gold dollar and handle it we are struck by its weight and its sound quality, revealing its superlative materiality. In addition, it has a dull gleam resembling the subdued brilliance of some of the distinct stars. Of the earth most earthy, it has yet about it something celestial. Its radiance embellishes the glory of the sceptre or the crown of kings, and the spires of temple towers shine with its lustre. It is thus more than a mere piece of inert matter, and this must be the reason why the "Tarka Sastra" (the Indian science of categories, relations of things, analogies, etc.) brings it under the category of "tejas" (fire, light) rather than under that of earth. It is thus lifted hypostatically and glorified


in the philosophical thought of India. Its mysterious role in human affairs, dating from antiquity to the present-day, seems only to justify this status.


When gold is yet in its raw or natural setting in the womb of the earth, it is hardly more than a virtuality or a potentiality. Once brought to the surface after good luck in prospecting, speculative investment and many man-hours of labour, it might be made into ornaments or plates to stagnate in the form of treasures or relics. Its main role is to pamper vanity. Through gold the newly rich and more ancient nobles get the ostentatious satisfaction of shining in contrast to the ragged poor around them. These 'bag-barons', as Ruskin would call them, like the 'crag-barons', as the same writer nicknames them - who were not other than highway robbers hiding in places of vantage against unwary travellers - had the same effect on 'rags', who were the poor. Thus he developed the famous aphorism: "Bags and crags have the same effect on rags".

When gold does circulate from hand to hand, it happens more often secretly, sluggishly, or slyly avoiding the public gaze. It takes the form of a gratification, a personal consideration or a mark of favour. Even at times of inflation, which is a form of modern economic malaise, gold's value is not affected much, and gold is not scattered about in the same way as paper currency. There is a steady dignity in its 'buoyancy' or 'shyness' in the money market.


When once outside the personal or domestic context, gold has an elusive way of hiding in safes or vaults. In national capitals like Moscow, Paris, London or Washington, the gold exists more by supposition in the form of credit, which can be abstract or concrete or both. Even there it is an elusive presence. Mutually protected against rival officers, who may themselves represent business or government interests or both, it has a way, as has been


reported recently, of being just 'found missing'. Later, when nobody is the wiser, book adjustments can set matters right, and neither business nor government are visibly worse off for it. Regeneration and recovery apply to money as well as to life or health. Whether the actual gold is in a mine or buried somewhere by a miser, or still in the forty acres of London's Banking District - it makes no perceptual difference to the actual individual human, whose meal reaches his mouth by the resultant interaction of multifarious life-factors and circumstances both man-made and natural.

Credit can be created at the head-end of the dragon of finance while the debit is a virtuality residing at the dragon's tail where gold-prospecting might be in progress. Irrespective of the amount of gold, and in spite of more and more being dug up, human life in its most vitally necessary aspects goes flowing on the same as ever. Gold makes itself evident through the newspapers now and then as a customs' haul, as a contraband article in the most unforeseen places, or as a treasure-trove unearthed thousands of miles away from its origin thousands of years later - making men ashamed or proud under varying circumstances. Gold-infatuation also comes now and then into evidence in human affairs as a fecund cause of culpable homicide.


We read in "Don Bell Reports" the following interesting commentary:

"Throughout the Babylonian Empire, temples were built to worship false gods. Within the temples were strong-rooms presided over by priests (later to be called bankers). The priests exhorted the people to bring their gold and other precious items to the strong-rooms for safekeeping. Customers were handed little clay tablets as receipts (paper not yet being invented). The people paid interest to the priests (20%) for guarding their gold. And since it was inconvenient 'to go to the bank' for every transaction involving the use of gold, clay tablets began circulating


as a 'medium of exchange'. The clay tablets were backed by gold supposedly deposited in the local Fort Knox. So nobody questioned the use of clay tablets instead of gold. But the priests of the strong-room made a startling and history-shaking discovery. People seldom called for their stored gold. Less than ten per cent of the gold was ever called for in a single day. Therefore, clay tablets representing ten times the amount of the gold on hand could be issued, and no one but the bankers themselves would ever be the wiser. The banker could loan out ten times the value of the actual deposits and remain solvent. So instead of making twenty cents on each dollar in hand he could issue credit money and make ten times twenty cents on each dollar in hand - or make two dollars profit for each dollar actually deposited in the bank."(1)

Gold thus enters into human life as finance. The possessive instinct of human beings and the advantage of one dealing with the possessions of many by proxy, as it were, in a thing like gold, is at the basis of this kind of financial relationship which works to the mutual advantage of both borrower and lender. 'Interest' and 'discount', which vary only in the time of actual use of value, makes for the thriving of banks. The modern bank rate may be more just and better founded, but the reference of finance to gold and the constant chance of ten per cent in favour of the banker are features that have not changed and cannot. The 'inverted pyramid' of the credit system thus becomes erected, with which the common man who cashes a cheque or buys a meal is unconcerned, or which he ignores.


Nimrod, who founded the city of Babel at the dawn of history, is said to have started to use gold as a norm in state affairs. Nebuchadnezzar, fifteen hundred years later, established the gold standard publicly. Although Britain went off the gold


standard as early as 1931, it holds on to gold as tenaciously as in days of antiquity, for the sake of regulating its international commitments through the Bank of International Settlements at Basle, Switzerland, or the 'World Bank'. The Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank of America or of the Bank of England are the architects of what is called 'sound finance' for their respective areas, or for world finance generally, which might be in the interests both of governments and of business at once.

There are lurking contradictions at the core of financial policies which are of a secret dialectical order wherever the interests of one comes into relation with the interests of the many - whether at the social, national or international level. The laws which might hold good in regulating the 'Credit of Nations' will not hold good the same way in dealing with 'One-World Economies', which transcends national interests. Private or limited liability-finance is thus different from public unlimited liability-finance, which makes all the difference to the justice or validity of the transactions. Without any unitive wisdom-principle being consciously introduced here, chaos in world credit is bound to prevail. A golden rule based on the virtues of integrity, trustworthiness, parsimony in the interests of one and all, and the just use of the power of credit, is involved here - a rule which has still to be properly formulated.


Saints or spiritually-inclined men have generally despised gold (with wine and women) as filthy lucre. The worship of false gods or Mammon is also associated with the worship of the golden calf in Mediterranean religious history. Even a coin placed under the bed of Sri Ramakrishna of Bengal is said to have shocked him in a strange way; and it is written of him also, maybe rather imaginatively, that he used to throw lumps of gold and mud into the river Ganges to prove to himself and others the truth of the dictum, otherwise familiar to many Indians, that the man of wisdom considers a lump of clay, a pebble and a piece of gold with the same equanimity of mental attitude (Gita, VI.8). A saint generally


wishes to live outside the world of high finance. The plain living and the parsimonious economical virtue that they generally cultivate for the emulation of their immediate followers, makes them consciously or instinctively recognize the truth of the saying of the American philosopher Thoreau, "superfluous wealth can buy superfluities only. Money is not required to buy one necessary of the soul." (Walden, Conclusion)

The Guru Narayana was once offered some natural flowers with a few gold ones thrown among them, by way of a pious birthday offering by a rich devotee who thought of surprising him and pleasing him by such a gift. The Guru picked a flower made of gold and, smelling it, remarked disappointedly that it had no scent. This was a gentle way of teaching the difference between the real value represented by a fresh blossom and the false value implied in the gold of the rich man. On another occasion, on the contrary, the Guru was known to have himself presented a gold coin to a disciple who was starting on a long voyage. He had questioned the same disciple already about his attitude to money and, on his telling the Guru that it was superfluity for a spiritual person, had remarked also that it was natural for one to keep money and use it, if only for purchasing a railway ticket.

Pastoral communities that might survive in mountain seclusion - as in Nagaland, where salt still takes the place of gold - may be supposed to live in a more or less self-sufficient economy of their own, in which currency in our sense may not hold good. Money, like everything else, is right in its proper place, when used with proper human intelligence or wisdom. Economists like Adam Smith have also voted on the side of saints when they wrote such words as these:

"A rich country, in the same manner as a rich man, is supposed to be abounding in money; and to heap up gold and silver in any country is supposed to be the readiest way to enrich it …Among the Tartars as among all other nations of shepherds who are generally ignorant of the use of money, cattle are the instruments of commerce and the measure of value. Wealth therefore according to them consisted of cattle, as


according to the Spaniards it consisted of gold and silver. Of the two, the Tartar notion was the nearest to the truth." (2)


Much wisdom about gold is enshrined in mythology, fables and parables. The gold disc that is said to hide the face of truth is mentioned in the Isa Upanishad. It refers to the false relativistic value which can hinder the vision of the absolute value behind it. The Hiranya-Garbha (gold-germ), which represents the supreme value of the Vedic hedonistic context, is the ontological and hierophantic counterpart of the disc of gold hypostatically referred to above. Between them they may be said to touch the two poles of value in the world of gold.
The golden ladder of Jacob's dream in the Bible (Gen. 28. 12), which touches heaven and earth and where angels with wings, who are supposed to be wiser and holier than ordinary men, go up and down, refers to the same two aspects of values, as in the Gita (XV. 2) where branches of the great fig tree turn upwards and also downwards.

The language of myth is not meant to be realistic or logical. Myths are to be understood with the help of intuitive imagination which can enter into the spirit of the situation, something which even the shrewdest of financiers are not usually capable of doing in any thoroughgoing sense. In the Indian legend, Prahlada suffered because he would not worship Hiranya (gold personified). There is also the famous fable of king Midas, the object of which is to bring out the difference between gold to be possessed as a thing and the gold that is a mere symbol of possession. The boon of the golden touch became a curse because of the "adhyasa" or false attribution of reality to the wrong aspect of gold in the mind of the king. Normal human relations with his own daughter were thereby frustrated. It is the distinction between the real fatted calf and the golden calf set up for worship which annoyed Moses.


This confusion between the perceptual and the actual object is a fecund cause of error, by which even very worldly-wise financiers can make grave mistakes in calculations which concern the everyday happiness of millions of human beings who come under their money-power. False and true credits are hard to distinguish except through the highest kind of dialectical wisdom.

Even such wisdom is not for its own sake, but for the real happiness of mankind, which is the resultant of the correct dialectical treatment of human values which refer to the good of all and the general good at once.


The Midas-mystery of gold is what economists recognize as Gresham's Law, by which it becomes important to balance the exchange- and utility-values of coins put into the open market. The slightest tilt in favour of the utility side of value in a coin can make it disappear from view altogether into the unknown domain of financial virtuality. Thus possessions can belong to two mutually exclusive worlds of value which, when wrongly handled, can spell double gain or double loss to the persons concerned. When carefully studied between the lines, the parables of the Bible reveal this subtle reciprocity between the two worlds, placed between which the 'certain rich man' of the various parables touching gold or coin teaches this wisdom in the name of Christ. Whether dealing with the wages for the workers of the rich man's vineyard; with the good and faithful servant who used gold rightly; or with the prodigal son who was dead to one world of economics in favour of another, and was found again by a parsimonious father who fêted his return to the first world of economics; or with the rich man who was the rival of Lazarus who suffered in the 'other world', while the latter suffered only in the world here - we have rare dialectical wisdom-secrets involving property values recorded for human guidance. To this day however, humanity remains deaf to such wisdom-teaching.


Modern economic investigation has fallen back on the normative method of statistical studies in arriving at laws, rules and controls to be applied to gold and economic policies. Here, however, the great drawback is that economics has not yet been brought properly under a normative science. The picture of a wealthy or prosperous state or individual, which should be the norm in economic thought, has not been clearly stated. The two worlds of wealth and gold - one of which aims at abundance, while the other has mere opulence as its ideal - have not been treated with any correct methodology. While parables and fables guided older generations in these matters, modern man relies on statistics which have no better status in reliability.

That statistics prove nothing, and that if they do prove anything at all, could prove either the 'pro' or 'con' side of a proposition indifferently, has become a modern joke. F.H. Le Guardia, as early as 1933 observed: "Statistics are like alienists - they will testify for either side". (Liberty, May 1933). Then there is the famous pleasantry about statistics attributed to Disraeli by Mark Twain, which says. "There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics". Even if these sweeping statements are not to be taken seriously, we have in the official publication of the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York, perhaps one of the biggest financial houses of America, the following on "Economic Statistics" with the subtitle "Economic Pulse-Takers Need Better Information":

"Mark Twain, having listened to widely varying estimates of the length of the Mississippi River, once marvelled "at the fascination of a science where one gets such wholesale returns of conjecture out of such trifling investment of fact"

... only a quarter of a century ago, the same could be said of economics. The subject dealt heavily in abstraction and was short on actual facts against which to check the theories.


Economists often disagreed because they had no accurate measurements.

"Economists have devised new and better methods for measuring the trends of our economy. As a result the Federal Government today spends about $40 million a year on compiling economic statistics. (3)"

It is not clear to the layman of common sense who scrutinises the above paragraphs, whether facts or statistics are given primacy to prove what is vaguely referred to as "trends of our economy". Textbooks on economics openly declare that there is no agreed explanation as to the cause of fluctuations, and that five theories have been put forward up to 1940, namely:
(1) the Over-Production Theory,
(2) the Under-Consumption Theory,
(3) the Monetary Theory,
(4) the Psychological Theory, and
(5) the Climatic Theory (4)

Whether more statistics will tend to prove the validity of any one of these theories, or help to make more theories instead, is not certain. The same statistics may be used to prove the sides of both the parties concerned in a controversy.

The proper use of statistics in such matters is itself to be questioned, because many generalisations based on statistics, like those of Malthus, have signally failed. Thus proof, the fact which is to be proved and the theory on which actual data are to be collected and interpreted, leave room for so much vagueness and conjecture that the common man stands confused in regard to the correct way of applying economy to his own personal life. Men have to be clear first about what they want before theorising or proving.


The fraction of gold implied in a penny is a principle that we recognize through dialectical reasoning, as when we say that the value of the gold dollar inheres in the cent and vice-versa.
The unit copper coin of any country, like the bad penny that turns up again and again in everyday human affairs, has only a negligible practical value in human terms.


Gold thus enters human life more as a figure of speech than as an actuality and, when it does enter mentally in this manner, it has two distinct aspects. One of these is usually that of Mammon, and the other that of God's kingdom. The gold of the nib of a fountain pen or in its cap is valuable only to the extent that something sensible is written with it. Again, we are called upon to distinguish likewise between what is to be rendered as a tribute to Caesar and what is due to God. The worship of the golden calf also refers to some wrong attitude to gold which ancient writings have condemned. Gold, representing true or false value, has entered into wisdom-literature in various ways and forms of rhetoric. Eternal values are compared to the phoenix, which burns itself at the altar to be reborn at once with its golden plumes. The fatted calf may be contrasted with the golden calf, which latter is associated with Mammon- worship which is the same as what Washington Irving called "the almighty dollar, that great object of universal devotion".
High finance is known to be a gamble in which the loss of both cash and credit makes speculators jump out of the skyscraper window. To see through the contradictions involved requires high common sense or rare wisdom. The virtue of the Golden Mean recommended by King Cleobulos of Rhodes and developed later by Aristotle really implies a man with gold or goodness in his heart. Economists recommend frugality of a certain kind, which can be tilted in favour of stinginess on the one side or prodigality on the other.

A golden rule or line may be imagined also to separate the world of abundance from the world of opulence. The most important matter for one to make up his mind about is whether he wants one or the other of these, because as a rule they are mutually exclusive by their very nature. Rousseau, in his famous essay "On the Government of Poland", presents two types of states to choose from. One he describes with the following epithets: "noisy, brilliant, redoubtable, influential over other nations"; and the other he describes as "free, peaceful, wise, fearless of anyone, self-sufficient and happy". Then he gives us the unequivocal warning against trying to combine the two in any single state.


He writes,

"Above all do not try to combine these two projects: they are too contradictory; and wanting to be related to both by a composite way of progression is to want to miss both."(5)


Between the language of myth, fable or parable and the graphs or pictorial representations of economic trends or situations found in modern magazines or books, whereby the common man is called upon to wade his way through such concepts as 'surplus-value', 'the trade cycle', 'economic equilibrium', 'sound finance', 'stable exchange', 'conditions in the foreign market', 'currency restrictions', 'the creation of credit', and 'the inverted pyramid of credit', in order to live his life in the light of common sense or wisdom, a more direct and simple way has to be found at the present stage of man's education or progress.

Of the three schools in economic theory, distinguished as the classical, the neo-classical and the dialectical, the last-mentioned has at present succeeded in catching the imagination of the masses in many countries. Meanwhile great controversy and polemics rage on such questions as the theory of rent-value, interest, capital, and even on the initial definition of wealth. National wealth and international wealth have not yet been clearly distinguished. Every university professor who writes a textbook on this highly abstract subject starts with a different intellectual formation, nurtured on academic soils, which differ widely from country to country, and as between the Old World and the New. Each develops a set of anecdotes or examples in his mind for the use of teaching and, as between Adam Smith, Karl Marx or Marshall, the variety of rival theorisation is so great that one has to cry halt and begin to think for oneself with the help of common sense and general information.

The first dictum we can arrive at immediately is that economics is for man and not man for economics. If it yields general satisfaction and works in experience, it must be acceptable, and if it reaches out vainly from one theory to another, it has to be discarded.


As a science it is not an 'experimental' one - no experiments are needed here, as common experience contains the elements of experiment. If it is to be treated as a 'normative' science rather than as an experimental one, the norm of human happiness has first to be fixed in terms of economics. As neither of these seems to be the case at present, we make bold to adopt a method where intuitive imagination is brought in to help us to see more clearly what economists are talking about.


Here the time-honoured wisdom-language is being admitted by the front door only to save us from the confusion of tongues in which we find ourselves at present. It will be seen that this unitive way of approach is the same as what has been called the dialectical approach: not in the limited sense of post-Hegelian dialectics, but rather in the sense of what is known as perennial wisdom the world over. It has ever had an apodictic quality which humanity has always recognized, whether in the Chinese, Indian or pre-Socratic context. With gold as a symbol of wealth and as a central notion of value, we shall now try to focus our attention on a simplified economic situation in order to see the subtle aspects which have contributed to make gold a mystery. A simple question may be asked by the layman as to why gold should not be left in mines if it is only brought out to be reserved in the banking areas of the great capitals, buried again in vaults as an elusive presence. Could not hoarded gold elsewhere be treated as at least equally respectable and justified?

Let us then enter intuitively and freely into a simple economic situation which will serve as a pattern for the understanding of other value-factors involved in economics, both in its static and dynamic aspects. Closed and open economic situations may also be distinguished with the help of this simplified pattern of everyday life in our minds.


An absent-minded professor of economics goes for a walk in the countryside and comes to a crossing of roads fringing on a forest reserve, where a monkey happens to live. On the diagonally opposite corner of the crossroads is a vendor of bananas and peanuts exposing his wares for sale. The professor, being a frugal and kind-hearted man, living alone and apart from the busy world of getting and spending, just happens to have an old coin of small change in his pocket. Seeing the monkey eyeing the nuts hungrily, he wishes to make the best of the situation by offering his coin to the vendor to induce him to give a handful of nuts to the hungry monkey.

Before accepting it, the vendor examines the coin. He hesitates at first because that coinage was one officially withdrawn from circulation but, having been minted when gold reserves covered credit better; it thus has a price-value which is to his advantage, in spite of its low exchange-value and null face-value. He therefore gives the nuts to the monkey, and the professor returns to his room as a satisfied representative of the human race.
The various aspects of gold-value involved here can be schematically represented in the diagram on p. 67.


Here the abstract, regulating, economic norm or principle of gold-value is the central notion to be kept in mind. We can readily distinguish four aspects of gold-value, which meet at the central point where values change over or interact in a subtle dialectical manner. The vertical axis represents transactions where time is the primary consideration. Interest and discount rates, which are always balanced in any country, operate along this vertical axis. The horizontal axis would represent actual exchange as between price and commodity. These take place in the present but have the two sides of actuality or virtuality involved. The price-value of a banana is virtual, while the banana, as an actual product of labour, is an actuality which is more specific and presents a more contingent verity. Need is hidden in the man, like hunger in the monkey, and is a virtual instinctive disposition from which man suffers in the







present or the eternal present. The price we pay for getting rid of hunger, which itself is a necessary suffering, is negative as compared with the positive pleasure which money or gold might command. Thus price-value meets commodity-value from opposite sides in this situation. The horizontal world of events, things, movements or activities has to be distinguished from paper transactions through bankers, which belong to a world of tokens or symbols. Here again, credit and debit, interest and discount interact to make business thrive. The banker has to be trustworthy and stable. The bank manager has to be parsimonious and have certain virtues, such as not being too easily carried away by outside events. He has to be just and keep to the golden mean of value without being involved in false lending or borrowing. He must have credit vis-à-vis other bankers, and clearing houses must honour his cheques, and to that end his accounting and bookkeeping must be on sound lines. Above all he must have an address, in his official capacity at least. The gold reserve somewhere in a vault is the nominal or actual credit for all bankers in a given area. This thin golden line of credit-value may be said to go past human affairs as a vital line of life in which the kind man has to play his role in the name of the happiness of humanity as a whole.

Reputation, goodwill, kindness, integrity, stability and sound credit are all involved here. They are qualities whose fund man must increase by all means for his happiness. It is thus important for man to have a heart of gold. To revert to our example: we have to remember above all that there are distinct sectors which represent economic compartments or worlds which cannot interact directly. There is no use in having the monkey borrow the bad penny from the professor. The vendor has behind him the plantation and the labourers, while the monkey has behind it at best living regions of fruits and leaves. The mercantile nation and he pastoral nation cannot thus be correctly related except through a very wise arrangement of economic interdependence. And finally, it is important to see how money must circulate if it is to serve life at all. Hoarded gold might increase the wages of mining labour, as Professor Jevons


says, but it would not be playing its legitimate role in human affairs, because as we have said, money is meant for man and not man for money. Similarly, the burning of food-products for the sake of better prices, as we hear of sometimes, is an absurdity of wrong economics. The contrast between opulence and abundance is also a matter for the imagination of man to visualize as belonging to one or other of the sectors represented in our diagram. As Rousseau points out, it would be unfair to ask a poor hard-working peasant to pay his tribute of tax or rent to the moneylender or to the government in the form of money, which does not belong to his economic sector or world at all. The farmer belongs to the world of abundant actual produce, while the moneylender belongs to the opposite world where wealth is merely a symbolic token. Increase of tokens may not agree with the produce in hand, and might produce economic crises which experts are still explaining. Caesar's domain and that of God should not be mixed up.



1. "Dan Bell Reports" (Florida, USA, Aug. 10, 1956).

2. P. 324, "The Wealth of Nations".

3. Manhattan Bank of New York, Official Reports, No. 10 of 1956.

4. Cf. pp. 276-82, Silverman: "The Substance of Economics", London.

5. Translated from "Le Contrat Social", p. 384, Edition Garnier, Paris.


Economics is a modern substitute for religion. While religion holds out promises for the hereafter, economics refers to the betterment of life here. Both can have questionable enthusiasts as leaders or blind believers in outmoded ideologies. The mass-mind can be swayed in the name of the one or the other into holding exaggerated or distorted notions against the general good and the good of all. Economic creeds can be as fanatical as religious ones, and claim as great a toll of human life in times of trouble. Both can join hands with politics and work havoc among peaceful inhabitants. Whether it is doomsday or perfect equality of opportunity, at times simplified pictures of felicity or suffering hold the imagination of either ideologist to fill him with much misplaced fervour. Between the ends and means visualized in either of these groups of believers who insist on having nothing to do with each other, the visible common event that takes place is that somehow what is in one man's pocket is transferred into another's without the usual commodities being exchanged. One who writes a book on the best method to abolish poverty best proves his case by himself becoming rich at the expense of his admirers.

In the name of being saved from sin or suffering, the same phenomenon can be seen in the camp of orthodox religion. While the transfer is taking place there might intervene much vague talk which lacks the apodictic precision that distinguishes either science or common sense. Both religion and economics thrive in the twilight atmosphere of a pseudo-science. Vain verbosity prevails in the name of both at present.


Economics is common sense claiming to be science. It involves Value-Wisdom. It deals with wealth and aims at welfare, starting from scarcity, poverty or want as its basic assumption. This assumption is not unlike the assumption of sin or suffering in the catechisms of religions. Scarcity of good or goods is to be overcome by dealings or arrangements involving long-term or short-term measures, from simple ones, as when ants store grain against winter, to international monetary adjustments.

It calls for certain types of virtues such as parsimony, abstention or shrewdness for intelligent getting and spending, which should not err on the side of being either penny-wise or pound-foolish. It is in the midst of a modern state that economic wisdom sits with grace, and the sum-total of its contrivances, whether conducive to wealth, welfare or both, is vaguely called 'good economics'. Success or failure is not measurable except by measuring-rods whose validity is itself questionable. Raising standards of living need not tally with the degree of satisfaction of a people. Between maximum, minimum and optimum standards, calculations can vary or go wrong. From the family budget to the national one, the special sagacity or wisdom called for in the heads of families or states is a very elusive one based on varied schools of theorisation. It has now become common to read strong and impassioned condemnation of one school of economics by another rival school. Respectable writers of one group are humbugs for others and vice-versa, making economists themselves wonder if the claim of a scientific status for their subject is not mere wishful thinking. Universal elements in economics are sadly lacking at present.


Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" by its very title reveals one of the chief drawbacks of the so-called science of economics. He did not dare to write a book on a science of Wealth or even of Value, but carefully limited himself to "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations". The nations that he had in mind were surely those that resembled England, where the Chancellor of the Exchequer, sitting on his woolsack in London, exercised his economic wisdom in favour of his country in just the same way as those in Rotterdam or the Hague decided on wise economic policies to bring gold into their own treasuries. John Stuart Mill, who was employed by the East India Company, wrote the next standard work, in which he was honest enough to avow that political economy was a subject bound to be in favour of aggrandising itself. Jevons pinned on the word 'utility' to fix the nature of wealth, and theories of value have been put forward by others which involve almost metaphysical notions of the reality of what is called wealth, value or goods. At present it is not the fashion any more to define economics or wealth. It is even stated that "Political Economy is said to have strangled itself with definitions" (Keynes). "Meeting man's physical needs" is the aim of economics stated in its most scientific form in some modern articles, and it is becoming the fashion to say that there is no need to define economics at all. It is not hard to see from all these that the central notion of economics is not a normative notion. It is not conceived in universal or unitive terms. Each writer has his own closed, static or fragmentary notion of what constitutes the core of economics as a branch of knowledge. How could a science emerge without the basic notion being clearly defined?


Exchangeable value-factors interest the economist rather than non-exchangeable ones, although they may hold a high place as a personal value. Father and mother are not precious, to the extent that they are not values of the market place. When we think of such subjects we transcend the limits of conventional economics. A rare painting for which a rich man might be willing to pay a high price touches another limit in the world of economics. A film star carries his or her value in their person, only indirectly contractible and treatable as an economic factor. Edible fruit in the thick of a forest is not an economic product, although it might satisfy human or animal hunger. Natural resources such as springs or watersheds are factors contributing to economic immaturity rather than signs of economic assets, because from the 'home-market' point of view they are only negative economic factors. Capital and wealth are poles apart according to the textbook notions of economics on which generations of modern experts are nourished. Maturity and backwardness in economics are myths that have developed in the days of the gold rush, mercantilism and colonialism, which are fast becoming outmoded. Before a normal one-world economics can come into full view, many of the old lessons will have to be forgotten. What is more, trusted advisers of the old school are likely to conceal attitudes which deserve to be suspected rather than respected in the new set-up. Charlatanism can be hidden under the cloak of economic advice. Countries once under colonialist economists will find it not so easy to unlearn what they have imbibed from their old exploiters who might still pretend to be their advisers in the interest of states which have changed their self-interest from one side to the other.

A discerning eye can discover many anomalies in the matter of economic policies. The London School of Economics still has its disciples seated in key positions in India and in the far-flung dominions of the Empire that once flourished to their profit, still safeguarding the same interests of the 'home market' which is no more at home. Scarcity-based economics, with its emphasis laid on exchangeable goods and built on the notion of capital, has many elements which are pernicious in their effect on human happiness, and is closed, static and curtailed in its applicability and its power to spell general happiness, or even the happiness of all. What concerns us more at present is that these do not represent the whole or even a good part of scientific economics.


It is high time that one-world economics shed its limitations and expand into its proper proportions. Scarcity economics has its natural counterpart in the economy of abundance. Before we can visualize the implications of these two mutually-exclusive worlds in economics we have to focus our attention on possible worlds of value.


When men have in their minds different goals as most desirable for themselves or their fellow beings and visualize corresponding means for accomplishing them, they may be said to live in different worlds of their own. Just as purgatories and paradises can be piled in graded fashion one above the other in a vast possible series, the world of economics can present a series of value-worlds.

"Utopia" and "The Republic" were ideal worlds painted with political as well as economic factors. In England itself we have had mercantilist adventurers side-by-side with highly humanitarian authors like Ruskin and Carlyle, whose economic worlds were different. When Ruskin was once asked by the London Association of Architects for some suggestions, he outlined for them the statue of what he called the "Britannia of the Market Place" as a goddess that would correspond to the world of money and selling in which they lived.

Carlyle was no less vehement and protested strongly against the economic trends of his times. Even now the London School of Economics represents a body of economic thought which pertains to a world of its own. If conservatism dies hard in actual politics, its ideological shadow in the world of economics persists longer still, and works through believers who continue through generations lisping the same jargon as their predecessors; and public schools and colleges continue this pattern of thought when actual conditions belong to another world altogether.


Through Adam Smith, Mill, Ricardo, Marshall and Marx we have graded worlds of possible values, within whose four walls and with whose frames of reference they outlined their economic theories. Their worlds can all be visualized as ranging from scarcity at one end of the scale of values, higher and higher into the world of gilt-edged notions of wealth or capital.
Pure credit as an abstract value is now emerging as an internationally acceptable economic factor, and in the name of scarcity or abstinence, economics at present includes measures of large-scale castration of healthy men and women so that some optimum equilibrium of population, long discarded by regular thinkers, can be attained. The human touch is now leaving economic thinking altogether, and we do not know if respectable-looking economic advisers are not wolves in sheep's clothing. The contemplative background of economics has long been left behind. The possible worlds in which an honest economist hides himself range from the cell of a hermit to that in which the economist is becoming more and more suspect as dangerous to public life.


Gold and capital are overlapping values. Credit is another economic term that is becoming more and more used. When credit is not covered by gold reserves it attains the status of a pure abstraction in the world of values, and when this point of recognition of credit is attained, the concept of credit begins to resemble that of God in theology. Economics started with the wisdom of the woolsack of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in London, and has ended at present in the surplus- and labour-value theories conceived by Marx in his "Das Kapital". An impartial thinker brought up far away from the home markets of Amsterdam, Rotterdam or the Hague, and free from prejudices of gilt-edged notions of value, will find that, when we begin to forget the one-sidedness that has been recognized in respect of values all through, from the woolsack economists to "Das Kapital" of Marx, we are at the same time called upon to think of economics with an altogether revised frame of reference, with a differently-conceived set of four walls within the limits of which economic life is to live and move if it is to make sense.


Opulence is not the only point of view from which economics can be envisaged. Opulence is only the visible portion of the iceberg of what has to be recognized as the total situation on which a unitive, global and scientific theory of economics has to be based. While one-eyed or lame economics progress lop-sidedly, a healthy economics has to progress normally on both the aspects of abundance and opulence. Scarcity economics implies capital, but the economics of abundance adds another new world to the whole matter. Economics must comprise both its natural counterparts of what refers to gold and to its negative aspect.


Gold in relation to the scarcity of marketable goods has a meaning that is quite different from gold in the context of abundance. The relation between the external shining thing called gold and its different aspects, virtual and actual, deserves special examination. Economics as a science of values must recognize that virtual and actual gold can be considered economic values by any philosophically-minded economist. We read in Plato's "Republic" the following interesting passage:

"They (the Guardians) must be told that they have no need for mortal or material gold and silver, because they have in their hearts the heavenly gold and silver given them by the gods as a permanent possession, and it would be wicked to pollute the heavenly gold in their possession by mixing it with earthly, for theirs is without impurity, while that in currency among men is a common source of wickedness."(1)

Gold as a value in economics is a notion far more complicated than at first sight might appear. If one should object and say that Platonic notions do not apply to modern economics, we would turn to Marshall, whose name commands respect among those who have put order into economic principles.


He emphasised both the sides that go into making economics a wholesale science when he said:

"Economics on one side is a study of wealth; and on the other, the more important side, a part of the study of man."(2)

Even before Marshall thus reluctantly, as it were, admitted that economics was for man as much as man for economics, many honest Englishmen had recorded their protest against the tendency for economics to lose its human element. Chapman referred to two possible aspects of wealth when he said: "External goods are goods only in relation to internal goods." Ruskin unequivocally declared:

"There is no wealth but life: life including all its powers of love, of joy and of admiration. That country is the richest which nourishes the greatest number of noble and happy human beings."(3)

If all these statements are not to be treated as merely poetic or philosophical effusions, how is it to be explained that the professional or official economist still thinks of wealth in terms of money? This question could best be answered in the words of a modern textbook-writer who says:

"Wealth is studied simply and solely because in this world of ours, wealth is the only convenient measure of the intensity of human motives. Other motives like love, friendship, family affection, charity, etc. also exert their influence, but the fact is that the steadiest and strongest motive behind economic activity is the desire to get 'money income'". (4)

Even with money as a measure, Moore further admitted:

"There is no convenient yardstick by which to measure the currents of business affairs, for these are subject to gusts of fear or perhaps fantastic optimism as unpredictable as earthquakes."

Money-mindedness or mammon-worship is thus, by such admissions, a charge from which economists even of the present-day cannot claim full absolution.


If, by the admission of economists themselves, economics remains still money-dominated in its attitude to problems, and ignores non-mercantilist values in life, it will be admitted that the time to lament for economics has come. In fact, economics has in our day become patently recognizable as a kind of die-hard religion to which, like a drowning man. the man who once began to speak its language wilfully clings, while fully aware that his arguments hold water no more. We have heard about economics - besides its being charged with mammon-worship and often suspected of charlatanism, over and above the standing charge that is a "dismal science" - that the claim of this branch of knowledge to be included among sciences has been questioned.

August Compte could not include it among the positive sciences. Its aspirations in this direction have been described by some eminent economic authority as a form of wish-fulfilment. Wooten in his book, "Lament for Economics", puts, as it were, the grave-stone on this economics that we are asked to lament for:

"Whenever six economists are gathered there are seven opinions…Economists are under the suspicion of being charlatans and they cannot afford to arrogate honourable titles to the increasingly common application of theoretical economists of the term "science" to their studies, there is an element of wish-fulfilment...the zealous student of economic science would do well from time to time to remind himself that, of all the demand and supply schedules, cost curves and difference curves that give so formidable appearance to his textbooks, not one (unless by accident) is founded upon fact. The reader would search far and wide through the works of analytical economists before he came upon a single prediction endorsed by the weight of authoritative opinion of the course of events to be anticipated in any concrete historical situation." (5)


When even Dr. J.N. Keynes deplores that "Political Economy is said to have strangled itself with definitions", it would be permissible for the layman to lament officially the death of old-time economics. Textbooks now begin by apologising for not being able to give a definition of the subject, and even if they try to do so, make the definition so banal and insipid that it tells us almost nothing. The "Columbia Cyclopaedia" contents itself with the following: "Economics deals with supplying man's physical needs."


Travelling in trains or returning from the West in ships, as the present writer has had occasion to do, one of the most distressing sights that he has been exposed to has been meeting young men and women who are still living in ideologies that have long been outmoded or dead, especially in what pertains to economic matters. Many off-hand statements are made by those who have had training in schools of economic thought. They talk of poverty in India as if Indians themselves were responsible for it and not their age-long exploiters from outside. They would then speak of over-population as if Malthusian theories of population were still valid. A statement like "there is hardly standing space in India for the present population", is taken for granted by most of them. But if one happens to travel with any one of them in a Trunk Express from Madras to Delhi, for days and nights one sees, passing outside the windows for thousands of miles, vacant lands which are fit for cultivation, as evidenced by similar bits already cultivated.

They are more ready to believe literally the mechanistically- conceived mercantilist economists than what they can verify with their own eyes. If you happen to speak of family planning, the same mechanistic attitude may be seen to colour their arguments to the point of childishness. They will state, as if it were very evident, that when there are too many members in a certain family they will begin to starve, and if one mentions that birds migrate to places favourable to life, such a biological verity too is unthought-of in the domain of mechanistically-conceived economics that their teachers might have spoken to them about.


When speaking of over-population they often forget that maximum population and minimum population, mathematically understood, have between them what is called an optimum population which the very textbooks mention. The optimum has to be determined, not by any mechanistic thumb-rule, but depending on the economic unit that is the basis of study. Rural and urban units differ and standards of living have very variable factors entering into their makeup. The luxury of one generation can become the necessity of another, and units in society are not static specimens to be studied in a museum, megascopically or microscopically. They have to be examined in situ in their living setting. Standards of living measured in terms of money must make allowance for many factors of incertitude. High prices might raise the figure without raising the amenities of life involved. Engels' Law that enters into regulating the standard of living is often overlooked by second-hand economists. The tendencies of the market place are changeful with every gust of wind in market conditions and it is next to impossible to visualize any rigid standard of life as prevailing. What appears as a favourable figure from the opulence side of economics might in reality be just the opposite, judged from the abundance side of the same economics, when viewed in the perspective of a full-fledged science. The whole question is vitiated by what might be called the mechanistic approach, which is a kind of religion of the modern man.

Anything that comes within the scope of a brass instrument passes as civilised, and there are still among us disciples of Western pragmatists and behaviourists who are directly descended from the days of Cortez and Clive, who put on the airs of Sir Oracles, and who talk down to the common man or woman with a superior air. Ancient civilisations and their wisdom of the ages do not count any more. Economics has become, in short, the enemy of the best in an ancient heritage like that of India; yet it is a pity that India's own best sons, who wish to see their country free from the shackles of colonialism, still live in ignorance of the evils of wrong economics as mechanistically conceived by Western fortune-hunters of old. Let us therefore lament for the old economics and try to rethink this whole subject from a new and global standpoint.


The tradition in economic thinking that has been handed down to our times, having its origin and basis in the mercantilist adventures of early colonialists, and conceived as it was in the interests of the woolsack Chancellors of the Exchequer or their counterparts in the West, has to be given a decent burial before even the outlines of a one-world economics can clearly emerge to view. Economics has to get rid of the inhuman and immoral background in which it had its origin. Even in the days when mercantilist economics was in full swing in Elizabethan England and in Europe generally, there were heard some honest voices who protested against the inhuman and immoral aspects of self-aggrandising principles tacitly taken for granted by its partisans and theoreticians. The members of the French School of Economics, who may be said to be the founders of modern economic theory, could not make themselves heard over the clamour for gold and capital which was the main incentive with the majority.

The Physiocrats* of France had many fundamental principles to enunciate which indirectly influenced the author of "The Wealth of Nations". The thoroughgoing statements of the Physiocrats were watered down by Adam Smith and comprised in an economic theory which still retained its closed and static character as against the fully free and human attitude implied in the position of the Physiocrats. Adam Smith's book became a sort of Bible for the English and those others who thought in terms of a home market as against that of the colonies, for making select nations in the North of Europe wealthy at the expense of the 'underdeveloped' - whatever this term applied to far-flung dominions might strictly mean.

* Followers of Quesnay, a Frenchman who, in the 18th century founded a system of political and economic doctrines based on the supremacy of natural order.


The immoral and inhuman elements that vitiated the origins of European economic thought were connived at or condoned in the name of a practical economic shrewdness which did not lay much stress on morality or just human relations between man and man. Thus it is that we find their disciples, who have been produced generation after generation, still tutoring the administrators of those dominions which have now become nominally independent, except in the matter of that other ideological domination which in effect is worse than physical servitude.

The same pernicious habits of thought that go against the interests of the larger humanity involved in economics are lurking here, and there are canker blossoms within secret brain trusts, and academic advisers who are still behind the policy-makers and planners for larger countries. When, as we have seen in the first section, the very nature of economics as a science applicable to all men anywhere is questionable, it is not hard to imagine the dangers to which the people of the world are exposed by advisers who are already inside their countries, or visit them from time to time under the respectable front of guides or guardians of good economics. In these days, when cartels exist on an international scale and trust busting is in vogue, such a suspicion would be seen to be only normal.


A science is sometimes described as something that depends on precise measurements. There is always a unit of measurement in all branches of the exact sciences. If we now ask the economist what his unit of measurement is, he will say he is obliged to fall back on money as the measure of wealth because wealth as a pure welfare-value does not lend itself to measurement.

We have already seen textbook economists bewailing this lack and openly suggesting that money itself could be used as the yardstick for economic measurements. We know too well that both the token- and the exchange-values of money are not firm enough to be used as a measuring rod in economics. The measuring rod has to conform to some sort of stable norm before it can measure another factor subject to many forms of fluctuation or variation.


If it could be otherwise, each piece of cloth could be measured by another piece of its own kind, instead of by a yardstick which has a standard or normalized prototype determined absolutely by outside considerations, independent of the object to be measured and itself free from change.

Writers on economics themselves have been frank enough to admit that a money-standard of measurement is adopted by them because there is no other substitute available. Prof. Dewett, whom we have already cited on this point, openly admits:

"There is no convenient yardstick by which to measure the currents of business affairs, for these are subject to gusts of fear or perhaps fantastic optimism as unpredictable as earthquakes." (13)

A measurement in terms of money is wholly untenable when the measuring unit itself is subject to various fluctuations. Economists speak of comparative standards of living in countries such as India or England, in spite of the fact that they involve so many uncertainties and fluctuating factors. Yet it is surprising that we read of raising the standard of life, whose effect is not directly visible or measurable and which is not unlike trying to read writing on water. When even decent men take such matters seriously, we cannot but help thinking that, as in religion, there are certain favourite notions which otherwise intelligent minds cling to and which persist as superstitions that die very hard. The myth-making instinct in man finds consolation in such. Economics vainly claims to be a normative science, and one of its greatest drawbacks is that it lacks a yardstick or even a central normative notion altogether. This can be pointed at as the one single defect of the subject taken as a whole.


From the token-value of a coin gone into disuse, to credit that can be created by bankers or states, we have a whole series of notions of wealth, value or money which have confounded economists for generations.


Exchange-value and utility-value, besides marginal value, exist as defined in textbooks. Price can fluctuate but it is said that "there cannot be a general rise of values although there can be a general rise of prices." Rent is another of the notions of value which has subtle theorisation implied in it, and clouds of subtle theorisation on the part of authors have added to the vagueness of the notion. Whether interest is moral or usury fair is still an open question.

There is then the famous "labour theory of value" which has involved writers in polemical duels and battles in recent years. The surplus-value theory is one of the masterpieces of theorisation about value that have come down to our times. All these values must refer to some sort of good or goods that have relation to the happiness of man. Then there are inner and outer values.

Economics must be for man at least as much as man is for economics. When economics becomes more important than man, it ends in absurdities. Economics divorced from ethics is becoming more and more absurd in our days. The latest of such absurdities is when people think that future progeny must be eliminated for the economic welfare of mankind. No other species of animal would be so ultra-intelligent as to think of its own extermination. Value, wealth and money in relation to human welfare is a matter still only vaguely understood.


Economics will recognize the value of goods of all kinds from frogs to monkeys, when they are marketable and have a money value. In the days of the slave trade, human beings were bought and sold and were goods of the market place. As soon as this was declared immoral by public opinion and the equality of all men became recognized, there began to prevail the opposite tendency to consider man, except for forced labour, as a superfluity. A monkey cannot read or post a letter, but a human child can run very intelligent errands.


Why should such a difference be of no value in human life? When too much fish is caught and people cannot eat all of it, they use it as manure; but when it comes to the value of the human body or the living human being, the same intelligence seems frustrated and driven into abnormal and absurd directions An intelligent boy can run away from home, as Clive or Robinson Crusoe are said to have done. Man is capable of many exploits and adventures that few animals are capable of, and finding food and shelter for him is not a problem. As long as there is any vacant space left on the surface of the earth it would be nonsense to think of exterminating populations, potential or actual. Even to think in these terms must normally be repugnant to a sensitive human mind with its natural interest in its own kind.

Although every textbook of economics now devotes a paragraph at least to how the calculations of Malthus have been proved false, there are men and women who claim to be intelligent and who put on the superior air of civilised persons who think they know more than God could ever know, and make statements about over-population which have long since been rejected and thrown overboard.

Science has now come to a stage in which even sex-determination mechanisms in biology are vaguely understood, but it could not with impunity dare to interfere mechanistically with what nature orders with its own balance and justice. The consequences of tampering with the balance of nature is known to biologists in the domain of rabbits in Australia, and with other animals both favourable and nuisable to man. Society and governments even tolerate methods that are suspect - not to speak of the motives that are actually involved - in this question of what is respectably labelled 'family planning'. What passes for persuasion can often hide subtle subjugation, against the will of individuals in the special circumstances that prevail in interior localities with innocent villagers. Those who cannot create human life must not think of taking it.

Although the days of slavery in physical chains are over, there are questionable methods of propaganda and persuasion which, judged by their large-scale adverse effects, are more detrimental to man.


The Eichman trial revealed that the castration of women had been practised by Hitler to exterminate the Jews, whom he did not like as a community. When it concerns foreign foundations* of a different civilization who have once spoken of the dangers of the yellow or the black perils which multiply fast, why should it be over-suspicious to think that rival interests in the matter of population control can be operative? A child that may be white, brown, black or yellow is a precious masterpiece of nature or God's creation. Anyone who has watched the growth of intelligence in a human child cannot help considering it as the dearest of goods. Slaves in chains in the market place could be angels instead of mere cannon fodder as moderns might tend to treat them. The omission to recognize the value of man, and to give him his legitimate central place in the world of economics, is the sin of the present mechanistic age of technocracy. It is high time that contemplatives of the world joined with the voices of those fathers of modern economic thought in England and in France - men like Carlyle and Ruskin and the well-known Physiocrats, such as Quesnay, Turgot and others, who have been hitherto mentioned with mixed approval - to raise a protest in the mind of the average man against this degradation of the value of man in the prevailing picture of economic progress.

From the time of Plato we have heard of men having, "in their hearts the heavenly gold and silver given to them by the gods". In the light of such a view of the value of man himself, is it hard to accept that economics must be as much for man as man is for economics? There are modern writers who belong to the mechanistic and technocratic age who still recognize at least two kinds of goods, those within and those without, which together spell human welfare or happiness which is the very purpose of economy. Ethics and economics have, in our days, become so divorced that at present they spoil the case of both, instead of enhancing the teaching of each other. This is a tragic state of affairs and it is a shame that some economics books go so far in the name of matter-of-fact modernity in market-place economics, as bare-facedly and blatantly to assert that economics has nothing to do with ethics.

* Editorial Note: the author, in this and other passages, is referring to the programmes of mass sterilisation, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and others, when illiterate peasants where coerced, threatened or forced to undergo sterilisation, often in ignorance of what was being done to them, and often dying as a result.


Even culture and art would be outside its scope, according to such uncivilized writers, who are still steeped in the idea of the search for the Golden Fleece. The normative notion around which every science needs to build its theorisation or practice, is naturally the happy human being himself, and there is no need to seek all over the warehouse for a yardstick for economics which, as we have seen, has ended up in the setting up of money-standards for measuring wealth. Man is the greatest of values and the best of goods available for man. The proper study of mankind, whether in philosophy or science, is man, and he is, as the ancient dictum puts it most pointedly, the measure of all things, even in economics. No man, no economics! Adam Smith was influenced by the continental Physiocrats of Europe in his own time. With Ruskin, Carlyle and Emerson we had, even among the colonialists and mercantilists of that age of adventure and expansion, honest men who thought right in economic matters. Their voices have been stifled by the louder clamour for moneybags, and it was Ruskin who put the whole protest in poignant and pithy terms when he declared: "Bags and crags have the same effect on rags". Clothed in figurative language, it is not hard to expand his words fully and state that capital, as represented by moneybags, has an adverse effect on the interests of the poor, who are referred to as rags. Capital gives to the man of bags the same unfair advantage as a highway robber who sits on the crags, which stand for points of vantage from which unwary innocent passers-by could be attacked. This pithy slogan contains all of the lesson that we have once again to learn in bringing proper one-world or globally human economics to prevail for civilising human life once more after the abolition of slavery. The whole of economic thinking in recent centuries has been sadly vitiated by one dominating factor, symbolized by the bags referred to by Ruskin above.


The bag represents some kind of undue advantage taken against the common fellow man who is willing to be in rags or to work for wages as a slave. The subtle upward sucking power of money in the form of credit in banks and in the form of capital has first to be clearly visualized in economic theory, and in this matter much credit must go to Karl Marx who, in his two formidable volumes called "Das Kapital", has put his finger on just that single factor which has been the bane of true economic prosperity ever since the days of the gold rush.


In recent years, especially in the economic life of the more 'mature' areas like America and Europe, the dangerous extent to which moneybags or capital could go in the direction of what is known as free enterprise, has come into evidence with a bang, as it were. Cartels and questionable trusts exist which have required states to enact 'trust-busting' laws, without which the large-scale mergers of big companies would make them so powerful as to dictate terms indirectly to Government purchasers themselves, on such a scale that laws are now being dramatically enforced against hitherto rich and respectable businessmen drawing salaries up to $125,000 a year, and directors of important concerns. Some of these have been put under guard in handcuffs. A peep behind the curtains of such a development could be got from the following extracts taken from Time Magazine:

"What merger-minded U.S. bankers regard as malicious harassment continued to be the Department of Justice policy last week. Unfettered by the refusal of a Federal court a fortnight ago to bar absorption of Chicago's City National Bank and Trust Co. by the Continental Illinois National Bank, Attorney General Robert Kennedy's trustbusters raced into New York in an attempt to block the merger of the Hanover Bank (assets $2 billion) and the Manufacturers Trust Co. (assets $37 billion)." (7)


The background on which the above news item would become more understandable is made clear by the following extracts from an earlier report entitled "The Great Conspiracy" in the same magazine:

"In a tense and packed Philadelphia courtroom last week, a drama took place that U.S. business will long remember to its shame. The case before him, said Federal District Judge J. Ollen Ganey, were 'a shocking indictment of a vast section of our economy'. They were more than that. They showed clearly that the executives of a mighty industry, publicly devoted to the concept of competition, had privately conspired to rig prices to the detriment of their customers on a scale so vast that it embraced everything from the Tennessee Valley Authority to the private utilities that supply the nation's light and power." (8)

Later in the report we read:

"What aroused Judge Ganey's indignation was not only the conspiracy but also the efforts of almost everyone involved to justify his misdeeds as part of a prevailing business morality. "What is really at stake here", said the judge, "is the survival of the kind of economy under which America has grown to greatness, the free enterprise system".

The conflict involved between the offenders and justice comes into clearer perspective as we read the following continuation of the same report:

"F.F. Lock, president and general sales manager of Milwaukee's Allen Bradley Co., who was slapped with a $ 7,500 fine and whose company was fined $ 40,000, maintained that 'no-one attending the (business) gatherings was so stupid he didn't know they were in violation of the law.' Then he added in a surprising non sequitur: 'But it is the only way business can run. It is free enterprise.'"


Free enterprise thus has come to mean the opposite in the mouths of the judge and the hitherto-respectable businessman. Capital, competition and free enterprise have thus arrived at a blind alley in our own days.


Although it is not in fashion to think of "economic man" as an abstraction, as the modern economist now relies more on the cobweb charts of equilibrium analysis, of which he is beginning to be even more proud because of its factual emptiness and the lack of effective predictability in economic trends; we revert to the ideal economic man here, not in terms of man as a self-seeking monster of the moneybag epoch in economic history, but in order that man may yield the central normative notion for this branch of knowledge which has been wishfully rather than legitimately laying claim to a place among the regular sciences.
Man can be a monster and a menace to mankind itself, or he can be a beneficial human as created by Nature. The power of the moneybag often distorts his personality with its pride, and greed makes him tamper with the beauty of nature, spoiling the surface of the green planet on which man is destined to seek his happiness.

Money or capital is only one aspect of the double reference that applies to the economic man at one and the same time. Opulence and abundance have to find a healthy equilibrium in the normative notion of the economic man conceived in generalized abstraction. Through Protagoras and Socrates down to the time of the writing of Pope's "Essay on Man", this need for a norm of thought has been sufficiently recognized in wisdom-literature the world over. Between natural abundance and moneybag opulence man must find a middle way of good economic living.


Economics resides as a double-sided virtue in the golden heart of the man placed in this two-sided economic environment. Like two immiscible liquids in the same bottle, there are two polarised, ambivalent factors involved which rarely live together in the same man.


The miser and the man of natural generosity do not live together. In this virtue it is that economics can participate in its value-content with aesthetics and ethics. The exchange of values - whether horizontal, as between prices and goods, or vertical between plus and minus sides of abstract value - takes place according to certain fundamental given laws in the normative world of economics, which tallies with economic man on one side and with his proper economic environment on the other. It is true that such a theoretical picture is becoming outmoded because in pragmatic terms it has not yielded practical guidance for the policy-makers of recent years. In spite of this fact, of which we are fully conscious, it must be stated that any economics that mixes up the polarities involved is worse than no economics at all. We should divide the "haves" and the "have-nots" so that economic programmes for the advantage of one or the other, or for regaining equilibrium in times of crisis or economic malaise, could have some intelligible meaning at least. Instead of giving up methods developed so far in this direction and abandoning the normative idea of the economic man, we here suggest that we should make a fresh and revised effort, from a global background this time, instead of in a partial fashion as hitherto. The two polarised worlds of abundance and opulence have to find equal place in this new normative scheme of economic life.


There are certain aspects of wealth and consequent happiness that we cannot share or exchange. The father's love for a son, or a husband's for a wife, refer to vertical happiness of this order, and the use of a good public road or bridge belongs to another order. A millionaire, who might be living with a wife who has filed a suit against him and is not on speaking terms, can feel his state of unhappiness more keenly than a happily-wedded poor peasant and his wife, who might be living in a hovel and half-starved, but endowed with love.


There are some common-sense banalities that need not be repeated if it is not to show that one-sided welfare economic programmes have lurking factors of uncertainty, which experts often miss, that might be hiding in the very heart of the problem. The planners in offices who sit with statistics and calculations, predicting varied good or bad results of large- scale measures, often do so looking at life quantitatively and mechanistically, which can be as absurd as the superstitions of the age of witch-hunts and sorcery. Between the Scylla and Charybdis of this situation, a laissez-faire and laissez-passer economy would be safer than trusting to the wrong experts who might turn out to be charlatans. There is ample room for suspicion and the clash of interests in the modern world.
On the very day I am writing this article we have the tragic news of the death of the secretary-general of the United Nations, an event which has economic and colonialist implications, as strong and as barbarous as in any bygone days, still alive in the world and manifesting themselves in the broad daylight of modern public opinion, which prides itself on being progressive.


When Shylock says in the last scene of "The Merchant of Venice" that taking away his property would amount to killing him, he is speaking the language of dialectical wisdom, by which a man and his property are related in bipolar verticality as a private or personal means of happiness and freedom, which are matters that are guaranteed by every free constitution all over the world. To seek one's own happiness freely would mean nothing other than the liberty to have happiness according to one's own private individual notions, whether right or wrong by public standards.

There are two worlds - of freedom and of happiness - involved here, which cross the paths of one another, contradicting, compromising, or counteracting the ways and means of one by the ways and means of the other. The human values involved can be frustrated and foiled for a man or for mankind generally when mistakes are made involving violations of dialectical verities.


Paradoxes present themselves in almost every question concerning happiness and the conflicting means to be adopted, making life a network-tangle of criss-cross problems. These are the domains where fools walk nonchalantly and where angels fear to tread. The whole matter of economics has to be viewed in the light of a revised dialectical point of view in which private and public interests now yielding negative results would on the contrary give double gain. One-World Economics must head in this direction if it is not to flounder altogether and get lost.


Economics is a four-cornered game in which we lose or gain or suffer disequilibrium or maladjustments in various ways that are subtle and gross. Time enters into this as well as quality. Credit, debit, supply and demand mark the four aspects of the game; and when it is played the ball goes from one side to the other, horizontally or vertically, within the limits of a mathematically-conceived vectorial space where various stresses and pressures act and interact. The periods of deflation and inflation that come into evidence now and then within economic areas, limited or general, affecting large and small groups of people at a time, or the whole of humanity when general hard times prevail, have various factors that enter into their composition, which are as unpredictable as the wind that bloweth where it listeth.

In accepted language the four corners of the game are known to be land, capital, the labourer, and the entrepreneur - but these factors are to be understood as more generic and symbolic than specific or literally fixed in meaning. They are only symbols in a larger mathematically- extrapolated or elaborated abstract economic world involving higher or lower, greater or lesser values as they touch human life in particular or in general.
We come to face here the mystery of economics as a whole, in which the virtues of the economic man come up against the whole of the economic situation, possible, actual or intentional, in any place at any time. This is the theoretical picture tacitly kept in the mind of economic theoreticians while lesser spirits only play their own game of checkers with one or other aspect of this global picture-board in their minds.


A world of abundance often forms one side of the court, and the world of opulence interacts with it with movements and manoeuvres which comprise the expert game which has always been going on. In spite of all these contrivances, human problems are only on the increase, both in number, scale of extent, complexity and intensity. To separate in our minds the two main factors involved, so that we could at least see the sides to which the players or pieces belong in such a game, is that first desideratum without which economic insight would forever remain a closed mystery.

The economic man, who within his heart carries that double-sided streak of golden virtue which makes for the good economics of any one generation in this human world of getting and spending, falls broadly into two distinct types.

One is represented by the peasant who tills the soil and the other is represented by the man who multiplies his money by lending interest. Although the latter practice has been condemned by the Quran and the Bible as disreputable, these two types have existed from time immemorial and are likely to exist hereafter. Any picture of the prevailing economic climate in which humans are likely to eke out their livelihood must count on the world of the peasant and that of the usurer, who belong to two rival worlds and carry their own virtues in their hearts. A generous usurer and a peasant miser are possible but rare. These two, peasant and usurer, represent respectively the worlds of abundance and of opulence. Only intuitive insight can open the doors to these respective worlds, and in order at least to have a rough idea of their import, it is necessary here to lapse into a kind of biblical pictorial language.


What lies spread before the natural man with all its varied intentional, possible or actual opportunities for a happy life, of birth, living, and multiplication of kind, with the food and shelter that it implies, is the Garden of Eden of the Bible.


A spring on fertile ground situated on the higher level of a gentle slope is not at once an economic wealth; but in the course of natural living by a normal human family unit, translates itself into wealth by slow, imperceptible degrees, by a progression subtler than the arithmetical or geometric one. Perhaps the law of squares holds good here and a logarithmic spiral might mark the ascent of this apparently waste land in terms of wealth. This can happen with different peasants living their own separate lives of Adams and Eves in their own particular and closed economic Edens or paradises. These closed worlds, monad-like as in Leibnizian philosophy, are units with doors only and no windows. A happy family unit, as found in natural conditions, is one in which individual, personal and intimate values prevail vertically, as it were, in self-sufficient independence. Collective economy is repugnant to the spirit of such a windowless universe in which human happiness is secured. An infinite number of monads can coexist in a happy economic whole.


There are inner goods which yield individual happiness for all, and outer goods which contribute to the general happiness. The happiness of all must not be confused with general happiness. If so confused, the outcome would be uncertainty of value-results. This in principle is not unlike the modern notion of uncertainty known to physics and associated with Heisenberg. Inner happiness has to be individual and for oneself, while outer happiness could be shared. This innate law of reality has to be recognized properly before an integrated body of scientific economic thought can emerge as applicable to the whole of humanity. The money-value of a trickling spring on the grounds of a peasant on the fringes of a forest in some inaccessible mountain district in any part of the world would be zero in the eyes of the shrewd banker-economist. But the eye of the peasant is guided by quite other considerations. The trickling waters of the spring, though a negligible factor in


short-spanned economic valuation, are one that can endure through generations when his children and grandchildren might be expected to live in the same place. The totality of the value that the apparently negligible spring has in reality, would represent, vertically viewed, enormous wealth, whose exchange-value at a given moment might be negligible in the valuation of the moneybag economist or bag-baron. Thus, there are values to be appraised vertically with long time-span units; and values that are to be estimated horizontally as money in exchangeable market-place contexts. These might present a law of direct or indirect logarithmic proportions between them. The calculus of real value thus becomes a complicated affair because of the double uncertainty principle involved. There are therefore two sets of values to be distinguished which are: 1) vertical or real values and 2) their reflections in the market place, where horizontal values are exchanged by tokens or money consisting of coins or currency.


Credit is an abstract value in economics that could be created by common consent. The high priests of the credit system live in Wall Street or in Lombard Street and are votaries at the altar of the Dollar or the Pound Sterling which at present are distinguished by them and treated with favouritism as key currencies, whether covered by gold or not. When public confidence is withdrawn - which can happen, theoretically at least, at any moment, and actually only by the will of God or the whim of chance - this high citadel of the temple of credit might crumble and a new money might have to be devised that would have a more broad-based liquidity or exchange value. Funds might flow from the Dollar to Sterling or in the reverse direction, to stabilise one or the other by short-term recovery programmes in the hope of the full recovery of these key
currencies. Credit, after Sterling was taken off the gold standard in September 1931, became a purer abstraction than before.


These two aspects of credit, one more abstract and independent of the prices of things than the other, would be clear from the following paragraph from J.S. Mill quoted in Thompson's "Elements of Economics":

"When credit comes into play as a means of purchasing distinct from money in hand we shall hereafter find that the connection between the prices and the amount of calculating medium, is much less direct and intimate and that such connection as does exist no longer admits of so simple a mode of expression."(9)

The notion of credit is thus seen to be one that need not be directly connected with gold or other coins in the hand. When England came off the gold standard this aspect of pure credit came into evidence more clearly than ever before in economic history. After this momentous event, the ethical implications of which remain questionable still, there has been further ascent of the notion of credit into higher and purer altitudes. In fact when we come to the International Monetary Fund and the conventions, adjustments and common tacit understandings between countries, whether of the key currency areas or the areas which come under the European Common Market, the status of credit as an abstract value rises one degree higher on the ascending pyramid of credit which we have to imagine. The arrangements and contrivances, both short-term and long-term, by which the credit system is at present propped up by agreements between governments and bankers, American, British and Continental, hold many mysteries for the common man who has not had a peep behind the scenes, where these stabilising or recovery measures are worked out and applied.
Financial wizards alone know, or pretend to know, all that is going on. What is more important is the question whether all that is accepted by expert advisers is really tenable by universal ethical standards. The crag-barons of the moneybag world know how to hide their egocentric, closed and static interests by putting on what they call the façade or big front of respectability, while in actuality "painted tombs might worms enfold". It is not considered respectable in such matters to speak bare-facedly the whole of the truth because we are supposed to live dreamily in the best of possible worlds.


I shall therefore content myself by quoting excerpts from two recent articles written by two of the latest authorities of England who have put the matter in the proper BBC language, clothed in respectable phrases now acceptable. The keen man of common sense can discern here and there gaps and lacunae which violate normal notions, moral, economic and even aesthetic, which ought to be expected to prevail when the wealth and welfare of the peoples of the world, mature or immature, advanced or backward, developed or under-developed, are equally involved. The cause of equal justice for all will be seen to be violated in a subtle way by the very statements which a scrutiny of these passages will reveal to anyone who retains some degree of common sense and common interest in the future of mankind.
Under the caption 'Death of A System', The Listener of July 27, 1961 contains an article by Robert Triffin, a leading economic expert:

"Among the millions of corpses strewn among the battlefields of the first world war, lies one which we have vainly tried for a half century now to dig up, dust off, and put back on its feet: the corpse is the nineteenth-century gold standard."

The gist of the plea of Triffin is contained in the following extracts (Mr. Triffin himself explains):

"The so-called Triffin plan is merely an attempt to couch this broad vision of my President and your Prime Minister into concrete and negotiable terms. It remains far short of the admittedly distant ideal of a free world central bank."

Explaining that the sovereign rights of individual states to create credit within their own frontiers would not easily be given up, Mr. Triffin goes on to indicate the way and extent to which international money could be created by a kind of half-consent, by interpretation of what has been tacitly accepted by a sufficiently large group of parties whose common interests are already involved.


He goes on:

"I would, as a minimum, authorise some international body - let us say the International Monetary Fund - to hold international, gold-guaranteed reserve deposits for the central banks of the member countries which wish to take advantage of this facility. It is generally felt that this could be done through some mere interpretation of the present status of the International Monetary Fund and would not therefore require re-negotiation and parliamentary approvals etc."

What is in the back of the mind of this expert will come into unmistakable relief when we read the concluding paragraphs of Mr. Triffin, where he refers to "A God-sent Channel for Britain", the title of which itself is sufficient proof that Mr Triffin is thinking still in terms of the closed prosperity of his own group or country without being strictly a One-World Economist as we envisage it here. He says:

"Finally, speaking to a British audience, I hardly need stress the relationship between this problem and the prospective move toward unification of the six or seven of the European Economic Community, Britain and its other European Free Trade Association partners."


The accent on the word 'interpretation' above involves the question whether moral considerations should come into this picture of a God-sent opportunity to create credit, as if by the back door. Another expert, Alan Day, writing in "The Listener" of August, 1961 explains and proposes the following way out:

"We are in the middle of a rescue operation for the Sterling which is probably of far greater magnitude than is generally realized; the steps being taken and likely to be taken, could, by a small diversion of their direction lead to the creation of a new world currency which would safely supplement the use of gold"


Once the new world currency is thus established by the small diversion mentioned above (instead of the interpretation that Mr. Triffin relied on) Mr. Alan Day opines:

"We can go on to the third stage of creating more of this currency in accordance with our needs".

The ethical consideration involved in creating a world currency without a proper world government is a matter that is not faced in these two expert opinions which seem to think in terms of back-door and short-cut terms, with the continued prosperity of only Britain in their minds. Others can use the money thus created, if it is good for them or not. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom is the only person who seems to have any qualms of conscience in this matter, as may be seen from his words quoted in Mr. Triffin's article. He is quoted as saying:


"All sorts of remedies are being suggested. The main difficulty about many of them is what I might call the mental hurdles that they might present . . . there seems to be something immoral in increasing the credit base by mutual agreement. Just as each individual country painfully acquired a central banking system, so there ought - ideally - to be a central banking system for all the countries of the free world."


We have noticed at the end of the previous section that free enterprise, as understood in a scarcity-based and money-centred economics, is facing, at the present moment, a critical phase. There is reason to think that the whole economic endeavour of the Western World is heading towards a blind alley. The very realization of the dream of big-business success on the lines of free enterprise is having the paradoxical effect of putting the present heroes of enterprise under government guards and in handcuffs to be marched off to prisons. Anti-trust law is by itself a bad sign of the reversal of the course of economic progress. Further, the crisis in which the key currencies are caught at present is making financiers think of creating new credit and new money. They have to take this bold step or face further grave deterioration of the situation. Borrowing by governments has reached some kind of limit of elasticity
of long-term recovery arrangements. Tariff walls do not keep out the smuggler any more, and this gives further room for economic anxiety on a world scale, as the crime itself has attained to large international proportions which have broken through the frontiers of countries. What are called 'silent ships' constantly cross the high seas with contraband cargo reaching from coast to coast, while mountain frontiers themselves are becoming increasingly vulnerable to this international crime. Flouting of tariff walls, trust busting and credit creation are new problems that face the economy of opulence. Soaring prices too point to inflationary tendencies. These, together with the rumblings of a possible war, cold or hot, give us a sombre picture indeed of the world of present-day economics. The end of this chapter of the 'dismal science', which has had its own course to run since the days of the fortune hunters, may be said to be in sight.


It is time that all informed minds think in terms of One-World Economics instead of dividing it up to confine it within rival, hard or soft, key or sundry currency areas in a relativistic or piecemeal fashion.


The Physiocrats under Quesnay's leadership represented a school of thought in economics which looked at the question from another pole altogether. They gave primacy to the world of the farmer and the circulation of wealth, whether in kind or in coin, that took place between the farmer and the landlord who received rents from him. According to this school, which thought in terms of the natural abundance of nature's products as against money value, wealth had to circulate freely from one pole to the other between the three main classes: the farmer, the commercial and industrial class, and the landlord class, for economics to be healthy and conducive to the welfare of a given area of populated land such as France. The circulation of wealth - in the form of money, agricultural produce, or raw materials - within only one stratum or sector of the three, was not considered at all economically significant by them. And even when two strata or sectors were involved in the circulation, such a movement of wealth in the world of economics was still called 'imperfect', by Quesnay and his followers. When wealth passed, in one form or another, cutting through the stratifications to reach all who were involved in the economic endeavour of any country; now changing from the farmer's hands to the wage earner's and the businessman's, and reaching the landlord or whoever received the benefit of the rent in money; and now returning to the farmer in a certain annual cyclic alternation and succession - that was a circumstance that spelt real economic progress for any country. We have over-simplified and presented this matter of changing hands and circulation of wealth so as to be able to visualize clearly the underlying scheme and mode of operation of this subtle process of economic circulation visualized by the Physiocrats, who are generally accepted to be the real founders of economic theory outside the old English School.


These latter were glaringly economists of opulence rather than of abundance, which latter label would more correctly apply to the Physiocrats. In order to show that in so oversimplifying the fundamentals of the circulation of wealth within the main economic classes we have not deflected materially from the authentic position of Quesnay's school, it will not be out of place to quote one paragraph from Engels' essays entitled "Anti Dühring", where he masterfully summarises Quesnay's "Tableau Economique" as follows:

"The whole process is certainly 'fairly simple'. There enters into circulation: from the farmers, two milliards of money for the payment of rent, and three milliards in products, of which two-thirds are means of subsistence and one-third, raw materials; from the sterile class, two milliards in manufactured commodities. Of the means of subsistence amounting to two milliards, one-half is consumed by the landlords and their retainers, the other half by the sterile class in payment for its labour. The raw materials to the value of one milliard replace the working capital of the latter class. Of the manufactured goods in circulation amounting to two milliards, one-half goes to the landlords and the other to the farmers, for whom it is also a converted form of the interest, which arises at first hand out of agricultural reproduction, on their invested capital. The money thrown into circulation by the farmer in payment of rent, however, flows back to him through the sale of his products, and thus the same process can take place again the next economic year."(11)

This summary of the "Analyse du Tableau Economique" of Quesnay, the father of modern economic theory, is described as 'fairly simple' to understand, by Engels in the above paragraph that we have just quoted. Engels himself admits elsewhere in the same essay:


"The Physiocratic School left us in Quesnay's 'Tableau Economique', as everyone knows, a riddle of which all former critics and historians of political economy have up to now broken their teeth in vain. This 'Tableau' which is intended to bring out clearly the Physiocrats' conception of the production and circulation of a country's total wealth remained obscure enough for the economic world which succeeded it."(12)

Even now a layman of common sense can read, with all the attention he can muster and scrutinize, the above-quoted paragraph in which a master economist, Engels, states in 'fairly simple' fashion the gist of what happens in a given unit, in any part of the world, when wealth is produced and is allowed to circulate under normal and normative conditions. We have to underline ourselves here certain key notions involved in the Tableau thus presented, before it can become meaningful to an ordinary reader of the present-day.

1. Quesnay here attempts a normative notion in respect of the production and the circulation of wealth in the most general and mathematically-precise terms that such a subject will admit. Taking his own France as the normative example, he speaks of "milliards of livres (pounds)" as the unit of measurement, grosso modo, considered for purposes of discussion. He relies here, as usual, on a monetary yardstick even when he includes the value of raw produce or consumer goods within its meaning. The abstract and elusive notion of wealth is thus arbitrarily brought under a common value-reference, independently of its actual exchange- or commodity- value prejudices. The milliards here refer to an intermediate kind of generalized and abstracted value-notion, measurable in terms of pounds or livres, which as we shall see, is not fully satisfactory.


2. After thus selecting France as his unit of a populated area, or as an economic unit, and fixing the yardstick with which to measure value in the abstract, he goes on to divide the stratifications that normally exist in any society into three main divisions, into which the other sub-divisions of economic, religious or political classes or groups, if any, have to be fitted by us, as secondary items that belong to the same picture. There are the farmers who till the soil and cultivate - the real producers of wealth in any country.

Industrialists and commercial people only transport, exchange or modify goods, without affecting the real production or circulation of wealth. These form the second class; and the landlord, who represents the modern capitalist, forms the third class, whose main function is to receive the rent paid by the farming class. The state and the church also have a share in this rent. All of these have to be understood inclusively in generalized abstraction if we want to have a simple, living and vivid notion of how wealth originates and circulates in a given community.

Labelled generically, for the sake of simplicity, we have to think of the 'farming', the 'commercial' and the 'capitalist' classes as forming the three successive strata, cutting through which wealth in the abstract, whether in kind or coin, changes hands. Another rule that Quesnay has laid down is that true circulation of wealth is only what takes place between the three stratifications of the farmer, the commercial world and the world of the receiver of rents.

The other, horizontal, circulation that is absorbed, as it were, within the stratum of one class itself is not counted as wealth of any economic import at all in the interests of the country as a whole. Just change of form or of pocket is not to be counted.
When circulation cuts across all three stratifications of the society, we have, according to Quesnay, a perfect circulation.
If two strata are involved the circulation is imperfect.

The wealth which is absorbed in the same class is like stagnant water within a bed of sand, not available for drinking purposes for the general good, although it might benefit individuals within the group or class and indirectly contribute to the good of all.


3. In addition to these key indications we have to remember that Quesnay treats the whole matter grosso modo and takes for granted that prices remain constant and that individual exchanges and transactions that actually take place in instalments are all added up into a total for the purpose of visualizing the total wealth in circulation.

3. During the course of any one economic year, the money paid by the farmer (who belongs, as it were, to the negative pole of the situation) to the landlord or capitalist who receives it, circulates, cutting through the successive class stratifications, and comes back to the source where it started. In other words, it flows back to the farmers after going through changes as commodities or exchange values in a very abstract and complicated fashion, which we have to visualize through much intuitive understanding. Thus, from the actual producers, the farmers, wealth may be said to pass through the sterile and unproductive class of the industrial and commercial stratum to reach the rent-receiving class, whether as cash or as a means of subsistence for each class, as it rises to the surface like a spring of net product or surplus-value.

Thus, to separate the net- or surplus-value that results from economic endeavour in any country, is the whole purpose of the "Tableau Economique" of Quesnay, which has puzzled generations of expert economists, but yet remains simple to imaginative minds, like that of an Engels, as he himself says.

In underlining the key notions implicit in Quesnay's normative picture, which is both simple and most elusive, we have in the numbered paragraphs above tried to add our own contributions to the thought in those parts which have been underlined. The reader would do well to scrutinize them again and also finally to take a look at the paragraph from Engels. He would then be able to form in his own mind, however vaguely, the outlines of a normative notion for economic thought which he should retain in his mind in reading the rest of what we have to say ourselves.


Next to Leibnizian Monadology or Indian Vedanta, there is no subject that is as given to hair-splitting theoretical speculations as modern economics. The one word 'Value', under its different aspects and complexions, has been the subject of volumes of literature filling many shelves in modern libraries. If we should pick any book on advanced economic theory and turn to the letter "V" in the subject index, we are likely to find a long list of items there, referring to parts of the work devoted to terms such as token value, price-value, use-value, net-value, surplus-value and the like - under direct reference to value, and indirectly to the discussion of such questions as rent value, interest or discount value, profit, product, commodity or individual 'good' or 'goods', seen in the perspective of a particular social context or of a particular time, as a necessary or luxury item of value. In fact, in the first section of this series we have tried to describe economics itself as pertaining to 'value-wisdom'; and then we see that others like Engels have referred to the theory of value in economics as, 'the touchstone of the genuineness of economic systems'. If we should further delimit the scope of this value-science, if we may call it so, as pertaining not so much to happiness in the after-life as to life here in an earthy sense, we would have fully given to the notion of value the central place in this branch of knowledge. When we remember here also that some eminent economists refer to inner and outer values, quantitative and qualitative values, long-term or short-term values, positive or negative values; the ramifications of the notion of values in the economic world of our day becomes a tangled cluster, well, ill or indifferently understood.

There are values of the market place and intimate personal values. Extended notions of value that trace its necessary evolutionary origins from the biceps of a monkey to that of man, as Engels traces it in great detail, bring into this confusion more complications. Can we ever expect that a day will arrive by itself when this kind of subtle theorisation would attain to its final term and leave behind it some simpler over-all outlines of the coherence of fundamental concepts in economics? The prospects seem to be bleak at present.


On the contrary, rival theories are on the increase as the departmentalization and specialisation of branches of value-wisdom tend more and more to disintegrate economic thought, dispersing individual notions instead of making them hang together by a single central normative concept. This applies not only to the so-called science of economics, but to all knowledge, which is tending to fall apart for want of one common integrative and normative notion which alone could give to subtler aspects of knowledge that unity without which they must remain pieces of information, without attaining to the full status of a science or wisdom.


The notion of pure or absolute value, which is important for us to fix for normative purposes of economic thinking, extends from good or goods that refer to life here, to those that go beyond such limits into the hereafter and even to the 'here-before'. An old curiosity shop can have much money- and market-value, but the commodities exchanged therein might have little reference to physical life here at all. Books of antique import, souvenirs and heirlooms, old paintings and the section in which religious articles can be included - all refer to a past which has gone into disuse and been left behind by life here as such. There are other articles of prospective import which refer to the latest vogue, pointing to a tomorrow that can invade the fashion market, which sometimes has fabulous money-values involved. These might refer to a flimsy feather or fur that is just coming into use in high life.

The price of a toy is not regulated by the congealed man-hour labour or the scarcity of the material that enters its composition. As opposed to milk which might be normal food for a new-born child and which might go bad in a day, we can have diamonds or medicines which do not refer to any simple, necessary or general life-interest here and now. The value of these varies with individuals and with the time they are most needed. The value of a beautiful tree in your home lawn, which might represent a high value in itself, is not exchangeable nor could it be replaced by so many man-hour units. You might be willing to pay an enormous sum to see it left alone, without any other article in exchange for it at all.


Life insurance has many kinds of theoretical values that enter into the economic world without commodities that correspond to them. Human fear, worry or anxiety is the negative wealth involved, which can be cleverly exploited. Likewise, religious charlatans can exploit the gullibility of women or simple and superstitious people, and this too can loom large as a factor in economic life. How drugs and patent medicines can play havoc with healthy economic getting and spending and go against welfare is also evident in modern days. There is thus negative wealth and positive wealth, which can yield both capital and profit. The way of value in human life is more mysterious than most economists make out. They offer us simple pictures of the Promised Land of gold, which is not unlike the promise of paradise from their counterparts in the rival group of persons who deal with the goods of the life to come. Whether life here or hereafter is involved; whether freedom from fear is the only commodity in question; or happiness and plenty for progeny still unborn, for whom misers might normally hoard money - the world of values presents a complex picture. Between human nature and what it might want for its inner or outer satisfactions here and now or hereafter; clinging to things of the past or looking for a prospective world of values; some orderly, organically conceived, normative way of relating all of them into a unitive whole must first be devised before we can answer simple questions of economic import, such as whether a well-bound and gilt-edged Bible would be better than an equal weight of bread to give away to a hungry man at the door. "The cow might die while the grass is being grown" is a familiar proverb, which faces the opposite way to the sense of the other similar saying that "man does not live by bread alone".

Problems of value-wisdom are many and varied. One has to feed the inner and the outer man, and what is food at one time for a person can be poison for another or even for the same man at a different moment. In such a domain of indeterminism and incertitude where time and space are components to determine value, it is sheer childishness to think that value can be visualized in the abstract in


mathematically-generalized terms without any normative notion to hold together the different aspects of the reality implied. Whether we like it or not; or whether modern thought sanctions such or not; unitive, one-world Economics would be impossible if no normative notion were supplied as a basis for proper economic theory to be raised on its foundations as a lasting superstructure.


Profit, interest, rent, net product, marginal value or surplus-value have been variously understood and defined from Ricardo to Marx. A host of others too have left behind a heritage of confused economic definitions, based on theories which give primacy to one or another economic factor such as utility, the consumer, the producer, labour etc. At the present-day there is a forest of rival ideas. If we will only interpose the law that "economics must be for man at least as much as man is for economics", and think in terms of a double-sided relationship between the interests of man and corresponding outer values, we will be able to arrive at a psycho-physical, normative, double-sided notion which will represent the relation-relata complex in which economic life may be said to live, move and have its being. The normative notion has to be simple. We can follow the lines indicated by the founder of modern economic theory, Quesnay, who has, in his "Tableau", which we have examined, simplified for us the economic picture common to any country. A living picture of the economic forces or factors in a normative economic unit anywhere in the world is what we should first visualize. Here, instead of relying on verbosity, as most books do in bringing clarity and simplicity to fundamental economic notions, we have to adopt a schematic and analytic method of geometry which we have elsewhere called the proto-linguistic rather than the meta-linguistic approach. What this consists of will become clear as we read further.


Modern economists admit that there cannot be a general rise of 'values', although there can be a general rise of price. They also admit, on the other hand, that a proper notion of value is the touchstone of sound economic theory. By examining the definition of value in any textbook of economics we can roughly determine the philosophical, metaphysical or theoretical basis of the particular school. These will be found to be as varied and subtle as with schools of theology and religion. God and gold have often been referred to in the language of economics as complementary terms referring to life-values here or hereafter. How gold enters the economic world, circulates as ornamental or money-value and finds a place in the vaults of Wall Street, Lombard Street or in Moscow, lending itself to being a standard of value-reference for complex and mysterious reasons - as is the case of the concept of God in theology - has already been studied.

Enough has been said to indicate in a sketchy preliminary fashion how there can be four distinct compartments in which gold as a value can operate. The adoption of the Gold Standard in England before 1931 and the climbing down from it; and the idea of 'created credit' and capital, is a long story in the history of the evolution of economic value into which we cannot here enter.

Capital credit-value, at the present moment, is what makes it possible for 'new money' to be put into circulation by groups of bankers who wish or agree to do so - the ethical implications and justice of which have been questioned by us already. In the world of opulence the circulation and value phases of gold give us the pattern of the relation-relata complex involved in the idea or notion of value. Complementary to this, the world of economics of the days of the physiocrats, which we have analysed in the "Tableau Economique" of Quesnay, gives us a simplified picture of a normative economic scheme. Gold circulation and Quesnay's "Tableau together give us some initial indications of how we can build on them a normative notion of value.


Economic policies of governments must show net value-production for making the country wealthy. The Physiocrats gave primacy to agriculture in this matter. The gold-rush economic world gave capital the primacy. Abstract credit is the culminating factor at which the so-called advanced countries have arrived. Abstract credit itself has become, at present, a major world economic issue with many-sided and delicate implications. An impending crisis that will affect the whole credit structure of the West is to be expected within reasonably short time limits. Agricultural countries like India have now to make up their minds one way or the other: whether they want to imitate the West and go into the wrong side of the economic fabric represented by capital and its evils; or if they want to build up a stable world of economic abundance in favour of those in rags rather than those with bags. These two economic worlds, however, cannot live together, just as crabbed age and youth cannot live together. The relation between the two worlds of abundance and opulence is such that there is a philosophical principle of incertitude involved between them so that any consciously-conceived programme which gives primacy to the one at once compromises the other. Just as in the case of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in modern physics, and the time-honoured error of 'jnana-karma samuccaya' that Sankara puts forward so ably in his writings on Vedanta, no state could have a programme which adopts both kinds of progress.


We have once already tried to explain the sectors or zones in the
economic world which cannot be mixed promiscuously; but more than presenting an arbitrarily imagined and over-simplified picture, we have not been able to go into all implications.* We have had occasion to quote Rousseau in support of the immiscibility of the two worlds and the programmes corresponding to each. The striking reference to this very fundamental economic law by such an intuitive and penetrating mind as that of a Rousseau warrants repetition of quotation here:

* See page 143 below.


"Above all do not try to combine these two projects
- they are too contradictory, and wanting to be related
to both by a composite way of progression is to want
to miss both." (13)

We know that between Rousseau and Voltaire the age called that of reason was ushered into being in the history of European thought. Between these two names, one erring on the side of the sentimental and the other on the side of a matter-of-fact attitude that often went beyond the bounds of a normal and candid outlook, we had a revaluation and demolition of old values for new. Any one who has read "Candide" by Voltaire cannot fail to discover that it was an attack on the love of fortune-hunting, whose last picture, marking the utmost limit of absurdity to which such a tendency could be pushed in human life, has been painted by him to hold it up to ridicule in the strongest possible terms.

Textbooks on economics generally take pains to make the student distinguish what is wealth and state its independence of money. Although the distinction is drawn, the rest of the discussion continues to give primacy to the money-aspect of wealth. A standard of life measurable in terms of money-value is not questioned and generally passes as valid. This is as misleading as when a young man says that he enjoyed his holiday by spending such and such an amount. The absurdity implied is a subtle one and hard to expose. Money and enjoyment do not belong to the same order of reality, and one cannot be the measure of the other. In fact wealth and money could belong to two opposite and reciprocal worlds which have nothing to do with each other. Certain relations in science, we know, vary inversely and others vary directly. Although it might be true that direct proportion might hold good between money and the pleasure it yields; it is a poor yardstick for general over-all use. A simple cup of coffee costs ten times as much in one country than in another, while the cheer it brings remains the same.


In a country where the economic progress has been money-based, giving opulence the primacy over abundance, the polarity or ambivalence that is evidenced and reflected in the prices of foodstuffs, as compared with a country that gives primacy to abundance, is to be traced to the existence of two distinct value-worlds which are hard to compare by common standards of measurement. A subtler form of vectorial mathematics is here applicable, and the usual statistical mechanistically-conceived statements could give an altogether false picture of good or bad economic conditions. In any attempt that we might be making to fix a norm for economic life, especially if it is to be applicable to the One World that we have in view, we have to make due allowance for the possibility of reciprocal and mutually exclusive worlds. Just as in vector analysis we have to think of the tensors and versors as different, there are subtle considerations in economics which we have to keep in mind if we are to avoid violating fundamental laws consciously or unconsciously. The clarification of a norm in economics could alone remedy such possible errors which prevail at present. The greenness of a colour cannot be measured in terms of redness, but the intensity of incandescence could be measured in terms of candlepower. Monetary standards can measure only horizontal aspects of value, while value as such, on which happiness depends, eludes such measurements. What we mean by these terms, horizontal and vertical, is precisely what these articles are expected to make clear.


A comprehensive definition of economics is that it pertains to wisdom about human values. The tendency in modern economics is to confine the world of economics to the market-place transactions that refer to man's physical needs. The Columbia Encyclopaedia defines it as "study of the supplying of man's physical needs and wants". The pragmatic attitude that is behind such a banal way of defining economics is unmistakable. Marshall and others have not delimited the scope of economics to such a drastically earthy extent.


Ruskin defines the full scope of economics, beyond utility values, when he says:

"There is no wealth but life: life including all its powers of love, of joy and of admiration. That country is the richest which nourishes the greatest number of noble and happy human beings."(14)

Between these two views of the scope of economics we have to arrive at a normative definition.


We have to admit in the first place that economics is for man and not man for economics, which latter might have no regulative or normative central principle at all, whether in the world of existence, of knowledge, or in that of axiological values. Economics has to cater to the inner or outer wants of man at all levels, from bread to freedom. All constitutions of states start by a guarantee of these primary factors that touch human life. Man does not live by bread alone, and losing one's soul would be more disastrous than profiting by the gain of the three worlds. Any science of economics worth the name must put man at the core, both as the 'subject-matter' and 'object-matter' of all economic endeavour. Although economics does not directly promise human happiness in so many words, no economics that does not refer to human welfare or what amounts to the same - his happiness - could be interesting or significant.


The notion of sin is a basic assumption in theology. To modern economists scarcity corresponds to the notion of sin in theology. It is on this basic assumption that they build up false theories of economic backwardness or immaturity without reference to any norm to evaluate the standard of life. It is the same as referring to a good Christian applying strange and outlandish norms. An opulent or an abundant economics must equally have the happy man as its yardstick, instead of a monetary standard, which would be like measuring something uncertain with another more uncertain.


Julian Marias, writing on the Commonwealth, brings out this point of poverty and 'poverty' when he says:

"Economic poverty is not equivalent of vital poverty; when poverty remained simple poverty, it inspired in me a deep respect, mingled with admiration, and it seemed to be not far from a state of well-being or if you prefer, happiness."(15)

The Empire State Building in New York requires hundreds of thousands of dollars to keep it warm for its inmates during more than half the year when it is cold; this has to be subtracted from the standard of living of the Indian who lives at a temperature that approximates body temperature year in and year out and through each day and night. How to measure the welfare involved by a monetary standard of life is one of the questions that stare us in the face. This, like many other myths, prevails in the mind of the average modern who claims to know such matters. The inner and outer man have to match with inner and outer good or goods to spell happiness through wisdom. Such is the scope of economics understood from a One-World and global human basis.


The fruit of the forbidden tree stands for the context of all that is considered evil in Christianity. Although stated in the language of fable or myth, the story of Adam and Eve gives the start for Biblical spiritual speculations. What economics amounts to, in the simplest of terms, is the question that must be squarely answered before any scientific economics could result. Man finds himself placed in an economic situation which calls for some good qualities on his part, whether of the head or of the heart, to deal with this question in a way conducive to the good of all and the general good. Virtue and wisdom go hand in hand and are to be treated as dialectical counterparts. Individual and collective happiness have to be thought of together, and life here and hereafter in all its grades referring to the present or the future, cannot be omitted from the full scope of economics, properly understood.


As we have seen, the emergence of value through correct economic wisdom and corresponding behaviour on the part of man is what economics is studied for. In a statement such as, 'there can be a general rise of prices but there cannot be a general rise of values', which is a textbook dictum already accepted, it is easy to derive that the almost mystical or metaphysical notion of value, which has further been referred to as the touchstone of all economic theory, has or ought to have a central place in economics conceived as a science. In the notion of "net product" of Quesnay and of "surplus-value" with its subdivisions of absolute and relative values in the writings of Karl Marx, we attain to a degree of subtlety in the name of economic theory which is on a par with philosophical and theological speculations. It would be, therefore, quite in place to examine in the simplest and most abstract terms that situation which is the basis of what is known as the emergence of economic value to Man.


Man as the central core or nucleus of the situation - equally concerned with the plus and minus sides, or the subjective and the objective sides, of the relation-relata-complex involved - is the measure of good or bad economics. A good economist is one who saves both himself and others from errors in respect of human values. With the neutral and abstracted idea of a man, representing all men involved, we have to place him in his proper economically-conceived relation-relata complex. There is the good within him like a streak of gold in his heart; and there are other goods which enter into and exit from their relation-relata complex, holding interest or significance for him at a given moment or place. There is primary wealth, or preliminary or negative wealth, as well as commodities or goods with use-value, price-value or exchange-value - all of which have to be thought of together in the process of flux of economic life that repeats itself year after year, decade after decade, or century after century in human life. There will be periods of economic depression or rise, like the seasons, or like night and day.


There will also be local changes like climate, or like weather, which is temporary. Man has to be fitted and studied in his economic environment, which varies according to time and space. The alternating cycles that are normally expected and actually registered in economic life have also to be fitted into a living, normative picture of the economic life of man. All these factors have to be imagined as clinging together as if hanging by the same peg, if the normative notion desirable for regulating economic thought should be effective.

It is difficult for the mind of man to grasp all the factors that thus come to a single focus of attention, and it is therefore that we have said in an earlier section that proto-linguistics has to come to the rescue here. Charting, mapping, graphs, schematic representations with one or more factors that vary reciprocally, concurrently or in direct or inverse proportion, with a polarity, dichotomy or ambivalence; as when we are asked to think of aspects of happenings that are interdependent in economic life, such as supply and demand, collection and distribution, interest and discount etc. - all require a monadic abstract model or pattern in visualizable terms. In fact the cobweb charts now employed in equilibrium analysis have paved the way for the use of proto-linguistics as against descriptive, statistical, formal or verbal definitions etc. - which pertain to the world of language which itself requires to be further examined, verified or confirmed from a more meta-linguistic standpoint such as that of mathematics or logical calculus. (16) An algebraically-expressed formula in economic calculus would thus have a meta-linguistic character, while a graph with the use of Cartesian correlates (which is also mathematical but belongs to analytical geometry) is proto-linguistic rather than meta-linguistic. A unit economic situation in a descriptive pictorial language and the various phases of value that gold could have in relation to man have already been examined. How the same scheme could be used in other branches of precise thinking has also been explained in various articles of the present writer, ranging through education, science and even theology and logic. Like vector analysis this is a new approach that is here recommended for clarity and certitude in the language of a normalized Science of sciences for the one world of tomorrow.


Just as the sun and sunlight belong together, we have to think of economic problems subjectively and objectively at once. In a science like that of geology it might be sufficient to examine fossils or rocks microscopically or megascopically as specimens in a museum. Where human welfare and wealth are involved, we have to approach the subject more unitively; and the totality of a unit economic situation has to be first visualized in living and real terms. In trying to be positive, economics cannot afford to be merely 'objective' in the sense that Compte meant. In fact, Compte failed to bring sociology and economics within the scope of his positivism, as he himself admitted. Just as the first fall of man in the Bible is the starting point for Christian speculation which concerns the welfare of man in the life hereafter, economics has to have a simple starting point for normative thinking in what concerns good economy here on earth. Instead of relying on myth or fable for supplying this nuclear pattern of all economic thought in the name of positivism, we have to resort to another modern device which is becoming more and more accepted by modern economists themselves, which is that of the charts of equilibrium analysis. If it is conceded thus far, it would be easy to see that every simple or primary economic situation examined as a relation-relata-complex consists of four limbs comprised within two main axes of reference, referring to the space-factor and the time-factor respectively. Nothing can take place without space and time being involved in it, whether it is physical space or mental space that we are thinking of. Actual and perceptual, or even conceptual space, have here to be fitted first into a natural psycho-physical frame of reference to enable us to arrive at a norm in economics which, as we have seen, concerns the inner man and the outer man, just as much as the inner and outer 'good' which enters into economic circulations, motions or transactions. Economics means movement as well as values that have inner or outer significance.

The charge of preferring scarcity as a primary assumption in economic theory, which persists like original sin, vitiating economics from the days of the gold rush to the present-day,


and the legitimate stigma attached to this branch of knowledge as a dismal science or as mammon-worship, would be more-or-less justified if we do not give to economics the total basis on which both natural abundance and opulence artificially created through a special kind of scarcity economics, have equal place. Negative and positive wealth have to be treated together as one whole, unitively understood.

In one sense economics could be visualized simply as an event that takes place between the two sides of a counter dividing one from the many, whether persons or goods might be involved. There are goods of qualitative value and goods of quantitative value that are exchangeable in space or in time. Individual transactions and transactions on a social or national scale involve one or many counters, real or implied. Representatives of different classes derive benefits from these transactions, taking in a frame of time-space and quality-quantity factors. The man, the transaction and the complex of values involved, must all be capable of being thought of together before economic intelligence, sagacity or value-wisdom generally, could operate and could lend itself to study or intelligent scrutiny. The economic policy-maker must predict wrong or evil and remain on the right path leading to the general good and the good of all involved. The political parties of any country in their rival election manifestos invariably devote a paragraph to their economic creeds, which in their effect of dividing the people of a country amongst themselves, are as effective, if not more effective, than religious schisms. It is therefore of the utmost importance that a normative notion be supplied for this science, which otherwise would be no better than the rival religious or sectarian groups that already spell unhappiness by their very existence.


The notion of value is the touchstone of sound economic theorisation. From net product, rent, profit and interest, to the culminating notion of absolute surplus-value, aspects of value have been found much mentioned in the writings of economists from Quesnay to Karl Marx. The distinction between absolute and relative surplus-values is a mystical or metaphysical one.


The following extract from Marx's "Capital" will make the complications evident to the lay reader:

"A prolongation of the working day beyond the time during which the worker was producing no more than an equivalent of the value of his labour power, and the appropriation of this surplus-value by capital - this is the production of absolute surplus-value. It forms the general foundation of the capitalist system and the starting point of the production of relative surplus-value. The latter presupposes that the working day is already divided into two portions, necessary labour and surplus labour, the period of necessary labour is shortened by means which enable the equivalent of the wage of labour to be produced in a shorter time.

The production of absolute surplus-value depends only upon the length of the working day: the production of relative surplus-value revolutionises out and out the technical process of labour and the way in which society is subdivided into groups."(17)

In the introduction by C. D. H. Cole of Oxford, a well-known authority in English economics, he starts off by saying that "Karl Marx's 'Capital' is not an easy book to read". (18) If this is a fact with fully-trained economists, we can concede that, as far as the common-sense reader is concerned, these and similar paragraphs must remain a closed book for ever, as in the case of the most cryptic sayings of any book of theology or esoterics.

We can see the affinities of the theory implicit here to that of Hegel, which through Engels has afforded the philosophical foundation and supplied the frame of reference for Karl Marx. We have to remember that Hegelian Absolutism, when further elaborated, leads to the triple notions of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, which interact and absorb each other or one another by a mechanism, known to dialectical thought, that would take us back to pre-Socratic philosophers in the history of European thought.


It would not be a far-fetched generalization to state that Marx's "Capital" contains mystical or esoteric secret doctrines which it is not easy to analyse and state in positively clear terms, as required of any science.


The difference between the Absolute and the Relative is itself a subtle philosophical one. When Einstein's Theory of Relativity prides itself in being different from that of Newton or Euclid of classical times, the vogue in science at the present-day seems to be in favour of the non-absolutist way. Philosophers themselves have raised the slogan of the 'Decline and Fall of the Absolute'. The very first sentence of a book devoted to twentieth-century Analytical Philosophers, which bears the above slogan as the title of its first chapter, reads:

"It is a remarkable tribute to an enormously muddled but brilliant German professor of the nineteenth century that almost every important philosophical movement of the twentieth century begins with an attack on his views; I have in mind Hegel…" (19)

To use the words 'Absolute' and 'Relative', expecting the ordinary reader to grasp its implications existentially, subsistentially or in the domain of value, is thus a difficulty at first sight insurmountable. If we could make use of proto-linguistics the task at once becomes easier. We know that as between a Bradley and a Bain in the logical tradition of
England there is still a great unbridged methodological and epistemological gap. Bradley is a dialectician, but Bain still confines himself to the framework of the tradition of Aristotle, which is that of the world of syllogism. These two worlds are far apart and at the same time they interpenetrate in a subtle way. The relativistic outlook of Bain is transformed into the absolutist way of thinking in Bradley. This absolutist way, in fact, belongs to the pre-Socratic tradition of dialectical thinking;
while the relativist way belongs to the usual world of objective realities and formal relations.


To give to both the absolute and the relative their legitimate places in a total scheme is the task that we have to accomplish here without taking sides with either exclusively. This would imply a revaluation of methodology and epistemology on a total unitive basis, which we shall deal with in a later chapter.


How the Cartesian tradition was broken by the phenomenology of Hegel, further amplified by the English philosopher Hamilton, and elaborated through various stages by Husserl in recent times, is a long and complicated story which we shall not enter into. We shall content ourselves by stating that this notion of absolute surplus-value has to be fitted into some sort of post-Hegelian philosophical context if it is to have any intelligible meaning at all. Without stopping to examine whether phenomenology, in its latest form, was subscribed to directly by Marx and Engels or not; and in order to be able to fit this mystico-metaphysical theory of absolute surplus-value into its proper context; we are obliged here to build up a spatio-temporal relation-relata-complex so that we could arrive at a normative notion for the restated science of value which we have said that economics must conform to in the world of tomorrow. The following quotation from Edmund Husserl, referring to a world of facts and affairs and a world of a values, a world of goods and a practical world, which could co-exist inter-subjectively and phenomenologically, penetrating each other trans-physically in terms of intentional immanence and transcendence at once; and which could belong to any person thought of in the first, second or third persons singular or plural, masculine or feminine; representing the final stages or unconsciously affiliated - would serve for us as a spring-board to enter fully into our own further speculations leading to the finding of a scientific norm for economic thought.


"In this way, consciously awake, I find myself at all times, and without my ever being able to change this, set in relation to a world which is 'present' for me, and I myself am a member of it. Therefore this world is not there for me as a mere world of facts and affairs, but with the same immediacy, as a world of values, a world of goods, a practical world. Without further effort on my part I find the things before me furnished not only with qualities that befit their positive nature, but also with values - characters such as beautiful or ugly, agreeable, or disagreeable, pleasant or unpleasant, and so forth... These values and practicalities, they too belong to the constitution of the 'actually present' objects as such...The same considerations belong of course just as well to the men and beasts in my surroundings as to 'mere things'." (20)


On such a phenomenological basis let us now visualize the circulation of value. If economic theory turns round the notion of value and is related to good or goods in the abstract on one side, and to the mind of man who practises good economics on the other; it is but natural to see that such a notion is made to belong to its proper background, scientifically and philosophically. We have seen that Quesnay himself, who has been called the father of modern economic theory, and to whom even Adam Smith wanted to dedicate his work on the "Wealth of Nations", had his favourite notion of value which he preferred to call the net product of agriculture, understood with reference to a unit country like France. The farmer produced true wealth, as opposed to the sterile activities of the industrialists whose labours were lost in the sands of vain effort and cancelled out by price rises. Net product was a value that circulated in annual cycles, changing hands from class to class among the three main stratifications of society; cutting vertically, as it were, across these stratifications instead of merely circulating within each of them and losing itself like water in a bed of sand. This same idea of two kinds of value - one that was not true value and the other which mattered - was thus at the basis of the scheme of normal economic phenomena, even with the Physiocrats.


With Engels and Marx we see this same idea further fitted into the context of Hegelian idealism or absolutism, in spite of the materialistic and historical perspective in which Marx and Engels wished to examine the notion of absolute surplus-value. We have purposely chosen this extreme position taken by Marx for discussion here so that between Quesnay and Marx, whom we have tried to examine, we could extract two fundamental and interrelated notions, which refer to relative and absolute value.


In proto-linguistic language the relation between these two sets of values could be represented by two lines that cut at right angles. This has been developed in the language of Cartesian co-ordinates. The same graphical schematization could be adopted in economics with a great reduction of mere verbosity.

Ricardo's rent, value, interest, profit, capital and credit, and pure credit-creation by Wall Street, Lombard Street or Moscow would all fall on the plus side of the vertical axis. If we should think of the four limbs of economic life, as conventionally accepted by textbook writers, which are: land, labour, entrepreneur and capital; we could make these four factors accord with the negative-vertical, the negative-horizontal, the positive-horizontal and positive-vertical aspects, respectively, of the unit economic situation, whether applicable to small-scale individual transactions or to economic phenomena viewed in the larger historical setting of Western conditions. Unexploited land should be understood as potential or negative wealth, not thinkable of in terms of coin or currency, which refer to the horizontal aspects of wealth. Big business and commerce, justly called by Quesnay the sterile stratum, would refer to the horizontal competitive, collective and mutually distinctive aspect of value. Inflation and soaring prices are produced when this aspect of economics is strained beyond certain limits. Vertical interaction between trust and credit within healthy economic units is what is most desirable in the interests of general economic happiness or welfare for all involved in that
particular unit.


World economics has to be imagined as the harmonised and scientific expansion of the four-fold factors involved, so that there would be proportionate growth and not lopsided monstrous accretions or bloatings of one limb at the expense of the others. The preservation of the identity, purity and integrity of the peasant population is all-important, as the negative base of the vertical is the real source of all true wealth, as we shall presently explain.


When Quesnay opines that commerce and industry are unproductive of net gain for any unit norm in economics, he is merely referring to horizontal value. When, on the other hand, Karl Marx refers to absolute surplus-value, he refers to the emergence of a subtle qualitative abstraction in the world of value which makes its effect felt in the total historical or social setting of any considerably large area treated as an economic unit. This is vertical value. This is like the cream that comes to the top of a can of milk, or like the honey that is stored by bees as extra when all the wants of the individuals of the bee-hive, whether drone, worker or queen, have been satisfied - this is also the share of the credit-making financier. Wealth has a habit of getting polarised as credit in centres of high finance, while the polar counterpart of the same wealth could exist in a negative, potential form in far-flung corners of the globe. Sheep that graze on the meadows of Australia are the real wealth of which the credit available in banks is only a poor reflection. Money does not multiply, but when sheep multiply, their reflection in the form of abstract credit could bear interest, to make credit ascend or descend vertically to serve human wants. Thus there is a return of rent paid to the landlord and to the farmer, as Quesnay in his "Tableau Economique" has made abundantly clear. Thus there is too, inevitably, a circulation of wealth in which it changes over from goods to cash of various grades and orders known to economic textbooks as commodity, consumer goods, produce etc. It is hard to imagine all the phases, virtual or actual, positive or potentially negative, as referring to time or space, as price-value or use-value. The course of value-transformation or metamorphosis is a mystery which none except the most gifted of intuitive persons can clearly visualize.


In broad outline, however, it is possible to generalise and state that the course of value describes a kind of figure-of-eight in its changeover or alternation between the four aspects of value that we have postulated.

One has to see the circulation of wealth in Quesnay's "Tableau" first, and then one has to fit this circulation into the four-limbed phenomenological world of values that we have outlined, (supported by the quotation from Husserl above). Finally, one has to visualize the emergence of absolute surplus-value as a result of action that is brought to bear on the total economic situation in the form of brute labour coming from the workman's muscles; and that subtler vertical counterpart of the same labour-principle, conceived in the abstract as a social, qualitative, historically necessary element - which is the use-value as opposed to the price-value of a product. The coat that a tailor makes to fit a particular man has a limited and personal or qualitative use-value; while ten yards of linen, which might cost the same as the coat made by the tailor, has a general quantitative price-value.

The use-value is thus a vertical factor while the price-value of ten yards of linen, which is exchangeable with the coat (as Marx points out through these favourite examples), is a horizontal factor.

Many other examples are possible, and it would be hard for the reader to extract the difference between these two sets of values - which it is most important to distinguish - without a proto-linguistic frame of reference. Every notion of value has implied in it four distinct aspects which have always to be kept in mind together before any conscious economic thinking or planning could take place, whether on a small or large scale, or on a short term or long term. The course that gold, as a visible economic factor, takes to enter into human affairs and effect its exit, after functioning as different values, vertical or horizontal, positive or negative, has been examined by us in Chapter 10. In it we have also tried in an initial fashion to indicate in the form of a table the same four aspects of a primitive or simple unit economic situation.


In that chapter we accomplished little more than to come in sight of the bare outlines of a normative notion in economics as a science of values in human life here. Now we have to draw further definitions, clarifications and schematic representations from these initial fundamental factors outlining this normative notion, where otherwise much false doctrine and consequent charlatanism could prevail in respect of this elusive subject.


The first step is to place man in his proper economic environment, conceived in terms of value. As the sun and the world lit by sunlight belong together, we have to imagine a phenomenological world of values of which the core is man himself. Man is the measure of all things: particularly so when, in economics, we are directly concerned with making man happy. The one and the many, the general good and the good of all, have to be fitted together as reciprocal aspects of the same dialectically-conceived verity. When all are happy, the individual is happy; and when individual happiness is not guaranteed, collective programmes of happiness or welfare would defeat their own purposes.


There is a time-axis and a space axis: with either of these as reference we could think of an axiological world. A planned economy cannot consciously give primacy both to the world of opulence and to that of abundance at the same time. Two rival gods cannot be propitiated by the same prayer. There is an innate reciprocity and an inverse variation between these two ambivalent aspects of economic life.

We have used the terminology of analytical geometry to refer to these aspects proto-linguistically as the vertical and horizontal aspects of value. A series of value-worlds could lie along these axes.


One could think of something like units or monads in economics, which could be graded quantitatively along the two axes with their positive and negative polarities. We have already referred to these four aspects in passing. In the next
section we shall examine them in greater detail and try to define them more precisely, insofar as such definitions could be indulged in without a fuller treatment in a regular treatise, which the subject fully deserves. Leaving such a task for someone better qualified and to the future, we shall here content ourselves with finally indicating the circulation of value in the economic world so that the normative notion that we are attempting to usher into view may have that living element without which economics would lack any reference to living movements as such, and give us only a static picture instead of a dynamic one. Good economics must spell progress and a life more abundant. The goal of economics must be to free man from want or suffering both inner and outer. Here its programme might have common boundaries with that of spirituality, though not with any static and closed religion as such. True economics, when it works, takes man from a lower world of values to a higher one, in a vertically conceived scale of value-worlds. There are lower worlds of negative wealth which have also to be given their legitimate place in the polarised worlds of values, so that we could plan both an abundancist and an opulencist economics - without, however, compromising the mutual exclusiveness of these value-worlds. The innate contradiction between the two can be transcended by a unitive approach, which would make economics the preserve of the expert of experts. The relation-relata-complex of value- factors, in which economics has to live and move when properly understood, has to avoid major errors and consequent disasters. Sometimes opposite effects can accrue from pressures wrongly applied in the delicate set-up of economic life. One has, in fact, to be greater than a yogi to be a fully sure economist. A planned economy is generally full of pitfalls. If the country subjected to a planned economy still survives it is not unlike the patient living in spite of the wrong remedies applied by the doctor. Ascending and descending economic policies can be applied only by way of adjusting the internal conditions of a country with its external relations, so that a favourable balance could be struck, and progressive pressure maintained with an eye to different kinds of human values.


If, after the reading of this fourth section, the reader would concede that there are two distinct economic worlds of human value: one of abundance and the other of opulence; and that there are between them two axes of reference where positive and negative value-factors reside; and also concede that in broad terms there is an alternating circulation, measurable in decade or century units, of a kind which has to be kept healthy in good economics for any economic unit to function - the rambling discussion that we have been obliged to adopt hitherto would have served its initial purpose. Above all, it is for a law of economics to recognise that the innate ambivalence makes it impossible for an abundancist economics to be consciously planned side-by-side with an economics of opulence.




We propose in this last section to try and arrive at indicating, though in a preliminary fashion only, the principles, laws and definite notions that must underlie economics if it is to be recognized as a science. We shall adopt a decimal system of numbers for the systematic taxonomy of these items, examined in a graded fashion.

1. Economics is a branch of axiology. It refers to human values both inner and outer.

1. 1. Economics is a science of value-wisdom as it refers to life here, as opposed to life hereafter, where we are more properly in the domain of religion.

1. 2. A Utopia or a heaven, which refer respectively to ideal conditions of life here or hereafter, are envisaged by rival enthusiasts who propose to better the lot of human beings.

1. 3. The danger of tenaciously adhering to favourite items of such programmes of values, is common to both these sets of enthusiasts. Superstitious creeds and dogmatic or doctrinal orthodoxy could vitiate both fields, except when looked upon with a living human aloofness and dispassion, without selfish axes to grind. Both of these fields offer equal opportunities for charlatans.


1. 41. Good economics, as it applies to a given unit, could yield either opulence or abundance, but not both, except by very rare coincidence.

1. 42. The difference between these two economic worlds is like a mirror image and its original. They form complex value-systems, both at the pole of opulence and at that of abundance.

1. 43. Prices can be artificially raised or lowered by economic planning, but the one value that spells human happiness is to be understood as a state of balance, equilibrium, stability or harmony between the forces of satisfaction and the wants that operate within a unit economic situation.

1. 44. In the absence of a normative unit notion of value, the idea of raising the standard of life can have no meaning. Raising the standard might be at the expense of abundance and in favour of opulence, which must spell economic insecurity, instability or lopsided progress - which is only progress in appearance.

1. 45. Price-value depends on exchangeability in the market; and use-value is of intrinsic significance for single individuals. The former may be called horizontal while the latter is vertical.

1. 46. There are values that yield short-term benefits to an individual or group, which are horizontal; and those which give long-term benefits may initially be broadly distinguished as vertical.

1. 47. Inner and outer values in life meet from opposite poles in the self, which is the absolute value that each human represents to himself.

2. A happy human being is the normative goal of economic endeavour. Collective happiness is only the resultant of individual happiness.

2. 1. The individual is only happy when he makes another happy or works for the general happiness of mankind.

2. 2. Unilateral economic transactions bringing benefit to one party while making another a loser, violate the most fundamental of all economic laws, viz., that all economics is for both parties in any transaction.

2. 21. Aggrandisement, selfishness, domination, explanation and injustice are various attributes signifying the absurdity involved in one-sided or dualistically-conceived economics. Charlatanism, cheating and robbery are also applicable in such dealings, in actual or figurative language.

2. 2. Absolute value has no limbs; it refers to a state of felicity when all concerned are, and each concerned is, happy at once and forever. Wealth has four limbs: production-consumption and trust-credit. The former pair represents the plus and minus sides of the horizontal, and the latter the negative and positive aspects of the vertical.

2. 3. Normal, perfect and economically healthy circulation of wealth is when all the above four aspects alternate as successive phases of the economic cycle of activity.

2. 4. Sterile circulation tends to be wholly horizontal, while productive circulation passes through vertical levels. Surplus-value is an abstraction which gains its meaning with reference to an absolutist or verticalized notion of wealth.

3. Pure values are those that have unity of ends and means. When means and ends are divorced, wealth becomes pillage or booty.

3. 1. Wealth is best when it is self-sufficient. The resulting value is human happiness.


3. 2. Capital is credit ready to support economic undertakings.

3. 3. Trust is what ensures endurance and security to wealth.

3. 4. Price, money, currency, exchange-value and token-value are aspects of wealth as it moves or circulates horizontally.

3. 41. Bank rates have their plus and minus aspects tending to come to balance or equilibrium as between interest and discount.

3. 42. Short-term and long-term economic transactions compensate or contradict each other by virtue of the principle of double gain or double loss.

4. The dialectics of the one and the many is involved in all economics. This is most evident in insurance, which involves no visible goods in its transactions. Advertising is for the broadening of the basis of the implicit dialectics of the one and the many. The business counter is the point where the limbs of business, involving one-and-the-many relations of long-term or short-term duration, have their locus, both abstract and concrete. Time compensates for space, and quality for quantity etc. at this locus.

4. 1. A normative notion in economics is like a monad or a Monad of all monads conceivable or possible as units in economic life. We have to distinguish between monads in which horizontal aspects dominate over the vertical and the positive over the negative, in each of the axes of reference. These monads might be supposed to exist in vectorial space in
terms of tensor theory, giving room to absolute or relative monads or the Monad of all monads. For the sake of simplicity we have to conceive of them as belonging to a flat surface consisting of two correlates - time or interval being the absolute element involved. The elaboration of this kind of economic monadology based on the four limbs of economic activity is mostly the work of future experts who accept the basis of the above.


4. 2. In "The Wealth of Nations" of Adam Smith and in the "Tableau Economique" of Quesnay, some unit country is kept in mind, which is mostly arbitrary. The Quesnay unit is more natural and normal than the 'nation' vaguely considered by Adam Smith, which would more really only apply to the mercantilist units in the economic life of such places as London, The Hague or Rotterdam and regions around them. So-called "economically under-developed" units have wealth only for exploitation by the so-called "developed" nations, according to such notions. To the extent that this notion of wealth is not normalized it is not right to think in terms of it.

4. 3. The number of happy individuals that a state can produce is the real measure of its economic well-being.

4. 4. Happiness has to be judged with its natural human counterparts. No mother could be considered wealthy if her child is poor, no king without his subjects, no master without his servant, no husband without his wife etc. Unilaterally-conceived riches, wealth, money or happiness as an over-all
value, has no sense. It is absurd.

4. 5. If the food that is grown in a country is not available to the mouths of its inhabitants to feed on in a normal and natural way, an economic absurdity of lack of living correlation of value takes place. Human intelligence often causes more trouble by mechanistic arrangements of production and distribution for money-profit, making the human lot worse than before. A fishwife on a coral island cannot get the coconut that grows near her hut, because of its money- and exchange-value which makes it beyond her economic reach. Horizontal forces cut across the peace and self-sufficiency that would have naturally prevailed when vertical forces are left alone. The laissez-faire policy has herein its justification.


4. 6. The outcome of horizontal economic endeavour is competition and that of the vertical is co-operation.

4. 7. When two farmers resort to litigation, both lose what each should have gained vertically by agriculture. A double loss or gain is implied which is dialectical in its implications. The children of both might starve instead both having abundance.

4. 8. A State Reserve Bank employee has a higher standard of living conditions when in service; but his children become homeless when he retires and there are scenes of weeping on that day. Long-term security is not always implied in a higher standard of life.

4. 9. The constant insecurity of the fear of being fired or laid off at short notice often stares in the face of people who enjoy a very high standard of life. This is poverty entering by the back door when the life of getting and spending gets a horizontal accentuation. Such a life is full of tension and exacting on the nerves.

4. 91. Working women in cold countries are often thrown out of city tenements for not being able to pay winter heating expenses in advance by a certain date in autumn. Long-term insecurity is a keen form of poverty, hidden under high standards of day-to-day individual living.

5. The dialectics of the one and the many, when it acts in conjunction with the principle of economic intervals of short-term or long-term changes of value, gives us the normative notion of what constitutes the core of economic life.

5. 1. To decide controversial questions, like the one that has been recently engaging rival schools of expert economists in London, on whether the European Common Market would improve the economics of each country involved or not, they have to be first viewed in the perspective of the vertico-horizontal complex involved. The broad-based perspective of the relations of the one and the many would spell gain, but individual nations might lose much during the transition.


5. 2. Advertising is a supreme example of how, by broadening the basis of the one and the many and by intensifying by repetition the value-aspect of some good or goods, monopolistic economic domains are built up. Here no goods need be involved, only ideas.

5. 21. A news agency or advertising firm, having advertising itself for its own sake as its item of business, shows how economics can thrive on airy nothings.

5. 22. Film advertising thrives on the features of a film star, which is a flimsy basis in itself.

5. 3. Banking and insurance thrive on mere bookkeeping, and that with other people's money. It is strange to hear, in spite of this, that religious mendicants who take after the example of a Christ or a Buddha, preaching the Kingdom of God or Dharma for all humanity without any return gain, are considered by modern plan-economists, even in India, as economic liabilities rather than assets. There is a strange irony here.

5. 4. Some holy cities of the East and some civilised ones of the West, thrive on exaggerations of sacredness or sin as their main article in trade. Prostitution as well as holiness could both be flourishing industries of a questionable character.

5. 5. Mere lewdness or obscenity could sometimes take the place of an article of trade. It breeds sterility or immoral prosperity without true economic goods.

5. 6. A man of good repute anywhere is an economic asset. A woman is more so.

5. 7. The correct way of getting and spending is represented by the model economic man characterised by parsimony, right abstinence and a wholehearted love of the general welfare and the welfare of all, and whose only added gain to himself is a life more abundant in every way.


5. 8. Gandhi and Tolstoy and all leading saints of all climes and times have had great economic forces implied in them, linking the one with the many, broad-basedly for enduring time-spans.

5. 9. Economics is as much for man as man is for economics. Economic ends and means have their meeting point in him.

6. Credit and Trust accrue round persons or corporations with the value called goodwill, which is a great economic good. Goods are only secondary in importance. Production and distribution take place when credit meets trust.

6. 1. Prodigals and fortune-hunters belong to the credit side, while misers and hoarders belong to the trust side.

6. 2. Trust could be lost, as with sterling now; and credit could be dishonestly created, as attempted through the ECM. World opinion can affect the combined structure and make it burst like a bubble.

6. 3. A carefree life in natural abundance is worth more than the life of a multi-millionaire ready to commit suicide from his skyscraper window.

6. 4. Grains and eatables hidden under bamboo beds make more real wealth than refrigerators containing only half a bottle of Coca-Cola.

6. 5. Winter in the West represents an accumulated weight of poverty unknown in warm climates and lands filled with mud huts and people in rags. A good climate is for all, and is not to be measured in money-value.

6. 6. Market fluctuations are either due to a spatial or a temporal scarcity of wanted goods. Both these factors could exist together with their four limbs so that inflation becomes an economic mystery. Conscious remedies due to 'experts' often make the patient die earlier.


6. 7. Lloyd's Bank represents merely the reflected glory of the sheep that graze in the pastures of Australia. The labour is on the part of the grazing sheep.

6. 8. Abstract labour as well as surplus-value are metaphysical
abstractions used by writers on economic theory. Mathematically, there is vertical and horizontal labour. These produce positive or negative values of price or of use.

6. 9. A woman conceiving and giving birth involves negative vertical labour. A man digging is in travail of a positive kind in the horizontal. When treated as recreation they become interchangeable and cancel-out naturally in the joy of living.

7. Work becomes no work when it becomes natural and enjoyable.

7. 01. The iron law of subsistence wage-levels marks the horizontal line of separation between the world of opulence and that of abundance. Economically-advanced countries tend to be poor abundancistically and underdeveloped countries tend to be poor in opulence that can only express itself by its streamlined bursting-balloon glory of emptiness.

7. 1. The ascending of wealth into the domain of symbolic credit and its descent to meet necessities and to exist again, stored in the form of potential trust, have to be visualized imaginatively before a programme of peace and prosperity could be spelt by finance ministers of any economic unit of a country or community.

7. 2. Roads and communications could by themselves be good as well as evil at the same time. Bandits as well as benefactors could enter protected areas by these means. Why should there be fortifications if easy communications are all for good?


7. 3. Taxation, tariff walls and trust monopolies imply barriers of dubious value in world economics. Indirect taxation shares in profit unjustly, resulting in a state compromising its own prosperity or creating a unit within another unit, each countering the interests the other.

7. 4. A World Bank might be a name for an illegitimate monopoly of credit.

7. 5. Contraband traffic, cartels and created credit are signs of the times indicating a world economic crisis.

7. 51. The ascending pyramid of credit draws people upward into sterile domains of more and more getting and spending.

7. 6. Unemployment and leisure refer to the same state of affairs. One is hardly distinguishable from the other. When unitively treated both are good. Dualistically treated, both become separate problems, one accentuating the evil of the other.

7. 7. The honesty of limited liability is questionable.

7. 8. A simple breach of trust can be implied in coming off the gold standard when that was not understood in the beginning.

7. 9. Hard currency, key currency and other such terms which are given consideration, often affect the settlement of internal debts unfairly by bringing in artificial considerations or concessions that give the advantage to some and disadvantage to others.

8. Economic theories like that of population control end in dogmatisms that refuse to die, even when proved to be superstitions.


8. 1. Celibacy is held up as a virtue or sign of holiness like Immaculate Conception within certain types of religious belief. The same aversion to procreation persists as family planning, when refracted through the orthodoxy of some Protestant sects whose priests are allowed to marry. Even scientists do not escape this influence and talk with a quasi-religious fervour when they speak of normal sex in men or women and the need for its control.

8. 2. Every decent textbook of economics devotes at least a paragraph to say that Malthusian ideas, which originated with priests, have long been disproved scientifically - but the idea persists and continues to haunt the minds of people who want to save nations. The fact that other intelligent nations like China and Russia pay mothers for adding to their population shows how opinion is based on mere false prudery or a sense of guilt or sin in sex. When Hitler employed this method of population control to exterminate races that he hated personally, as known through the Eichman evidence, why should it be over-suspicious to think that foreigners could use this against their enemies, actual or potential?

8. 3. Birds migrate; plants distribute their seeds far and wide to survive; but man is at his wit's end about living space for his progeny, when half the surface of the green earth is still vacant. Experts would make the common man believe that there is no standing space on the earth. Hundreds of thousands of acres are said by expert opinion, in the same newspapers at the same time, to be available to be given to the poor to cultivate, even in states like Kerala which is supposed to suffer from overpopulation. To think of killing future progeny to solve this problem that does not really exist can only be called suicidal madness.

8. 4. There is no good so precious as a young and growing human being, male or female. Let anyone challenge this statement.


8. 5. When there is too much fish it is used as manure, but when too many humans are born they say no use could be found for them. No wonder sensitive persons have called economics a dismal science.

8. 6. Tariff walls, curtains, barriers and impediments by permits needed, by licenses and papers of all kinds, make of the world a prison house instead of a place for the common man to live freely and seek his normal happiness as a human being. The world is tending to resemble a big concentration camp. All wrong impediments must go. Slavery is not yet abolished. It persists more keenly in other forms.

8. 7. Bread and freedom must be guaranteed for happiness, both general and individual. The Bible must be at least as important for a sinner as a loaf of bread now. The former refers to a vertical need, which must be met in horizontal terms of everyday life. Bread without freedom and freedom without bread defeat the purpose of both and either. Economics has to be approached dialectically, not with a unilateral aim.

8. 8. Pure factors like credit and trust must translate themselves into actual benefits in everyday life by the contract of "all for one and one for all". The quantitative slogan, "the greatest good of the greatest number", would then be seen to be meaningless. Everybody should be considered his human brother's keeper.

8. 9. A sum of money could be spent in two different ways for the benefit of others - by fractional benefit to many and full benefit for a few. The calculation should be based on life-units' needs rather than mechanistically, as illustrated in the parable of the talents in the Bible. Funds of public bodies, often spent neither for individuals nor for humanity at large, tend to become absurd waste. The Kingdom of God could be interpreted economically as belonging to the regions here below, instead of the prevailing relativism, which introduces barriers of both time and space in respect of the benefits of life - barriers which should be replaced by absolute sharing in full generosity.


10. 1. The highest form of co-operation is unlimited liability between the one and the many, understood dialectically. This will yield double gain where now double loss prevails.

10. 2. Money-centred scarcity economics cannot escape the nickname of mammon-worship that has been applied to it. The dismal science becomes lighted up with hope when the good of human beings is kept in mind. Topsy-turvy economics, by placing a wrong accent on human values, is to be avoided. The goal of economics determines its character, as a tree is known by its fruit.

10. 3. "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need" is a dialectical verity to be applied to economic theory more and more. Mechanistic and statistical approaches cannot accommodate this verity.

10. 4. The quadrants involved in economic life tend to make the science full of possibilities, probabilities and incertitudes. The science of economics must be restated dialectically, normatively and absolutely with the fourfold aspects of value cohering together in living terms.

10. 5. The hunger of one man, woman or child in the remotest corner of the world must concern all men at all times and all human resources must be applied to it. Such is the desideratum of One-World Economics.

10. 6. Putting up economic barriers against fellow men is a crime against humanity.

10. 7. Class distinctions spell sterility of wealth and its stagnation within stratifications in human society, which must be kept mixed and homogenous for economic health. Caste or race notions create complicated economic boxes one within another.


10. 8. The honey in a beehive represents the surplus-value coming from an agreement between one bee and the whole hive.

11. Man and Humanity must be treated as dialectical counterparts if One-World Economics is to be a science, referring to the general good and the good of all at one and the same time.


The items given in this article are to be treated as broad indications for showing the lines along which any future revision of economics on a One-World basis is to be envisaged in a complete treatise, which is largely the work for the future student. We give below (see page 145) some schematic representations with reference to items above. A general reference to the whole way of looking at economic theory is implied throughout.